Monday, Jun. 03, 1957

Green Light for Stassen

Gathered around Dwight Eisenhower in a suddenly convened White House session one morning last week were the eight leaders of his diplomatic, military, atomic energy and intelligence teams. Key men among them: Secretary of State Dulles, U.S. Disarmament Specialist Harold Stassen, and Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The meeting followed hard on the heels of other top-level, top-secret conferences--by the National Security Council, by the State and Defense Departments' top brass. And it was called to allow the President to settle a disagreement that had broken-out in his official family over U.S. disarmament policy, and thus to crystallize a set of firm U.S. positions which Harold Stassen could take with him--in written form --when he flew back to London for another round of disarmament talks.

"Open Mind." Although many of the basic decisions had already been worked out at the earlier meetings, the original disagreement had evidently run deep. Eight days before, when Stassen first reported home from London for new instructions, it was with the cheery word that the Russians, after two years of backing and filling over President Eisenhower's "open skies" inspection plan, now seriously wanted to negotiate a "partial" agreement on mutual aerial inspection and arms reduction. To hard-bitten Admiral Radford, Happy Harold Stassen's expressions of "cautious optimism'' about the possibility of such agreement had an ominous sound. Snapped the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, returning to Washington from a three-week Latin American survey tour: "We cannot trust the Russians on this or anything. The Communists have broken their word with every country with which they ever had an agreement."

The President seized the first opportunity at his press conference to volunteer an implied rebuke for Radford's skepticism: so important is it for the U.S. to "work on this business of disarmament," said Ike, that it must not find itself "recalcitrant . . . picayunish about the thing. We ought to have an open mind and make it possible for others ... to meet us halfway." At the end of the 2 1/2-hour White House meeting, Dulles announced that the President had personally "resolved" the remaining "unresolved issues" in U.S. disarmament policy, and had made the final decisions.

Dulles was not saying what the instructions were, but word leaked out that in London the U.S. will seek Big Power agreement to a treaty:

P:Limiting nuclear weapons production to countries now possessing them, i.e., the U.S., Britain, Russia. The Big Three would agree not to turn over weapons to a fourth country.

P:Halting all future production of nuclear material for arms, with a pledge to begin gradual diversion of nuclear stockpiles to peaceful uses--possibly through the yet-to-be-ratified International Atomic Energy Agency.

P:Setting up an aerial (limited "open skies") and ground inspection system to make sure the treaty subscribers live up to its requirements.

P:Halting nuclear weapons testing as soon as the development of the inspection system and the manufacture ban makes it feasible. A possible first step: an early stop to big H-bomb tests, if it can be guaranteed that violations can be promptly detected.

P:Cutting back 10%-15% in major conventional arms--aircraft, ships, artillery, etc.--by turning them over to disarmament depots, staffed by international inspectors, for possible destruction. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would agree to cut back military manpower to 2,500,000 men each.

Risks v. Opportunities. At week's end, his briefcase bulging with the U.S.'s new-position papers, Stassen flew back to London. Even more important than his specific instructions was the fact that the President had authorized him--and committed the U.S.--to take the "first step" if the other nations would take it, too. The risks, the President knew, were considerable. A faulty step could involve the U.S. in acrimony with its non-nuclear allies--especially with West Germany, which is already stirring with the unfounded suspicion that Washington is about to conclude an arms "deal" with Moscow before ensuring German reunification. A more faulty step could give the Soviets an enormous propaganda victory--or even worse, bring great peril to the U.S.

In Ike's view, the risks are outweighed by the opportunities. If the Russians (as he said at his press conference) now show themselves to be "reasonable, logical men," the first reversal in the eleven-year-old East-West armaments race might be in sight.

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