Monday, Aug. 18, 1958
On Capitol Hill & In the White House, Grade A Leadership
THE second session of the Democratic 85th Congress ran in a remarkable time. Its life was shaped by Russian Sputniks and rocket diplomacy. Middle East turmoil, U.S. economic recession, election-year politics--by its own generally responsible leadership, and, above all, by the firmest treatment Capitol Hill ever got from Dwight Eisenhower. Last May, after a slow start, the President came out swinging for his program and especially for three legislative "imperatives": 1) defense reorganization, 2) mutual security, and 3) reciprocal trade. These are the grades Congress might give itself on demands of the President and passing the tests of Year One, Space Age:
FOREIGN RELATIONS: B-PLUS
Report Card for Congress
Against Russian rocket-rattling and economic recession, mutual security and reciprocal trade measures were more vital than ever. Yet recession gave congressional reactionaries an excuse for a savage fight to "protect" U.S. industry and to kill "giveaways," meaning foreign aid. In general, Congress wrote a responsible foreign relations record against heavy pressures from the irresponsible.
Reciprocal Trade. President Eisenhower asked for five-year reciprocal trade extension, with tariff-cutting authority of up to 25%. During bitter House fight, the Administration applied heat (moaned veteran Tariff Lobbyist Oscar Strackbein: "I have never seen such pressure since the days of Franklin Roosevelt"), got vital help from able Arkansas Democrat Wilbur Mills, chairman of House Ways & Means Committee. House result: 317 to 98 for the President's program, an astonishing victory. But reciprocal trade ran into trouble with the protectionist-dominated Senate Finance Committee. Senate result: a relatively weak bill, with three-year extension and 15% tariff-cut authority. Near-certain final outcome: a good bill, with House-Senate compromise of four-year extension, longer than ever before, and 20% tariff-cut authority, more than ever before.
Mutual Security. President Eisenhower named $3,950,000,000 as "the smallest amount we may wisely invest in mutual security." Skillful missionary work by State Department's Deputy Under Secretary Douglas Dillon helped persuade Congress to authorize a $3,675,000,000 program, only $275 million below the Administration request. But actual appropriations, handled apart from program authorization, got ambushed in the House, where Louisiana Democrat Otto Passman, chairman of key Appropriations Subcommittee, engineered a slash of $597 million below authorization figure ($872 million below Administration request). President Eisenhower desk-hammered at G.O.P. congressional leaders ("This thing is vital to our country's interest") too late to sway House but in time to buck up Senate Appropriations Committee, which restored $440 million. With the Senate likely to follow the committee recommendation, the most probable outcome: a split-the-difference House-Senate compromise, with a final mutual security total of about $3.3 billion--more than the Administration at one time could have expected but still $650 million, or 16%, less than "the smallest amount we may wisely invest."
Atomic Information. Russian technological rush made mandatory a pool of Western nuclear know-how. Congress softened old (1946) McMahon Act, granted Administration permission, subject to congressional veto, to 1) pass along facts of size and destructiveness of any nuclear weapon to NATO allies, 2) transmit nuclear-weapons designs and non-nuclear components of atomic weapons to NATO nations for arming by U.S. in case of war to any ally that has made "substantial progress" in its own atomic weapons program--meaning Britain.
NATIONAL DEFENSE: A
Russian Sputniks forced a U.S. decision to bring meaningful unification to the military, unclog command channels and bring a significant degree of order to the defense chaos that had each service building one or more of its own weapons systems, hindered the U.S. in the missile race. In the field of national defense, Congress compiled a first-rate record.
Pentagon Reorganization. This was an Eisenhower must. Georgia Democrat Carl Vinson, chairman of powerful House Armed Services Committee and longtime advocate of Navy's strength-through-separation theory, huffed and puffed against Administration program, buckled under no-quarter Administration determination. In Senate, need for reorganization had been made obvious during constructive subcommittee hearings chaired by Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson. Result: a signal Administration victory in a bill which 1) put the Defense Secretary in direct command of the armed forces, dropping the separate secretaries of Air Force, Navy and Army from the operational (but not administrative) chain of command; 2) gave the Defense Secretary explicit authority to assign weapons to services as he sees fit; 3) gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct operational authority, enlarged the J.C.S. general staff from 210 to 400 officers, authorized three service chiefs, who double as J.C.S. members, to delegate their services duties (but not their responsibilities) to their vice chiefs; and 4) put a new director of Research and Engineering, responsible to the Defense Secretary, in direct control of all R. & D.
