We Will Be Far Better Off Facing the Issue

The great fear that pervaded U.S. policy toward Korea 14 years ago today pervades U.S. policy toward South Viet Nam.

That is the fear of a confrontation with Communist China. It troubles President Johnson, who talks in terms of mortal peril about coming to grips "with 700 million Chinese." It came to afflict even General Douglas Mac Arthur, the old hero of Inchon and champion of crossing the Yalu, who in his declining years warned Johnson never to get involved in a war on the mainland of Asia.

No one talks seriously about a full-scale land war on China's mainland. But there can be no doubt whatever that China is the real enemy in Asia, and the greatest threat anywhere to world peace (see cover story). And there is room for argument that a more positive U.S. military policy toward Viet Nam would be to risk a confrontation with China in the right place at the right time.

"It Is Not Appeasement." Last week, however, seemed to be a good week for China's Communist bosses. U.S. efforts to establish a "stable" government in South Viet Nam seemed farther than ever from fruition after another ludicrous sequence of coup and countercoup. The shooting war against the Viet Cong was relatively quiet, and President Johnson, despite his recent air reprisals against North Viet Nam for attacks on Ameri can personnel, now seemed willing to let matters calm down. But at home, the cries for negotiations leading to a withdrawal from Viet Nam came to crescendo.

On the journalistic side, they were led by the New York Times. In an editorial titled "The War Hawks," it said: "A comparatively small group of Americans, at this moment predominantly political in character and predominantly Republican in politics, is doing its best to multiply the perils and frustrations of the war in Southeast Asia. This group ignores the realities of the present situation ... It ignores the logistics and belittles the cost in lives lost, blood spilled and treasure wasted, of fighting a war on a jungle front 7,000 miles from the coast of California."

In the U.S. Senate, Idaho Democrat Frank Church declared that Viet Nam is "a war we cannot finish," called for a settlement guaranteed by the United Nations or a special peace-keeping force. North Dakota Democrat George McGovern said his mail has been running 15 to 1 for negotiations, said: "It is not appeasement to recognize that the problem of Southeast Asia does not lend itself to a military solution."

"No Time for a Munich." There were, of course, strong opposing voices. To call for negotiations now, said Connecticut Democrat Thomas Dodd, would be like urging that "Churchill enter into negotiations with the Germans at the time of Dunkirk or that President Truman enter into negotiations with the Communists when we stood with our backs to the sea in the Pusan perimeter." Said Wyoming Democrat Gale McGee: "This is no time for another Munich. If Red China is prepared to expand its sphere of influence and territory in Southeast Asia, we might as well find out now, before it's too late."

Senate Republican Leader Everett Dirksen said: "However such proposals for negotiation under pressure may be explained or camouflaged by intricate rationales, it is simply a proposal to run up the white flag before the world and start running away from Communism." He and other Republican leaders, in a joint statement, declared: "So long as there is a Communist-promoted infiltration of South Viet Nam in violation of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements,* there can be no negotiations on the Vietnamese question, and we urge the President to make this unmistakably clear to the world."

Blackout. As for President Johnson, he was keeping his own counsel about his plans for Viet Nam. He devoted many hours to the subject last week. He met with the National Security Council. He had a long session with visiting French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, who tried to sell Charles de Gaulle's plan for an immediate international conference aimed at neutralizing all of what used to be French Indo-China.

The President also went out of his way to consult with Republican Dwight Eisenhower--sometimes a sign that a crash landing is in prospect. Hearing that Ike was in Washington for a routine physical examination, Johnson invited the old soldier to the White House for a two-hour talk, followed by lunch.

There was no public word as to the conversation, but its gist may have been reflected in a passage added by President Johnson to a speech he made that afternoon to businessmen attending a meeting of the National Industrial Conference Board (see BUSINESS).

Said the President: "I should like to end this visit with a word on Viet Nam. Our purpose, our objective there, is clear: to join in the defense and protection of freedom of a brave people who are under attack that is controlled and that is directed from outside their country. We have no ambition there for ourselves. We seek no dominion. We seek no conquest. We seek no wider war. But we must all understand that we will persist in the defense of freedom, and our continuing actions will be those which are justified and those that are made necessary by the continuing aggression of others."

Those were President Johnson's first, last and only public words on the subject of Viet Nam last week. Indeed, he ordered an Administration-wide news blackout that was broken only by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara in an appearance before the House Armed Services Committee to testify on U.S. defenses (see box).

McNamara placed the meaning of the U.S. effort in Viet Nam in a rather larger context than Johnson had. Speaking of the consequences of possible U.S. withdrawal from Viet Nam, he said: "We may be certain that we would have to face this problem all over again in another place, or permit the Communists to have all of Southeast Asia by default. Thus, the choice is not simply whether to continue our efforts to keep South Viet Nam free and independent, but rather whether to continue our struggle to halt Communist expansion in Asia. If the choice is the latter, as I believe it should be, we will be far better off facing the issue in South Viet Nam."

What McNamara did not say was that the present U.S. policy of advising but not fighting in Viet Nam is hardly a winning strategy. The U.S. can probably continue that policy for a considerable time without serious damage, but it cannot possibly win the war without a far deeper involvement. The present alternative to that involvement is negotiating from a position of weakness. Some day the inevitable choice will have to be made.

* The 1954 agreement requires signatories, including North Viet Nam, to "respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity" of all the nations involved, and "to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs."

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