THE MILITARY & SCIENTIFIC RISKS

In assuring the nation that the test ban agreement preserved U.S. security, President Kennedy opened an inevitable debate over the military risks involved in the treaty. The pros and cons of the argument:

Cheating. Any agreement with the Soviets assumes inherent risks. Moscow could secretly prepare a massive series of atmospheric tests while the U.S. is lulled into the illusion of security (which is just about what happened when the Kremlin broke a three-year moratorium on testing in September 1961). With or without formally disavowing the treaty under some pretext, the Russians could then touch off a series of explosions that might swing the nuclear balance in their favor. Even without such clandestine preparations, the Kremlin could carry out tests in outer space behind the sun or the moon, under the polar icecap, or at very low atmospheric levels.

Such tests might conceivably escape detection, but the chances of doing so are minute. Besides, particularly in outer space, the costs would be enormous, and it would be extremely difficult to collect reliable data. Moreover, most of the U.S. program for nuclear weapons development is now conducted below ground and will remain unaffected by the test ban. It is therefore highly unlikely that even prolonged secret preparations for a new round of atmospheric testing would tip the power balance.

Power y. Punch. The freeze on atmospheric testing will preserve the Soviet lead in huge hydrogen bombs, such as the 58-megaton monster the Kremlin exploded during its Arctic test series in the fall of 1961. The tests taught the Soviets much about packing more punch into a lighter weapon, thus giving them valuable information on how to deliver the warhead by rocket rather than by vulnerable bombers. But the U.S. did not bother to invest the time, money and manpower in a big-bang competition with the Kremlin; the biggest U.S. nuclear bombs are in the 25-30 megaton range. Reasons for the U.S. decision:

1) Years of intensive effort have already given the U.S. a wide variety of powerful tactical atomic weapons whose quality and quantity far outmatch the Soviets'. So far ahead is the U.S. with these weapons that the Pentagon is seriously considering stopping their further production.

2) The U.S. has a 6:1 lead over the Russians in ICBMs, which can land the weapons on any chosen target. 3) The superior U.S. fleet of intercontinental bombers is equipped with enough larger bombs to wipe out Soviet cities many times over. One possible disadvantage: by not being able to test in the atmosphere, the U.S. may fail to find out enough about the effects which the Red superbombs might have on U.S. defenses, such as blurring radar and knocking out delicate electronic ground-control mechanisms.

Underground Testing. A Soviet crash program to build and equip underground test facilities could enable them to develop U.S.-style smaller, high-yield nuclear weapons. Because they have more to learn from below-ground testing than the U.S., the Russians have more to gain by an intensive underground testing program.

But the U.S. does not believe that the Soviets now have a major underground testing capability; developing one is a long and expensive job. At the same time, the advanced U.S. underground testing program would be making new gains in defensive weapons systems, as it did during the last moratorium. By denying the Soviets the ability to test in the atmosphere, the U.S. nuclear advantage is preserved longer by a test ban treaty than without one.

Anti-Missile Missile. The Soviets seem ahead in developing this "ultimate" defensive weapon. In one test last year they reportedly intercepted and destroyed two rockets with a single blast; since then, U.S. intelligence has discovered what may be the world's first operational anti-ICBM system at a huge construction site near Leningrad. Moscow also is believed to lead in the design of "decoys"--phony missiles without warheads that enable loaded ICBMs to confuse and penetrate enemy defenses. Since the development of decoys and anti-missile missiles requires atmospheric testing, according to some experts, the U.S. will be more handicapped than the Russians.

On the other hand, new offensive weapons might soon make any anti-missile system obsolete, assuming that a reliable operational system could be built in the first place; the theoretical problems are immense and the costs astronomical. Even if the U.S. took that plunge, atmospheric testing is not necessarily decisive. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, a former U.S. test ban negotiator and physicist, who is now at work on an anti-missile missile, believes that the big hurdle is not nuclear testing, but highly intricate radar problems. Meanwhile, the U.S. has its Nike-Zeus, which recently downed seven rockets in tests over the Pacific.

The Atomic Establishment. Scientists at Atomic Energy Commission labs at Livermore, Calif., and Los Alamos occasionally feel as though they live in air-conditioned leper colonies. The restrictions on new research imposed by the test ban could lead to further worsening morale and to a mass exodus from the labs. "In the laboratory," said one top Los Alamos scientist, "you drive a new nuclear system as far as you dare. If you don't test it, that design will flop." Dr. Edward Teller, "father of the H-bomb," is suspicious of the treaty for this and other reasons, would prefer an agreement that does not rule out atmospheric tests altogether but would only limit the amount of radioactive matter to be put into the air.

In contrast, Dr. Norris Bradbury, chief of Los Alamos, welcomes the ban ("We have no fondness for atomic weapons") and feels that testing is not as crucial as it is sometimes described. Says he: "But we found out by new experimental techniques, by people beating their heads against the wall, just how much we can learn without final testing." Since the last moratorium did not damage morale or hurt recruitment at Los Alamos, says Bradbury, he does not expect the new treaty will either. j

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