Outer Space. To oversee the U.S. reach toward outer space (and to overcome the interservice rivalries that had confused the U.S. missile and space programs), Congress created a Pentagon Advanced Research Projects Agency and a civilian counterpart for nonmilitary exploration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, to be set up much like the Atomic Energy Commission.
Armed Forces Pay. As incentive for career military service, Congress passed a $576 million military-pay-raise bill, which rewarded initiative and special skills in the enlisted grades, substantially raised the pay of top-ranking officers.
THE ECONOMY: B-MINUS
Recession in an election year brought an almost irresistible political demand for tax cuts and pump priming. President Eisenhower, strongly and effectively backed by Treasury Secretary Robert Anderson, held fast, insisted that the recession was leveling off and the upswing would soon begin. Congress did do some wasteful pump priming--but its record is more significant for what it considered but did not carry out.
Tax Policy. Treasury's Texan Anderson reached agreement with congressional Texans Johnson and Sam Rayburn to keep tax cuts out of politics, won a wait-and-see period. Result: notable absence of grass-roots demand for tax cuts helped Congress avoid political temptation, keep income, corporation and most excise taxes at present levels.
Pork Barrel. At height of recession flap, Congress rushed through a monstrous pork-barrel (rivers & harbors) bill authorizing $1.7 billion for construction projects, some without engineering studies. An Eisenhower veto brought back a more reasonable bill, which the President, somewhat reluctantly, okayed.
Unemployment Compensation. President Eisenhower wanted to extend unemployment compensation benefits--within reason. But House Democrats tried to ram through an all-things-to-all-men bill costing $1.5 billion. The President denounced it as "dole," and a House majority rallied behind him. Result: a $665 million bill extending unemployment benefits up to 15 weeks beyond previous limits.
Other Pump Primers. With emotions ranging from cold to lukewarm, President Eisenhower signed these pump primers: a $1.8 billion emergency housing bill, a $5.5 billion highway construction bill and a $524 million federal civilian pay raise. In the congressional works last week was a $700 million increase in social security benefits--and it is threatened by veto.
STATEHOOD: B
After years of stalling, Congress finally voted Alaska to statehood--but it left its job half done by refusing to recognize the equally valid credentials of Hawaii.
FARM POLICY: C
When President Eisenhower and Agriculture Secretary Ezra Taft Benson asked for authorization to peg farm subsidies as low as 60% of parity, the Democratic Congress rammed through a 75% parity freeze--which Ike brusquely vetoed. Then 1958's farm prosperity (TIME, May 12) began splitting the congressional farm bloc: the House refused even to consider a wild, catchall Democratic farm bill, and the Senate passed a strong bill which would 1) significantly lower price supports, and 2) loosen acreage controls for corn, cotton, rice and grains. Benson pronounced himself satisfied with the Senate bill--and fought to keep the House from diluting it. Speaker Sam Rayburn got mad at Benson's persistence, refused to force the farm bill to the floor. Unless Rayburn changes his mind, the 85th Congress rates a barely passing grade--on the theory that if it did no good, it did no harm either.
LABOR LEGISLATION: F
The investigating committee headed by Arkansas' Democratic Senator John McClellan had demonstrated with frightening clarity the need for remedial labor legislation. Urged on by Labor Secretary James Mitchell, Massachusetts' Democratic Senator John Kennedy and New York's Republican Senator Irving Ives co-sponsored a fairly satisfactory bill that would require 1) periodic secret-ballot union elections, and 2) regular union reporting to the U.S. Labor Department on financial and other dealings, under threat of subpoena. But Sam Rayburn kept the Senate-passed bill stalled for weeks before finally promising to work for it. If Rayburn gets the measure passed, the Kennedy-Ives bill rates no more than a B. And if it dies, the 85th Congress will have flunked cold.
Dwight Eisenhower's own grade rating of the 85th, second session: "A pretty good record of accomplishment."
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