The Union & the War

Lyndon Johnson's third State of the Union address was, in effect, a holding action. He wanted to discuss the war in Viet Nam but, because of the still continuing peace offensive, not in too much detail. He had plans for many new projects at home, but he wanted to leave himself an out in the event the war escalates. So, in a sober, straightforward speech, he strongly expressed his belief that the U.S. has the strength to fight the war and simultaneously improve its society at home.

"We will not permit those who fire upon us in Viet Nam," he said, "to win a victory over the desires and the intentions of all the American people. This nation is mighty enough, its society is healthy enough, its people are strong enough, to pursue our goals in the rest of the world while still building a Great Society here at home." To that end, he laid out an astonishingly demanding list of domestic legislative proposals (see box, next page) for the 89th Congress, which had already set a record for bill passing during its hard-working first session and had looked for a light load this time around.

As for Viet Nam, Johnson spoke while several of his envoys were still circling the globe as part of the American peace offensive. He made it clear that the peace offensive will continue, while leaving no doubt that the U.S. will stay in Viet Nam. "The enemy is no longer closer to victory," he said. "Time is no longer on his side. There is no cause to doubt the American commitment. The days may become months and the months may become years, but we will stay as long as aggression commands us to battle."

Felt-Tipped Pen. The President looked tanned after weeks of L.B.J.

Ranch recuperation, but the strong TV lights accentuated new lines in his face and highlighted a thin, somewhat scrawny neck. It was a long speech--53 minutes--and the President read it rapidly, sometimes almost perfunctorily. It was devoid of any high rhetoric or drama --intentionally so. The President wanted to make it plain that he was saying as much as he could about the war and, at the same time, had far more domestic plans than anyone had imagined.

The speech was initially compiled from memoranda ordered weeks ago from Government agencies and advisers. White House aides digested the memos, and the speech's first draft was written by Richard Goodwin, a former Kennedy and Johnson speechwriter who was called back from his post at Wesleyan University. When Goodwin was through, the President reconstructed the speech with the help of No. 1 White House Aide Jack Valenti and Press Secretary Bill Moyers, finally wound up penciling in many of the words and phrases himself. He was still making changes with his felt-tipped pen as his chauffeured limousine sped him from the White House to Capitol Hill.

Low Deficit. The President first dug into the domestic portion of his program, rattling off more than a dozen general proposals for the 89th's second session. Then, almost casually, he dropped the word that next year's administrative budget will be a record-breaking $112.8 billion, while the estimate for federal revenues for the same period totals $111 billion. That left a deficit of $1.8 billion, which, Johnson carefully emphasized, would be "one of the lowest in many years." In fact, he said, the cash budget for fiscal 1967 (as opposed to the smaller administrative budget, which does not include such ready-cash sources as social security payments and highway funds) would actually show a surplus of $500 million.

The President's desire for a cash budget surplus next year was clearly

Keynesian in approach, an anti-inflationary manipulation aimed at curbing a surging economy. It appeared to many to be a bit of sleight of hand as well, and it did, to be sure, depend rather heavily on some imponderables. For one thing, the President was relying on congressional passage of his various tax programs, which may face some opposition. Beyond that, Government forecasts have averaged an almost 9% error on revenues, more than 6% on spending. This year's budget totals, said a White House aide, are "highly uncertain." As it now stands, the administrative budget, not counting a projected $5.8 billion increase caused by Viet Nam, will rise by $600 million over fiscal 1966. The extra requests for the Great Society will be partially offset by a $1.5 billion cut in Pentagon spending not related to Viet Nam, and by another $1.5 billion reduction by all other federal agencies.

A Proviso. The President threw down his spending plans like a gauntlet before those who have attacked his Great Society programs. "I have not come here tonight to ask for pleasant luxuries and for idle pleasures," said Johnson. "I have come here to recommend that you bring the most urgent decencies of life to all your fellow Americans." Then he put forth his faith and his warning for the coming session: "I believe that we can continue the Great Society while we fight in Viet Nam. But if there are some who do not believe this, then, in the name of justice, let them call for the contribution of those who live in the fullness of our blessing rather than try to strip it from the hands of those that are most in need."

Despite his optimism in predicting a healthy financial condition for the Federal Government, Johnson added a proviso: "I will not hesitate to return to the Congress for additional appropriations or additional revenues if they are needed." They may be needed if the peace offensive fails and the war worsens in Viet Nam--and the President pulled no punches in detailing the hard realities of that "brutal and bitter conflict."

Swelling Stream. A substantial part of the President's speech was given over to the war, a remarkable change of emphasis from his 1965 State of the Union address, which contained only 126 words on the Viet Nam conflict. This time, Johnson carefully and lucidly redefined the principles behind the U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia. In keeping with the almost bland tone that he brought to the rest of the speech, he managed to discuss a white-hot situation without so much as a hint of belligerence. Yet there was an unmistakable undertone of strength and determination.

"The insistent urge toward national independence is the strongest force of today's world in which we live," he said. "History does not favor a single system or belief unless force is used to make it so. Six years ago, North Viet Nam decided on conquest; and from that day to this, soldiers and supplies have moved from North to South in a swelling stream--swallowing the remnants of revolution in aggression." The U.S. commitment in Viet Nam, he said, is based on the fact that "around the world are countries whose independence rests in large measure on confidence in America's word and in America's protection. To yield to force in Viet Nam would weaken that confidence. We would have to fight in one land, and then we'd have to fight in another--or abandon much of Asia to the domination of Communists. And we do not intend to abandon Asia to conquest!"

Combat or Conference. Johnson added that "our decision to stand firm has been matched by our desire for peace" --at which point, many listeners thought that they would hear some news about the peace mission. The President kept mum, but in pursuit of that mission, Vice President Hubert Humphrey last week talked with Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin in New Delhi, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman conferred with South Vietnamese officials in Saigon. As the U.S. stretched to its fourth week the halt on bombings of North Viet Nam, the White House also revealed that a U.S. diplomat recently handed a North Vietnamese representative a direct communication, dealing with Washington's peace proposals, to Ho Chi Minh's government.

The President reviewed U.S. efforts at peace: "In 1965 alone we had 300 private talks for peace in Viet Nam. We have made it clear, from Hanoi to New York, that there are no arbitrary limits to our search for peace. We will meet at any conference table, we will discuss any proposals--four points or 14 or 40--and we will consider the views of any group." Still, said Johnson, "so far we have received no response to prove either success or failure." Then, uttering a phrase that he had penciled into the speech himself only hours before he appeared on Capitol Hill, Johnson said: "I wish tonight that I could give you a blueprint for the course of this conflict over the coming months, but we just cannot know what the future may require. We may have to face long, hard combat or a long, hard conference--or even both at once."

Since the President's message was more a report than an exhortation, it drew a generally mild, undivisive reaction. There were questions about whether there would be enough money to pay for all the programs he proposed, but that problem would have to be worked out in Congress in the months to come. As for the issue of war or peace in Viet Nam--who could say when or where the signal would come?

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