To Moscow, with Caution

The pattern of arrival and departure might be symbolic. By week's end everyone in Moscow believed that the Red Chinese delegation was ready to head home before too long. At the same time, U.S. and British delegations were due to arrive. The Russians were jamming Radio Peking but let the Voice of America come in loud and clear. Faced with the open Chinese challenge to Soviet leadership of world Communism, Nikita Khrushchev may want to ease tensions with the West, both to bulwark his position at home and to demonstrate the genuineness of his much-heralded coexistence policy abroad. But whether Khrushchev wants it badly enough to make some really meaningful concessions is still another question.

The Issues. As he flew off to Moscow for another round of test-ban talks, Presidential Envoy Averell Harriman noted hopefully that Russia was being more pleasant in "the small things of life." As for the big things, "we are going in good faith and in the hope of achieving some steps that will be beneficial." The principal issues facing Harriman and his fellow negotiator, British Minister of Science Viscount Hailsham, in Moscow:

sb TEST BAN: Khrushchev has indicated that he would revive Russia's 1961 terms for a test ban, which included a voluntary moratorium on underground detonations, without effective controls. This proposal was rejected by the U.S. at the time. Then, last year, Russia offered to permit three inspections of its territory yearly by way of policing an underground ban. Moscow subsequently reneged, Khrushchev now insists that Russia will never "open its door to NATO spies," and that "this is no subject for bargaining." The West will not accept an unenforceable moratorium on underground tests, since it believes that the Russians would break it at will, as they violated the voluntary test ban in 1961. However, if Russia agrees to a treaty that simply forbids tests in the atmosphere--which are easily detectable--the West is willing to take up the problem of underground testing at a later date.

sb NONAGGRESSION PACT. Khrushchev declared that "at the conclusion of a test-ban agreement," he will revive Russia's hoary demand for a nonaggression pact between the 15 NATO powers and the satellite nations of the Warsaw Treaty. In the past, this proposal has invariably been rejected by the West because West Germany and France object that it would imply Western acceptance of a divided Europe and recognition of East Germany. In any case, they point out, no such declaration is needed, for NATO's defensive purposes were guaranteed in its charter 14 years ago.

The Prospects. U.S. policymakers emphasize that a test-ban treaty would have little if any effect on the balance of power. Since both East and West have more than enough nuclear warheads for any conceivable conflict, the only way either side could gain a decisive strategic lead would be through a major breakthrough in missile delivery systems, which would not be covered by the test ban. In any case, nuclear technology is now so advanced that weapons such as the anti-missile missile can be developed entirely in the laboratory. Furthermore, no Western statesman believes that a test-ban agreement will restrain the French or Chinese from testing nuclear weapons at will, or even slow the spread of nuclear arms to other nations.

Why, then, is the West so eager to sign a nuclear pact with Russia? Rightly or wrongly, Washington has come to view a test-ban treaty as the touchstone of Soviet intentions. If this one outstanding issue can be resolved after five years of frustration, the State Department believes, then there is hope that East and West may ultimately be able to settle other issues. Though Harriman is empowered only to negotiate a test-ban agreement, he expects to "explore" other cold war problems, such as Berlin and Russia's failure to enforce the Laotian neutrality pact. On those matters Khrushchev so far did not appear to budge. Talking to Belgium's Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak in Kiev last week, Khrushchev said: "Berlin is the foot that Kennedy has in Europe. Every time I want to, I'll stamp on it."

In short, the East-West talks in Moscow may just possibly prove no more fruitful than the Sino-Soviet talks. But U.S. observers still wonder how long Khrushchev can go on fighting a two-front war, refusing both concessions to Peking and a genuine move toward "peaceful coexistence" with the West.

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