How Nice Must We Be to Nikita?

The U.S. and Britain are often accused, particularly in Bonn, of "running after Khrushchev." For a while last week it looked more as if Khrushchev were running after the West.

The Russian press duly blasted Kennedy's announcement that the U.S. will resume nuclear tests in the atmosphere (see THE NATION), and there were some local harassments in Berlin. But after a secret conference with East Germany's Walter Ulbricht, a Khrushchev communique omitted the standard polemics, contained only a mild mention of Berlin and West Germany as topics on the agenda. Meanwhile, Khrushchev kept trying to lure various heads of state to Geneva next week so that the 18-nation disarmament talks would, in his chummy phrase, "start in the right direction." No major power succumbed, but both the U.S. and Britain warmed slightly to the notion of a summit meeting, possibly in June, if preliminary discussion promises a worthwhile climb.

In pressing so hard for a summit, Khrushchev was possibly guilty of another offense often charged against the West --paying too much attention to world opinion.

Don't Push. In addition to demonstrating once again Russia's "peaceful intentions" Khrushchev was obviously also attempting to soften up the West and extort some real concessions. The West's response depended in part on how Western statesmen evaluate a theory about Khrushchev that has gained wide acceptance, particularly in Britain. Its advocates make the case that Nikita Khrushchev is the most reasonable of all Russian leaders and "the West's best friend in Moscow." Therefore, they maintain, the Allies should try hard to reach an accord with him.

By accommodating Nikita, the argument goes, the West would strengthen Khrushchev's hand against the still powerful Stalinists, who, with the Chinese Communists, still cling to the Marxist dogma that war between the two systems is inevitable. If, on the other hand, the West pushes Khrushchev too hard, he might fall, and a Stalinist or "Chinese" successor might be far tougher to deal with. In effect, this theory is a political version of Hilaire Belloc's cautionary verse:

Always keep ahold of Nurse

For fear of finding something worse.

Nuclear Reality. If the U.S. were to act on this advice, no one would be better served than Nikita Khrushchev, who has often deliberately spread it in the West. Example: when Russia resumed nuclear tests last September at the very time the conference of unaligned nations met in Belgrade, Khrushchev explained to Tito that the testing decision had been forced on him by the "antiparty group"; Tito promptly passed this excuse along, arguing that Khrushchev must not be criticized lest he get into serious trouble with the "Stalinists." In fact, many experts contend that despite lower-echelon jockeying for power, the Stalinist anti-party group ceased to be a threat to Khrushchev in 1956, that he has used it since merely as a political whipping boy. Thus, to act in order to "save" Khrushchev, says a British diplomat, would be "sheer nonsense and dangerous." Most diplomats and Kremlinologists agree, furthermore, that in some ways Khrushchev has proved a more imaginative adversary than Stalin, and that his retreat from the inevitable-war theory is merely a pragmatic adjustment to nuclear reality. "With a friend like Khrushchev in the U.S.S.R.," says Philosopher Sidney Hook, "the West needs no enemy."

Even if the West could influence Kremlin politics, which is doubtful, it can be argued that the non-Communist world has more to gain from Khrushchev's downfall than from his survival in office. Some experts believe that a prolonged power struggle in the Kremlin might make the militant Chinese more influential in the Red bloc, but few believe that any significant Kremlin faction would be more warlike than Khrushchev.

Law of Dictatorships. A top British Kremlinologist goes farther, says that there is little danger and great potential advantage in dragging out negotiations with Khrushchev, who is 67 and has a heart ailment, in hope that he may be succeeded by a younger, more flexible leader who does not "carry a burden of guilt from the past."

Among possible successors: Dmitry Poliansky, 44, a fast-rising Khrushchev protege who toured the U.S. in 1960; Aleksandr Shelepin, 43, who came up through the Young Communist League and efficiently destalinized the secret police. Likeliest candidate is still Frol Kozlov, 53, a hard-bitten Central Committee member who deputizes for Khrushchev in his absence and has been mentioned by him as his heir. Even if a successor were not to be more "liberal," some experts guess that he would probably have less prestige and ability. Political Analyst Bertram Wolfe cites the Natural Law of Dictatorships : "Each successive dictator is likely to be more mediocre than the one before."

Whatever Khrushchev's advantages, the consensus of the best Kremlinologists is to dismiss the whole theory of being nice to Nikita for fear of "something worse." Says M.I.T.'s Herbert Ritvo: "The more changes in the Kremlin leadership, the more unstable the situation, the better for us."

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