INFLUENCE PEDDLING IN WASHINGTON

HARDLY any Administration is free of scandal. Harry Truman had T. Lamar Caudle and assorted "five-percenters." Dwight Eisenhower had Sherman Adams and his vicuna coat. Lyndon Johnson had Bobby Baker--and Abe Fortas. To a cynical public, the recurrent surfacing of peculators and huggermuggers suggests that almost everyone in Washington is on the take. The truth is more reassuring, though bad enough. The capital does tolerate unsavory practices that could and should be stopped.

If it is any consolation, moral standards in Washington have rarely been higher than they are today. For most of the last century, many famous politicians were plainly crooks. During Andrew Jackson's fight against the Second Bank of the U.S., Daniel Webster, Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun sold their votes and oratory to the bank. In the Civil War, great fortunes were hatched from corrupt federal contracts. Early in the 20th century, the National Association 'of Manufacturers bought Congressmen and influenced appointments to key committees. Nothing since has matched the gall of Harding's Interior Secretary Albert B. Fall, who pocketed $268,000 in the Teapot Dome caper.

Influence is the Washington grail. In a sense, influence peddling is what democracy is all about. The voter who complains to his Congressman about air pollution is peddling his influence, though far less openly than an industry promoting a tax break. The conflict between group interests, which defines U.S. politics, has also produced an army of expert lobbyists, many of whom actually improve lawmaking by carefully analyzing bills that help or hurt their clients. On some issues, lobbyists cancel one another out, and the merits decide the case. Unfortunately, the game lacks adequate rules.

The U.S. Code requires the registration of all lobbyists who plead before Congress, but the law is so full of loopholes that probably more do not register than do. Until this year, one of the most effective lobbies, the National Rifle Association, did not consider it necessary to admit that it was any such thing. Powerful individual lobbyists like Lawyers Clark Clifford, Thomas G. Corcoran and Abe Fortas in his precourt days earn their high fees by dealing directly with important friends. A phone call is often all that is needed. During the Truman era, James V. Hunt was able to do wonders for aspiring Government contractors by calling his friend General Harry Vaughan, Truman's military aide. Though no evidence of a direct payoff was uncovered, Vaughan did receive a freezer from one of Hunt's clients, and the Democratic Party was the recipient of numerous gifts. A few years later, Boston Industrialist Bernard Goldfine gave a vicuna coat to Sherman Adams, Eisenhower's chief White House aide, who intervened for Goldfine with two regulatory agencies. Again, there was no evidence of a payoff, but Adams was forced to resign. Lobbyist Julius Klein had such a grip on Senator Thomas Dodd that he was able to write him bullying instructions. It is probably neither possible nor desirable to curb the lobbyists, but how can public servants be protected from temptation?

Federal judges are rightly expected to meet the most stringent standards. Not only do almost all have lifetime appointments, but they also have unique powers over both the legislative and executive branches. On most matters, they have the final word. Almost none of the 98 justices who have sat on the Supreme Court have ever done anything even questionable, and the nation's highest tribunal has been uniquely free of outside influence.

The same cannot be said of the other two branches. For one thing, many political appointees go in and out of Government and acquire close friends on both sides of the fence. Some are skilled lawyers who see nothing unusual in asking large fees (reportedly up to $1,000,000 by Clark Clifford) during their out periods for discreetly pleading a client's case behind the bureaucratic fac,ade.

It is hard to find an ex-aide of Lyndon Johnson's who has not gone to a firm that solicits work from the Government, and there is a long list of men who have served on regulatory agencies and later represented clients before those very same agencies. Last year the Civil Aeronautics Board completely reversed the recommendations of its own examiners in handing out lucrative trans-Pacific routes, largely favoring airlines whose officers or lobbyists had connections with the Democratic Party. Richard Nixon has since vetoed the deal; whether Republican-oriented airlines win the next round remains to be seen.

The 100 top defense contractors have found it prudent to hire 2,072 retired military officers, three times the number of ten years ago. General Dynamics, No. 1 in dollar contracts, employs 113; Lockheed, No. 2, no fewer than 210. The relationship is not necessarily sinister. Ex-generals have as much right to sell their expertise as anyone else. Long before he retires, though, a procurement officer may have difficulty being tough on a company that is looking him over as a possible employee. One solution would be for Congress to bar military men from working for defense contractors for at least two years after retirement.

Unhappily, Congress itself violates the most elementary rules of conduct. In the early 1960s, for example, Missouri Senator Edward Long accepted $160,000 from a lawyer who had spent most of his life representing gangsters and gamblers. Finally persuaded to look into the matter, the Senate ethics committee found nothing wrong.

While pouncing on the slightest skulduggery in the executive branch, Congress sees nothing wrong with its members accepting campaign cash from special interests, owning stock in companies that depend on Government contracts or receiving profits from law firms whose clients need a friend in power. Last week, acting under a code drawn up in 1968, members of the House partially disclosed some of their outside interests. Limited as it was, the information was startling. About two-thirds of the 435 members of the House have substantial financial interests other than their salaries. No fewer than 92 are officers, directors or stockholders in banks or other financial institutions, while 87 have ties with law firms; 61 are stockholders in companies with major defense contracts. Ten Congressmen with direct connections to financial institutions sit on the House Banking and Currency Committee, six on the Ways and Means Committee; both committees pass on legislation that profoundly affects banking institutions across the country. If that is not a conflict of interest, what is?

If nothing else, the obvious abuses ought to be ended. No member of the House Banking and Currency Committee should be the director of a bank; it is questionable whether he should even vote on banking legislation. All high-ranking public servants should disclose their assets and their outside incomes. None of this would ensure honesty. None of it would guarantee that a Supreme Court justice would not have questionable dealings. It would, however, be a start and a sign that the people will no longer accept conduct that embarrasses the Republic.

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