THE FUTURE OF FRANCO-U.S. RELATIONS

CHARLES DE GAULLE had a genius for infuriating Americans on questions large and little. He frustrated grand designs for transatlantic harmony and military cooperation: he withdrew French forces from NATO, ordered U.S. troops out of France and built a costly independent nuclear deterrent, the force de frappe. Though a giant of his times, he could be petty on the smallest matter; three years ago, he refused to permit the annual memorial service for U.S. Army Sergeant Larry Kelly, fatally wounded in the liberation of Paris, to be held at the Invalides, the French national shrine that was its customary site. For a time, while the U.S. tried to keep relations between the two countries from getting worse, American tourism in France fell off, and an occasional U.S. restaurateur made news by dumping his supply of French wines into the gutter.

Yet even before De Gaulle fell last week, the Franco-American freeze was thawing. The U.S. bombing halt in North Viet Nam, coupled with the opening of peace talks in Paris, eased one major cause of tension. De Gaulle's own position lost some of its majesty, both within and outside France, after the student riots a year ago and the autumn monetary crisis that almost forced devaluation of the franc. De Gaulle had courted the Soviet Union during a triumphal tour in 1966 and had implicitly excluded the U.S. from his often-stated vision of a Europe "united from the Atlantic to the Urals." But his policy of detente with the U.S.S.R. suffered a violent setback when Soviet tanks invaded Czechoslovakia, and French critics of NATO suddenly fell silent. Rapprochement was further advanced by Richard Nixon's European trip in February, which he used to affirm both his personal admiration for the general and the continuing U.S. friendship for France.

Increased Flexibility. At the time, Nixon's tour seemed to be little more than a welcome gesture of reconciliation with Western European leaders who felt neglected by the Johnson Administration's preoccupation with Asia. The new U.S. President had no way of knowing that De Gaulle's political demise was imminent but, as it turned out, Nixon's timing was lucky. With De Gaulle's departure, Europe's statesmen must reappraise their direction. Nixon's meetings with the British, the Germans, the Belgians and the Italians, which seemed perfunctory at the time, may now turn out to have prepared the way for a significant U.S. consultative role in the shaping of Europe after De Gaulle.

President Nixon responded to the news of De Gaulle's defeat by writing a letter of regret and repeating his invitation to the general to visit the U.S., now as a private citizen. Said Nixon: "I have greatly valued the frank and comprehensive exchanges of views it has been my privilege to have with you." U.S. foreign policy experts responded cautiously to De Gaulle's debacle. "We've got a whole new ball game," said one, but nobody is yet certain of the game's exact rules. One thing at least is clear: De Gaulle's resignation will not automatically produce fundamental or necessarily rapid change.

De Gaulle may have led the opposition to excessive American influence on Western Europe, but he was not alone among Europeans in his objections. Given the enormous Western European advances in prosperity and stability since he came to power in 1958, there is no prospect that Europe will now revert to a position of dependence on and subservience to the U.S. such as prevailed 15 and 20 years ago. Georges Pompidou, De Gaulle's likely successor and a seasoned Gaullist (see THE WORLD), may bring a more flexible approach to the government of France but will not soon alter its fundamental doctrines. Pompidou is by no means unfriendly to the U.S. He said last week: "I have always been conscious of the ties of Franco-American friendship, which are as much a matter of the heart as they are of good sense. Perhaps we should pay more attention to the good sense." He believes that relations between the U.S. and France are improving and adds: "I hope to continue to work in this direction."

All-Azimuth Defense. Possibly Pompidou or another new President of France will relax De Gaulle's pro-Arab stance in the Middle East. This would simplify the task of the U.S., Britain and the Soviet Union in proposing an Arab-Israeli settlement during the current four-power discussions. France's next President, whoever he is, probably will not bring French forces back into NATO or soon abandon the force de frappe. De Gaulle emphasized that French defenses had been reoriented to repel an attack from any direction: from the U.S.S.R., from a European neighbor --even from the U.S. Before last week's voting, however, Air Force General Michel Fourquet, the French armed forces Chief of Staff, suggested that De Gaulle's "all-azimuth" defense policy be abandoned in favor of closer military cooperation with NATO.

Foreign policy questions were not paramount in De Gaulle's defeat. Obviously, though, not even the strongest successor will have the stature at home or abroad to perpetuate the haughty independence that was De Gaulle's personal panache. French policy on the Common Market and defense may change simply because it has to, because French leadership after De Gaulle probably will not be strong enough to make continued defiance of France's neighbors stick. Sooner or later, West Germany, which can already claim greater prosperity and a sounder currency than France, will assume more influence. Even divided, Germany will likely regain its historic role as the Continent's strongest nation west of Russia.

Shouldered Burden. One result of this shifting balance could well be a French decision to bring Britain into the Common Market as a counterweight to the increasingly potent neighbor across the Rhine. De Gaulle favored a "Europe of nation-states" and doubted that political union was possible or desirable. The U.S. has long backed British membership, as have France's five Common Market partners; Pompidou has already indicated that he thinks British entry is not forever out of the question. If the French now help to make Britain more firmly a part of Europe, what may finally come about is a unified Western Europe strong enough to be independent of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

While that cannot happen overnight, Western Europe may finally be able to cooperate in taking over much of its own defense--thus shouldering more of the huge military burden that the U.S. has carried since the cold war began. "The shape of Europe's future is essentially the business of the Europeans," Richard Nixon has observed. If De Gaulle's return to Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises clears the way for a new Western European consensus outside his outsized shadow, the U.S. may finally see what it set out to achieve after World War II: a Continent once more self-sustaining, at peace with itself and the world.

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