The Crisis That Wasn't

For months, the East Germans and Soviets had threatened a new Berlin cri sis if the West Germans persisted in their plan to convene the Federal Republic's electoral college in the western half of the divided former German cap ital. Last week, as 1,023 West German electors met in West Berlin's cavernous East Prussia Hall and by a narrow margin selected Socialist Gustav Heinemann to succeed retiring President Heinrich Luebke as West German head of state, the Communist response was relatively mild and constrained.

Settling for Less. As many people, including President Nixon, had expected, the Soviets had obviously refused to allow the bellicose East Germans to create a crisis that would have jeopardized Russian hopes of holding talks about arms controls with the new U.S. Ad ministration. As part of his campaign against any political ties between West Germany and West Berlin, East Germany's Stalinist Boss Walter Ulbricht had wanted to clamp on a full-scale land blockade and to harass Allied air liners that carried the West German electors into the isolated city.

The Soviets made Ulbricht settle for much less than that. Though some 250,000 East German and Soviet troops took part in maneuvers near West Ber lin's road, rail and canal routes to the West, only road traffic came in for serious harassment. On eight occasions in seven days East German soldiers blocked the access highways for two or three hours; Soviet officers explained that Communist tanks were using the roads.

At week's end, with the departure for Moscow of Soviet Marshal Ivan Yakubovsky, the Warsaw Pact commander who personally directed the exercises, the maneuvers and perhaps also the delays seemed about to end. In Moscow, Soviet officials insisted that Yakubovsky, whose travels in the past have some times presaged Soviet pressures, had been sent to East Berlin this time only in order to keep the East Germans in line. Still, a lingering fear remained among West Germans and West Berliners that the Communists would use their new charge about illegal armament production in the city to selectively harass freight traffic from West Berlin.

So far, the East Germans have turned back only one truck, whose "military goods" consisted of belts, buckles and shoulder straps manufactured by a firm that makes accessories for firemen.

Power Shift. As the crisis evaporated, West Germans had an opportunity to assess the significance of the presidential election. Though he edged out the Christian Democrats' candidate, Defense Minister Gerhard Schroder, by only six votes, Heinemann scored a symbolically important victory for the Socialists, who have been perennial runners-up in postwar German elections. The presidency is mainly a ceremonial office, but Heinemann's victory encouraged them to hope that they can do as well or better in next year's national elections.

The Socialist victory signaled what could become a crucial shift in the balance of power between West Germany's two major parties. Heinemann was put over the top only because the Free Democrats gave him nearly all their 83 electoral votes and then resisted enticements to defect through three rounds of tension-filled balloting.

In the past, the Free Democrats, who command the allegiance of some 10% of the electorate, have always sided with the dominant Christian Democrats on the national level. In fact, many West Germans felt that the party was unable to do anything more than play junior partner to the Christian Democrats. The Free Democrats' performance in Berlin proved otherwise. If neither of the two big parties emerges a clear winner in next September's elections, the Socialists might be able to form a coalition with the Free Democrats, thus ousting the Christian Democrats from power for the first time since the Federal Republic was founded in 1949.

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