NATO ENTERS THE THIRD DECADE

THE scene evoked a poignant sense of history. One by one, to the ruffles and flourishes of the blue-uniformed Army Band, the foreign ministers of 14 Western nations entered the flag-bedecked Departmental Auditorium on Washington's Constitution Avenue, a few blocks from the White House. Their predecessors had assembled in the same hall in 1949 to sign the epochal pact that created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Though the foreign ministers were gathered to celebrate NATO's 20th anniversary, they used the occasion to discuss how the 15-member alliance* should react to changing technological and political realities, especially to overtures from the East bloc for improved relations. In an address to the delegates, President Nixon came as close as anyone could to summing up NATO's attitude toward its Communist opponents. "All of us are ready as conditions change," said the President, "to turn that fist [of self-defense] into the hand of friendship." But, warned the President, "it is not enough to talk of relaxing tension unless we keep in mind that 20 years of tension were not caused by superficial misunderstandings."

It was not so long ago that there was much talk about converting NATO from its original military purposes into an instrument of diplomacy and cultural exchange to further detente in Europe. The change of roles reflected almost unanimous conviction in Western Europe that the threat of a Soviet attack had diminished to the point of nonexistence. In the long run, NATO's final mission remains one of negotiation and settlement. But in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the plans for demilitarizing NATO have been temporarily shelved. Reflecting the concerns of their countries, the European ministers felt that NATO must retain its defensive role while gradually taking a diplomatic initiative.

The Soviets tried their best to persuade the NATO ministers that the military function of the alliance was already obsolete. On the eve of the Washington meeting, the Soviets offered to dissolve the Warsaw Pact in return for the disbandment of NATO, on which they heap all the blame for starting and prolonging the cold war. Last month's Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest renewed the call for a conference of all European countries to settle the problems left over from World War II.

As the two-day Washington meeting opened, Italy's Pietro Nenni argued that NATO should take the Communists at their word and agree, at least in principle, to the European conference. Similarly, West Germany's Willy Brandt, whose Ostpolitik has placed a high priority on seeking an East-West settlement, felt that NATO should be willing to dare a little for the sake of detente. But French Foreign Minister Michel Debre, whose President set off the great wave of bridge building to the East two years ago, urged extreme caution. Debre warned that if the European peace conference failed to make any progress, it would be a greater setback to the hope for better relations than if no conference took place. (As a sign that Charles de Gaulle is himself no longer so convinced of the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions, Debre, in an earlier speech to the National Press Club, reaffirmed France's political commitment to the Atlantic Alliance--though the French still refuse to take part in NATO's military activities.)

Canadian Withdrawal. Debre's warning about a possible backlash was buttressed by the U.K.'s Michael Stewart and U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, who emphasized the improbability that one great conference could bring an end to the divisions that have rent Europe for more than 25 years. The final communique reflected a cautious line: the NATO foreign ministers resolved "to explore with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation and an early resolution." The foreign ministers also ordered the North Atlantic Council, the alliance's highest executive body, to prepare an agenda of items that might profitably be discussed with East bloc countries.

At the same time, the foreign ministers pledged that each NATO country would keep its alliance partners fully briefed on whatever negotiations it undertook with Warsaw Pact members. In addition, the NATO ministers stressed their "continuing determination" to maintain substantial "North American and European conventional forces" in Europe. The words were a rebuke to Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who a week earlier had announced his intention of withdrawing Canadian forces from NATO assignments in Western Europe.

Overly Dependent. In his speech, Nixon called the alliance "one of the great successes of the postwar world." And indeed it is. Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe, capped by the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, prompted the creation of NATO. Behind its shield Western Europe gained a sense of security while rebuilding its economic strength. The alliance provided the frame within which West Germany was able to rearm and assume a large part of the responsibility for Western European defense without unduly frightening its Western European neighbors. NATO also helped keep peace between two members, Greece and Turkey, whose ancient enmity threatened twice--in 1964 and 1967--to flare into open fighting over Cyprus. Perhaps NATO's most critical test came in 1961, when its united stand helped face down former Premier Khrushchev over his threat to make a separate peace with East German Boss Walter Ulbricht and turn Russian responsibility for Berlin over to the East Germans.

NATO's unhappiest hour was in 1966, when Charles de Gaulle summarily withdrew his country from military participation in the alliance and evicted NATO from installations in France, including military headquarters at Rocquencourt and Fontainebleau. To a degree, De Gaulle's decision was perhaps an unavoidable product of his own intense nationalistic pride. But his action also reflected the larger problem that NATO has historically been overly dependent upon the U.S.

The relationship came about naturally enough, since the U.S., with its virtual nuclear monopoly, was the military mainstay of NATO in the early years. But the military situation has changed, and the Europeans have failed to assume the proper share of their own defense. Most of NATO's European partners spend less than 6% of their gross national products on defense, v. the U.S.'s 10%. One consequence is that NATO has never met its defense goals. At present, NATO combat-ready troops, whose divisions are below full strength, are outmanned by Warsaw Pact forces along the Central European front, 585,000 to 355,000.

What-lfs. NATO planners fear such a troop shortage means that the alliance could not contain a Soviet thrust by conventional means and would thus have to resort almost at once to nuclear weapons. Though the possibility of direct So->~a aggression remains highly unlikely, NATO commanders nevertheless worry about "what-if" situations that could spill over into Western European soil. What if, for example, a revolt by the Czechoslovak army led to fighting that saw Soviet troops pursuing the Czechoslovaks into West Germany? Similarly, a Soviet move into the so-called gray areas of Yugoslavia or Austria would pose a threat to NATO. A strong conventional force would be able to turn back Soviet intrusions, but a weak NATO nonnuclear army might lead to a precipitous lunge for the atomic trigger that could send thousands of NATO nuclear warheads raining down on Eastern Europe and start World War III.

There is some evidence that even if the Europeans do not supply more troops, they will at least assume a larger share of NATO's defense burdens and a more important role in NATO policymaking. In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, several European members shored up their defense budgets. Britain's withdrawal from east of Suez may also benefit NATO by bringing home forces that can be put at NATO's disposal. That, in turn, may move Britain into a position to supply the supreme commander for NATO, a post that until now has always been filled by Americans--from Dwight David Eisenhower to the newly appointed commander of the allied forces, General Andrew J. Goodpaster.

*The 15: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the U.S. and West Germany.

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