The Issues

Once again the world witnessed the disturbing sight of foreign United Nations soldiers, supplied by U.S. planes, blasting the buildings and shooting at native troops in the Congo. There was some legitimate doubt as to whether the U.N. should be there at all, even though it was responding to violence or threats of violence on the part of Katanga. The U.S. firmly backed the U.N., but Britain, although on record as favoring the U.N.'s presence to keep the peace, was deeply unhappy about the armed intervention. "We support a unitary Congo state," declared Whitehall, "but we oppose the use of force by the U.N. to impose political solutions. You are not going to get unity or pacification by military means."

Underground Interest. What bothered Britain and France was the chance that the Katanga chaos could spread elsewhere in Africa, a continent where political tempers are close to flash point at the best of times. London was especially worried, since Katanga shares a 1,100-mile border with Britain's tense Northern Rhodesia protectorate. Moreover, some Britons and Frenchmen also have heavy financial interests in Katanga itself,* mostly through part ownership of the rich Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga, one of the world's biggest copper and cobalt producers, which (according to a report by U.N. Acting Secretary-General U Thant) has been supplying arms to Katanga.

In the U.S., the issue presented itself in a few seemingly simple questions:

>Why all the fuss about the foreign soldiers employed by Tshombe, who are widely and bitterly denounced as "mercenaries"? Many of them are probably no less idealistic than the U.N. soldiers fighting against Katanga (who in turn are denounced as "mercenaries" by Tshombe). Other African states employ foreign officers, and many Americans recall that their own country was aided by idealistic "mercenaries" from Europe during the American Revolution.

>Why shouldn't Katanga have the right to "self-determination"? The overall area of the Congo is not defined by clear ethnic or geographic factors, but simply by the fact that it was carved out 76 years ago by Belgium as a colony.

>Why destroy Tshombe, who is one of the few proven anti-Communists in black Africa and a prime target of attack by the Soviet Union? Tshombe himself encouraged this question last week by saying that there must be Communists in the U.S. State Department who are influencing U.S. policy against him.

Fact of History. But the real issues are not the nature of Tshombe's "mercenaries," or self-determination (Katanga is not a nation, and its people probably understand little about their real situation), or Tshombe's antiCommunism. As a fact of history, the Congo exists, and it depends on mineral-rich Katanga for economic survival. Without Katanga the rest of the Congo may well slide into chaos and possibly Communism. Privately, many in Britain and France--and some observers in the U.S.--are willing to let this happen, and retain Katanga as the one viable part of the Congo.

But the U.S. insists that if the rest of the Congo goes, even Katanga might not be defensible. Furthermore, as the U.S. sees it, Tshombe may not be so reliable as his friends make him out; he has proved himself as stubborn, unpredictable and inclined to demagogy as most other African leaders.

U.S. Decision. Supporting the U.N. is an admitted risk for the U.S. If the U.N. army succeeds in subduing Katanga by force, it will hardly be the beginning of good will in the Congo. On the other hand, if mere stalemate is once again the result of the battle, the U.N. will be badly compromised and the situation will grow even more chaotic. But, deeming non-support of the U.N. action an even greater risk. Secretary of State Rusk last week firmly placed the U.S. on the side of the U.N. in its efforts to integrate Katanga with the rest of the nation, hoping for a federation as the only eventual solution.

Edmund A. Gullion, U.S. Ambassador to Leopoldville, well summarized the U.S. case: "We want a central government, we want a unified Congo." The overriding problem, he insisted, is the secession of Katanga. "Unless this problem is resolved, it is possible that a strong central government in Leopoldville, well disposed toward the U.S., may fail, and further secessions may occur within the territory of the Congo." Gullion indicated that the central government would be willing to give Katanga "a considerable degree of autonomy," but they could not accept negotiations with Tshombe in which he "holds himself out to be the chief of an independent state."

*Angriest critic of the British-French role is Conor Cruise O'Brien, the 44-year-old Irishman who headed the U.N. Katanga force for six months this year. A onetime author and literary critic, O'Brien built a reputation for explosive opinions, bluntly expressed, along with his successful career in Ireland's diplomatic service. As he resigned from the U.N. staff last week, O'Brien accused the British and French of pressures against the U.N. in Katanga. The two countries, he said, had forced him out of his post because he tried, in compliance with a Security Council resolution, to expel the white officers hired by Moise Tshombe to run the Katanga army.

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