Those Sanctuaries

Few statesmen have proved themselves so adept at befuddling--and occasionally exasperating--the U.S. as Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia's head of state and Southeast Asia's most accomplished political juggler. The Prince's dervish foreign policy has earned him the almost automatic and somewhat derogatory appellation "mercurial." Yet Sihanouk maintains that there is method and consistency of purpose in his maneuvering: to ensure Cambodia's continued survival as an independent, neutral nation in stormy Southeast Asia. As he said recently: "Whether I swing toward the right or to the left is my concern, because I work only in the interests of my country."

Last week the Prince announced a major policy shift, one that has been in the making for some time. He declared that he would resume diplomatic relations with the U.S., ruptured almost four years ago after violations of Cambodia's borders by U.S. and South Vietnamese troops.* Sihanouk's announcement followed a U.S. pledge of recognition and respect for Cambodia's independence "within its present frontiers"--a commitment the Prince has long demanded from Washington as the price of resuming diplomatic ties.

Infiltration Worries. The main reason for the rapprochement can be found in the evolution of the Viet Nam war and its spillover into Cambodia and Laos. Over the past six months, the Prince has become increasingly concerned about the presence of thousands of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops on Cambodian soil. With a Viet Nam settlement a possibility, he wants to call attention to the intruders--if only to make sure that he will not be stuck with them when the war ends. In 1954, when the French Indo-China War ended, he managed to negotiate the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Cambodia; he seems to be setting the stage for a similar maneuver now. "There are Vietnamese infiltrating Cambodia, and I am deeply worried," says the Prince. After years of denying the presence of Communist forces in his country, that was quite a public admission by Sihanouk.

North Vist Nam and the Viet Cong began using Cambodia and Laos as conduits for manpower and arms early in the war. Eventually the Communists set up sanctuaries inside the two countries for rest, regroupment and tactical movement. The allies used airborne, side-looking radar, electronic listening devices and ground patrols to keep track of Communist movement. The Pentagon's belief is that more than three Communist divisions are now operating out of Cambodia and that more than two divisions are deployed in Laos.

Diplomatic Liabilities. A little more than a year ago, General Creighton Abrams, now the U.S. commander in Viet Nam, ruled out the idea of large allied ground forays against Communist concentrations outside Viet Nam as too fraught with diplomatic liabilities; he also maintained that they made "no military sense." But undoubtedly the problem troubles him greatly: every time the subject of Cambodia comes up, says one source close to Abrams, he "clenches his teeth." More than a few U.S. commanders would like nothing better now than to take a crack at the sanctuaries, wherever they might be. "It is axiomatic that if you are going to defeat guerrillas, you have to deny them their base areas," says one general.

The allies so far have launched no major ground operations in Cambodia and Laos. Their activities, except for aerial bombardment in Laos, are essentially confined to small, mixed U.S.-South Vietnamese patrols that steal across the border to pinpoint Communist concentrations. In Laos, such reconnoitered targets usually come under quick air attack; U.S. bombers fly about 300 sorties a day into that country with the tacit approval of neutralist Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma.

In Cambodia, where the U.S. does not bomb, except for tactical strikes against gun positions that fire into South Viet Nam, the patrols carry out scouting and occasional sabotage against Communist bases. There is no military coordination as such between the allies and the 35,000-man Cambodian army. But along parts of the border, the two sides have reached "local accommodations"--including at least one instance of Cambodian artillery support for a beleaguered South Vietnamese outpost. Some intelligence information has also been exchanged. Indeed, Cambodian troops have been involved in small skirmishes with Communist forces. For all that, Sihanouk is not likely to permit sizable allied units to cross the border and go after Communist sanctuaries or bomb inside Cambodia. Militarily or diplomatically, he can ill afford such a turnabout against the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, with whom he continues to maintain friendly relations as part of his balancing act.

U.S. intelligence claims that a string of at least ten Communist base areas stretches along the Cambodian border with Viet Nam, stockpiled with enough supplies to last two divisions several months. The sanctuaries are well-dispersed, camouflaged, defended by antiaircraft guns, and are said to contain training as well as rest camps. U.S. officers claim that as much as 60% of Communist supplies for III and IV Corps, the southern areas of South Viet Nam, now are funneled in via the Cambodian ports of Sihanoukville and Kep.

Gondola Cars. The Ho Chi Minh Trail complex through eastern Laos, an area firmly in North Vietnamese and Communist Pathet Lao control, remains the other major supply route. Intelligence estimates that 7,000 to 10,000 North Vietnamese troops monthly filter south. Truck sightings have risen fivefold since the U.S. bombing halt over North Viet Nam: up to 1,000 vehicles are spotted daily, moving north and south. Recently an allied patrol even uncovered a railway track in Laos reaching to the northwestern edge of South Viet Nam. Gondola cars on the line were pulled by men or by trucks.

Eventually, the Paris negotiations must include Cambodia and Laos on their agenda. A settlement strictly confined to South Viet Nam would not necessarily ensure complete North Vietnamese withdrawal to the North: conceivably Hanoi's forces could simply pull back into their old sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos, there to wait for another chance to invade after U.S. troops had withdrawn. That would be anathema to Sihanouk and Souvanna Phouma, as well as to the U.S. In effect, it would mean no settlement at all.

* He is also cautiously maneuvering toward a rapprochement with neighboring Thailand, a traditional enemy in Cambodian eyes.

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