Monday, Mar. 04, 1957
"What I'm Going To Do"
THE PRESIDENCY 'What I'm Going to Do' Into the vortex of the Israel crisis flew the President of the U.S., his forehead deeply furrowed, his mood somber as he alighted from an Air Force Constellation at Washington National Airport in a cold and soaking rain. "This is some weather," he growled to his military and naval aides, hankering back to the vacation he had just cut short in sunny Thomasville, Ga. As he sped off downtown to the White House, Ike huddled down into his tan raincoat, reached often into his left coat pocket for a handkerchief, breaking out every now and then into a hacking cough.
The Middle East situation, explained an Administration spokesman, was "very serious." Around Ike as he got down to talks with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. the pressures of Israel v. the Arabs were piling up menacingly. On Israel's behalf, public pressures were spreading through Congress all the way up through Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson and Minority Leader William Fife Knowland to the White House door. Ike had come back from Georgia to press his step-by-step program. His next move: talk it out with top Senators and Representatives in secret session beginning the next day at 8:30 a.m.
Fears of Guerrillas. Around the polished brown mahogany table in the White House Cabinet room the congressional leaders gathered--Senators seated up front with Ike, Dulles. Lodge and Nixon, Representatives seated against the walls. A Filipino mess steward served coffee. (Ike drank Sanka.) Through the long French windows a light snow could be seen covering the rose garden as the President began to speak: "Here is the situation and what I'm going to do about it."
The situation was that Israel was refusing to get out of the last of its conquered territory (the Gaza Strip, the Gulf of Aqaba shore) without specific guarantees, and that the Arab-Asians were demanding U.N. sanctions.*If Israel did not withdraw, said Ike, there would almost surely be a new guerrilla war that might stoke up a general war, in which the Russians might once more be tempted to intervene. If the Israelis did not withdraw and the U.N. did not act, the U.N. would be more or less through. As for the Arabs, Ike pointed out that they could scarcely be expected to negotiate with the Israelis while Israel has "a foot in their face." As for himself, he added that it was impossible to negotiate or compromise "with a country while it has its troops in the territory of another." ' Hopes for Unanimity. If the U.S. did not take a firm stand for principle, the U.S. would lose its friends and its ability to influence events in the Middle East, Ike said, and he intended to take just such a stand. Then, his voice rasped by his brief speech, Ike waved toward Dulles: "You take over, Foster."
Secretary Dulles, occasionally badgered and prodded by Lyndon Johnson and others, tried to explain away congressional and public concern that the U.S. had not talked sanctions when the Russians defied the U.N. in Hungary. It had long been implied, he said, that if sanctions were ever applied either to the U.S. or Russia the U.N. probably would break up and there might be war. Anyway, the U.S. already was applying a kind of sanction to Russia by limiting trade with Communist nations.
As the congressional leaders, ranging from the G.O.P.'s Bill Knowland to the Democrats' Bill Fulbright spoke up, Eisenhower and Dulles seemed increasingly surprised and pleased that the Congressmen were not repeating their public sound-offs. So mild was the general tone that Ohio's Republican Representative John M. Vorys suggested that the group put out a unanimous statement that Israel should withdraw. He was frowned down by Massachusetts' John McCormack the Democratic House leader.
''But what will we tell the newspapermen about sanctions?" Bill Knowland wondered aloud, and quickly the group abandoned the idea of trying to work out a joint statement. Then Georgia's Senator Richard Brevard Russell sensed the end of the meeting. "Mr. President, you face one of the awesome responsibilities of your office," he said, "and we don't want to add to that burden." Democrat Russell advised Ike to take a step Ike had been pondering: a nationwide radio-TV talk to the nation. "The American people," said Russell, "generally rally around the President when they have the facts."
Promises of Support. As the President walked into his office that evening beneath the glare of the TV lights, his cough was still bothering him. "This is going to be a struggle," he said three minutes before air time. He began by asking his audience to forgive any interruption because of "a very stubborn cough" (see below). But soon he was surely and sharply retracing the ways in which the U.S. and U.N. step-by-step policy had got results--the British-French withdrawal, the partial Israeli withdrawal, the clearing of the Suez Canal. "We are approaching a fateful moment." he said, "when either we must recognize that the U.N. is unable to restore peace in this area, or the U.N. must renew with increased vigor its efforts to bring about Israeli withdrawal."
He reviewed his correspondence with Israel's Prime Minister Ben-Gurion urging voluntary withdrawal, his recent offer of U.S. support, after Israel's withdrawal, for U.N. deployment in the Gaza Strip and for free and innocent passage of the Gulf of Aqaba (which might open up a profitable oil route for Israel--see map). "But Israel seeks something more. It insists on firm guarantees as a condition to withdrawing its forces of invasion. This raises a basic question of principle. Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of U.N. disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its own withdrawal? If we agree that armed attack can properly achieve the purposes of the assailant, then I fear we will have turned back the clock of international order . . .
"If the U.N. once admits that international disputes can be settled by using force then we will have destroyed the very foundation of the organization, and our best hope for establishing a world order. That would be a disaster for us all."
"To Exert Pressure." Carefully Ike repeated Dulles' point about double standards: it was simply not possible to apply heavy sanctions to Russia short of war, and in any event a law-minded nation such as Israel could hardly be regarded in the same light as Russia. If Egypt violates the armistice agreement, it "should be dealt with firmly by the society of nations." As he drove home his points, however, Ike rarely moved far from his central theme: "The United Nations must not fail," he said, looking directly into the cameras. "I believe that in the interests of peace the U.N. has no choice but to exert pressure upon Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolutions.
"Of course, we still hope that the government of Israel will see that its best immediate interests and longterm interests lie in compliance with the U.N. and in the declaration of the U.S. with regard to its future."
By week's end the Arabs and Asians had introduced their sanctions resolution in the U.N. (see FOREIGN NEWS), but they soon allowed the session to adjourn so that
Israel and the U.S. could talk. The U.N.'s own tireless Dag Hammarskjold said he had got Egypt to agree to let the U.N. deploy into the Gaza Strip. The President received a letter from Israel's Ben-Gurion that was considered "constructive," whereupon Israel's Ambassador to the U.S..Abba Eban, flew back from Israel. Dulles held an unusual Sunday conference at his home with congressional leaders, then a few hours later met with Eban. and a new round of diplomacy got under way. But should Israel remain recalcitrant, the President of the U.S. intended-to stand on his demand that Israel get all the way out of Egypt or pay the price that the U.N. thought necessary. "The present moment is a grave one," said Eisenhower, "but we are hopeful that reason and right will prevail."
*Although U.S. officials hoped at week's end that the crisis will not come to sanctions against Israel, one stroke of the President's pen could shatter the Israeli economy. In 1956 Israel had a deficit of $365 million, most of it made up with income from U.S. sources--including $49 million in U.S. Government aid, $91 million from philanthropic organizations like United Jewish Appeal, $52 million from U.S. sales of Israel Bonds, $74 million from private U.S. remittances.
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