Useful Leverage

On the first of August the Israeli ambassador in Moscow transmitted to Jerusalem a threatening note he had been handed by the Soviet government. The next day Washington learned that Israel was about to ban the overflights of U.S. and British planes across Israeli territory, thereby cutting off the vital airlift of oil and supplies, one of the few trickles of aid that is reaching beleaguered Jordan.

Secretary of State Dulles, not believing that Israel could be intimidated by the sort of blustering Soviet note that the Turks receive and reject nearly every month, summoned Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban to see what the Israelis were up to. Israel did impose a ban on overflights, only to lift it "temporarily" three days later--for U.S. planes only.

Apparently Ben-Gurion's government was not so much frightened by the Russian note as eager to use the overflight permission as a bargaining lever to force the U.S. and Britain into heeding Israel's feelings. There had also been other pressures on Ben-Gurion besides Russia's. Israel's best Afro-Asian friends--especially Ghana and Burma--made their disapproval clear. Two left-wing parties in Ben-Gurion's coalition were strongly against letting Israel appear too committed to the West. Furthermore, Israel has tried to avoid backing one faction or another among Arab powers, whether Hussein or Nasser, on the ground that all are violently anti-Israel.

What the Israelis particularly hoped for were positive assurances, in writing and publicly pronounced, that Washington and London would work to guarantee Israel's borders, and would come to Israel's aid if it was attacked. At week's end Israel's Milwaukee-raised Foreign Minister Golda Meir was invited to London on short notice. She had just held "satisfactory" talks with the French in Paris, where the De Gaulle government promised stepped-up arms shipments (Israel and France have been buddies against Nasser since Suez). From the British, about whom Israelis feel less sure, Minister Meir wanted a briefing on their intentions in Jordan, and a definite promise that, if the British do pull out, they will leave no arms behind them that could be used by a Nasser-dominated Jordan against Israel.

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