The Look of the World

In the interim between Geneva I and Geneva II (due to resume July 13), the headlines tended to stress the disarray in the Western camp: Britain's impatience for a summit on any terms, Adenauer's quibbles with Britain and quarrels with his own party, De Gaulle's insistent demand for big-power status. But serious headlines, based on the anxieties of the moment, are apt to obscure basic trends that move more slowly--slower trends that justified a more optimistic outlook in July 1959.

Around the world, peace could be captured in the sight of Dior models in front of Stalin's tomb, in the pensive glances of Belgium's Prince Albert and Italy's Princess Paola Ruffo di Calabria before their marriage this week. The prosperity of Western Europe could be seen at the crowded beaches, in the tumult of new cars crowding the Autobahnen. Those insecure lands of the Middle East, of Africa, of Asia were taking turns that caused concern as well as hope; in some, harsh methods employed new guises. But in this Geneva interval, when a basic worldwide test was how firmly nations stood on their own, how able and anxious they were to resist the reach of Communism, the results were impressive. A partial check list:

Western Europe. Never before have so many shared in such prosperity. The recession is over: in France, a record 102,820 cars were produced in February; Germany has 2,670,000 TV sets. One result: in only France and Italy are Communist parties still strong, and in neither do they have an effective say in the country's policy. The new six-nation Common Market promises revolutionary business opportunities for a market of 166 million people.

Berlin. Still free. Still drawing around 2,000 refugees a week from East Germany.

Eastern Europe. Perhaps more resigned to its fate (a limited victory for Khrushchev), but not even in the remotest satellite village would anyone hazard a really free vote.

France. Its finances back in shape, its economy is healthier than it has been in three decades; its public--with only scattered misgivings--is content to accept the side effects of firm rule in gratitude for tranquillity. The result is an ally acting more prickly in its pride, but stronger.

West Germany. Its prosperity steadfast; its politics momentarily jolted by Konrad Adenauer's awkward handling of an aged man's transfer of power.

Great Britain. Facing a general election before next spring, with the Socialist Opposition--its reforming passion assuaged --unsure of what it has to campaign about. Not in 35 years, boasts Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, has there been so favorable a combination of full employment, steady prices.

Spain & Portugal. Both nations are now in the restless stage before an aging strongman surrenders authority (after 27 years for Salazar, 22 for Franco). But in each, the anxiety to avoid violence will probably prevent a revolution--or the injection of much democracy.

Outside Europe. 1959's changes mostly reflect what the optimists call "creative abdication" of empire and the pessimists call retreat. But to the surprise of many, including the participants, an independence movement that begins as a protest against the West, taking help where it can find it, often ends by discovering that its freedom has to be as jealously maintained against another outsider:

Middle East. Nasser swallowed Khrushchev's patronizing description of him as "hotheaded," and accepts rubles to build the Aswan Dam, but now actively campaigns and intrigues against Communism in the Arab world. Iraq's Premier Kassem seems to be learning the same lesson.

Africa. So far, almost all the 19 new African states have held practice elections, but show little aptitude for democracy. Most seem to be developing into one-man, one-party states with little respect for minority rights. Many of their leaders went through a Marxist phase--and their organizational tactics combine Marxist lingo, local practices and Tammany tricks --but all seem determined to boss their own show.

Southeast Asia. The takeover of the generals--in Pakistan, Burma and Thailand (as well as in the Middle East)--has meant more order and less democracy. Predecessors were usually more democratic in form than in practice, and the new army rulers proclaim themselves transitional. There has been a net gain in civic honesty, cleanliness and authority, though the problem of succession must always haunt strongman regimes.

India. Nehru's shilly-shallying on Communism has cost him much respect in India (see below) and an opposition to him is finally developing--a process that in the end should be beneficial in India's search for a successor to the man who, for all his faults, organized and inspired his vast new nation.

Indonesia. Still a mess, though no longer on the critical list.

Red China. Though the power most to be feared in Asia, China is losing its prestige as the power to be admired. Severe agricultural crises at home, disillusioning reports reaching the 15 million overseas Chinese of the hardships suffered by their relatives in the people's communes, and the debacle of Tibet (which opened Asia's eyes as Hungary did not) have taken away much of its appeal.

There were other factors on the worldwide Scoreboard to be reckoned in: whether the West is sufficiently equipped militarily to offer Russia no military temptations; whether the U.S. has done enough to further the trends that favor it, has shown a capacity to lead or is merely responding to changed circumstances. But the roll call of nations eager to keep their independence, and increasingly sophisticated about the ways and means of doing it, gives little cause for despair.

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