Reserve Reform

When the Army called up 119,000 reservists and National Guardsmen during the 1961 Berlin crisis, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara was appalled at the results. The civilian soldiers stood at a pitiful average of 65% of authorized combat strength. Several supposedly crack divisions were hopelessly out of training, and many of the troops spent most of their time writing Congressmen and complaining to newsmen about the indignity of being summoned to duty. Then and there, McNamara vowed to overhaul and shape up the nation's reserve ranks. Last week he got into action.

Horse Trading. Few institutions enjoy more political protection than the National Guard. Financed 97% from Washington, yet commanded by state Governors when not federalized, the Guard is a rich receptacle for political favors. Invited to the Governors' Conference in Hershey, Pa., last summer to explain his proposed reorganization, McNamara pleaded for understanding. But he could not head off a resolution opposing "any plan which would drastically reduce the size and effectiveness" of the Guard.

Instead of throwing up his hands, McNamara turned horse trader. Wiring each of the 50 Governors, he offered to compromise with them on which units would be cut back. His Pentagon staff worked overtime to win the support of reluctant Congressmen. McNamara himself paid a quiet call on Georgia's Carl Vinson, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, at Vinson's cattle farm. Flattered, Vinson couldn't say no. His tacit agreement led to last week's announcement of the biggest reform of the nation's standing militia since World War II.

Shuffling. The essentials of McNamara's plan are simple. Four divisions of the Army Reserve, which is under permanent Pentagon command, are abolished outright because they are either undermanned, undertrained or outmoded. McNamara is seeking the required approval of Governors involved to downgrade, for similar reasons, four National Guard infantry divisions--the 34th of Iowa and Nebraska, the 35th of Kansas and Missouri, the 43rd of Connecticut, Rhode Island and Vermont, and the 51st of Florida and South Carolina. Those outfits (authorized division strength: 13,500) would be regrouped into 3,300-man brigades. Further, 1,800 smaller Guard and reserve units would be disbanded because they are dead weight--among them, crews of vintage 90-mm. antiaircraft guns, now useless against jets. But 1,000 new units would be created, such as guerrilla-warfare squads. The end result, McNamara hopes, will be a lean, modernized reserve capable of taking up front-line positions in as little as four weeks.

McNamara, under state pressures, let a few obsolete Guard units stay on; he backed down on a plan to vacate 16 state-owned armories. But his major concession--agreement to accept "authorized" reserve strength at its present 700,000 men instead of slashing it to 642,000 --turned out to be no concession at all. The ranks at present total only 665,282 men (389,738 in the Guard and 275,544 in the reserves), and stringent new physical and proficiency requirements also announced by McNamara should trim the total even more. Half a dozen Governors voiced objections; Oregon's Republican Mark Hatfield called it a "blackjack effort." But there seemed little doubt that McNamara's plan would go through.

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