A Small Something for Hanoi

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield has made no secret of his misgivings over the war in Viet Nam. In public, and in private with the President, the Montana Democrat has repeatedly declared that the Communists may be willing to negotiate peace in Viet Nam on conditions acceptable to the U.S.

Just to make sure Hanoi was still listening, Mansfield last week once again set forth his own view of the Administration's terms for a settlement--and once again, North Viet Nam warned that it would rather fight for 20 more years, if necessary.

It was possible, of course, that Hanoi did not accept Mike Mansfield as a spokesman for the Johnson Administration, which the Senator has often faulted for its handling of the war. It was even more likely that the Communists were simply confused by Mansfield's language. Many Americans were too.

As he saw it, Mansfield said, the U.S. position is that: 1) "there must be a verified choice by the people of South Viet Nam of their own government--a choice free of terrorism, violence and coercion from any quarter"; 2) the people of South Viet Nam should be free to choose between independence and reunification with the Communist North; and 3) "all foreign forces and bases" must be withdrawn from North and South Viet Nam, provided "peace can be reestablished, and the arrangements include adequate international guarantees of noninterference, not only for Viet Nam but for Laos and Cambodia as well."

Unacceptable Condition. In addition, Mansfield had some conditions of his own, which he termed "obviously essential corollaries": 1) there must be an amnesty for everyone on both sides as "an essential block to an extension of the barbarism and atrocities of the struggle into the subsequent peace and, indeed, as an essential part of that peace," and 2) both sides must be willing "to accept and abide by a cease-fire."

Mansfield's aim was "to lay down on our side as cohesive a statement of our aims as Hanoi did of its own" after the President's offer of "unconditional discussions" last April. By comparison with Mansfield's elaboration, Hanoi's terms were cohesive indeed. The Communists' principal, and unacceptable, condition is simply that "the internal affairs of the South Vietnamese people must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front--the Viet Cong's political arm. In other words, as Hanoi sees it, South Viet Nam should be free to elect its own government, provided that the government is Communist.

Both Sides Alike. What was almost as hard to swallow was Mansfield's apparent assumption that the U.S. could withdraw in good faith from South Viet Nam, in the belief that the Viet Cong--most of whom are not "foreign"--would do likewise. As for Mansfield's insistence on an amnesty to prevent further "barbarism and atrocities," he made it sound as if the U.S. and government forces in South Viet Nam were just as guilty of systematic torture and terrorism as the Viet Cong.

Whatever Mansfield's reason for speaking up, his words met with approval all around. White House Press Secretary Bill Moyers maintained that the speech "reflects the sentiment of the Johnson Administration," which was the only polite thing to say, since Mansfield had discussed it with Johnson before he made it, even sent copies to the White House, State Department and Pentagon a few hours before he rose to speak. Press coverage of Mansfield's speech interpreted it variously as a straight endorsement of Administration policy and a calculated attempt to goad Lyndon Johnson into spelling out equally elaborate conditions for "unconditional" talks. The most hopeful verdict, perhaps, was Mike's own: "This may amount to nothing," he said. "I hope it amounts to something, no matter how small."

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