Problem's Solution?

In the cool of the early morning, S.S. President Jackson moved into Suez and took on veteran Egyptian Pilot Mahmoud Metwali. The Jackson paid $10,295 in tolls with a polite note indicating that she was obeying U.S. Government instructions to pay under protest. Then, with the U.S. flag flying at the stern and the green Egyptian flag at the foremast truck, President Jackson steamed slowly northward into the canal at the head of a convoy of four ships. Mahmoud Younis, manager of Egypt's Suez Canal administration, wired the twelve passengers a Happy Easter and a pleasant trip. At Ismailia, U.S. Lieut. General Raymond A. Wheeler left his office in the U.N. canal-clearance headquarters, appeared on the canal bank to salute the ship's captain and wave to the passengers.

That evening, as Jackson cleared the northern end of the canal and sailed into the Mediterranean, Egypt's Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi released a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, declaring: "The government of Egypt are pleased to announce that the Suez Canal is now open for normal traffic." Accompanying the letter was a "declaration" of President Gamal Abdel Nasser's charter for the operation of the canal. The declaration, wrote Fawzi, "constitutes an international instrument," and he asked Hammarskjold to register it as such.

"Very close to unacceptable," said the French. "Vague and elusive," said the British. A U.S. diplomat commented more cautiously: "We're not happy with it; we don't think it's as good as it could be--but it's a lot better than what we started with. We think it ought to be given a try."

Respecting the Spirit. From the preamble to the end of the short (1,000 words) document, it was evident that Nasser was anxious to get business, to show himself conciliatory, and to proclaim Egypt's respect for law. The document declared Egypt's "unaltered policy and firm purpose to respect the terms and the spirit of the Constantinople Convention of 1888."

On one point Nasser was adamant: the canal would be run exclusively by Nasser's Suez Canal authority, with no advice from anyone. But after weeks of talk in Cairo between Fawzi and U.S. Ambassador Raymond A. Hare, Nasser had gone a considerable way toward meeting the user nations' demands for protection against abuses. His willingness to accept arbitration and the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, his volunteered limitation of toll increases, his undertaking to maintain and improve the canal in accordance with the old company's plans, and his acknowledgement of the old company's rights to compensation, were all clearly stated pledges.

But in response to Hare's pleas for recognition of the right of a user-nation organization to consult and cooperate in the canal's operation, Nasser conceded only that the Canal Authority would "welcome and encourage cooperation"--with "representatives of shipping and trade"--meaning companies, not nations.

Off the Hook. Many of the terms of the declaration can be traced to the ingenious brain of India's Krishna Menon, who spent two days in consultation with Nasser last March. Convinced that it would take months to negotiate a multisided agreement between Egypt and the users while the canal stood idle, Menon seized on the idea of working out the terms as a unilateral pledge and registering it with the U.N. as "an international instrument," thus partially answering the charge that the terms could be changed any time and without notice at Nasser's whim. The terms can still be repudiated --so can the treaty--but at a cost of greater publicity and opprobrium. Reportedly, Nasser also confided to Menon that he was willing to let the World Court settle the question of Israeli passage through the canal, saying: "After some months, the court will probably decide against me, but I will be off the hook with the rest of the Arab world"--which is fanatically opposed to any sign of softness to Israel.

A month ago there was brave talk of summoning Egypt before the Security Council for a reckoning. Last week there was no longer any thought of that. U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge declared for the U.S.: "Perhaps no final judgment can be made . . . until it has been tried and in practice." France, Britain and Australia stated subdued reservations, but avoided any irretrievable defiance.

The basic objection to Nasser's offer is that it is a unilateral declaration, which gives the users no sure right of redress in case of abuse. Legal experts found many loopholes Nasser could use, if he chose, to escape the apparent pledges he had made. But given Nasser's good faith, and his need to keep the canal going, the terms seemed workable. Given his bad faith, even a more binding .agreement would be worth little. The test of performance by Egypt over the next few months will prove whether Nasser is really prepared to make an honest and workable accommodation for the shipping nations of the world.

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