In the Eye of the Storm

"If the Directory survives," said a White House aide, "the government survives." The phrase was oddly evocative of 18th century Paris. And so, with precious little else in common with the French Revolution, were the mindless mob scenes in Saigon last week. More remarkable was the Administration's notably cool assessment of a perilous situation that had seemingly been plotted to provoke an intemperate reaction from Washington.

All week screeching street mobs, urged on by the same Buddhist monks who ignited the 1963 uprisings that led to the murder of Ngo Dinh Diem, rampaged out of control in Saigon, Danang, Hue and other cities. This time they were baying for the end of South Viet Nam's ten-man Military Directory and, in particular, for the ouster of Premier Nguyen Cao Ky (see THE WORLD). Through it all, the Administration maintained a meticulous, almost relaxed air of calm in the eye of the storm.

"More Whammy." In one of the Administration's few public comments on the crisis, Secretary of State Dean Rusk spoke with tight-lipped optimism: "This is in part an effort by some civilian groups to carve out a certain position in relation to the steps that have been announced for some time by the military government to move toward a constitutional system."

Tough, well-trained Viet Cong agents helped stir the mobs. Yet the demonstrations were directly inspired by a politically astute, professedly anti-Communist Buddhist prelate, Thich (meaning venerable) Tri Quang, a ruthless infighter who has been described by former Ambassador Maxwell Taylor as "the Makarios of Southeast Asia."

The uprising began in earnest on March 10 when Ky's junta dismissed Lieut. General Nguyen Chanh Thi, long considered Ky's chief rival for power within the Directory. Administration experts are convinced that the ambitious little general was only Tri Quang's pawn. "Thi's dismissal simply gave the movement a little more whammy," said a top State Department expert. In Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy's view, Tri Quang's men want to "accelerate the timetable" for a change in government in order to set up "a constitution and elections that would be dominated by them."

Dispensable Cog. Regardless of the sinuous internal motives behind the uprising, many U.S. editorialists and cartoonists faulted President Johnson for Ky's plight, arguing that the Administration had been overly enthusiastic in its support of the Premier, making him appear an American puppet in the eyes of his countrymen. In fact, Johnson had been scrupulously careful in his meeting with Ky, proceeding on the logical assumption that Ky was no more expendable than any of the other nine members of the Saigon junta. Indeed, Ky has never considered himself an indispensable cog in the Saigon government. A few months ago, he said flatly: "If a majority of my colleagues on the Directory want me to step down, I will gladly do so. But I can also tell you this: If there is a coup attempt, then I will fight, and I will fight to the death if necessary."

Though Ky had violently overreacted to the first Danang demonstrations by sending troops to the city and by threatening to shoot the mayor, he insisted late in the week that he was not really concerned about the rioters, pointing out fairly enough that they represent only a small minority of Vietnamese citizens. Paradoxically, Ky's own fate may not be decided by Buddhist bonzes but by a group of Young Turks in the military, who have been critical of the Premier for his failure to quash the demonstrations.

Whatever Ky's fate, at week's end there were grave doubts that the junta itself could ever again act as an effective political force--if it could survive. For all practical purposes, South Viet Nam was without a government. In order to reassert its authority, the Directory would have to accomplish three things almost simultaneously: 1) re-establish authority in the rebellious I Corps area, which includes Danang and Hue; 2) start the political processes that would lead to an efficient change of administration; and 3) somehow ensure that the Buddhist monks do not achieve total dominance.

Far from the strife in the cities, the allied military offensive continued relentlessly and successfully; ground forces launched 108 operations of battalion size or larger, a record high for the year. But the civil uprisings were costly. The allies' ambitious efforts to improve life for the peasantry had ground to a standstill. Most discouraging of all was the obvious fact that the unrest could only encourage the Viet Cong, offering them a glint of hope at a time when American fighting men had shattered Communist hopes of imminent victory. Moreover, as Washington was well aware, the perilous drift toward anarchy in Saigon could, if continued, lose the war by default.

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