How Britain France and Israel Got Together

THE CONSPIRACY

WITHIN 24 hours after Israel invaded Egypt, Britain and France joined in an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel--and then began to bomb Cairo.

Israel's Foreign Ministry talked of "the unexpected intervention of Britain and France." Britain's Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd protested: "There was no prior agreement between us." Despite their words, there was plenty of evidence to show that the two attacks were planned in collusion ("orchestration" was the French word for it). In this conspiracy, France was the instigator, Britain a belated partner, and Israel the willing trigger.

First & Fastest. The evidence of premeditation runs back nearly two months. France moved first, and fastest. Angry and frustrated by their troubles in Algeria, the French wanted to get Nasser. Within days of Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal Co., Premier Guy Mollet sent his Defense Minister to London to concert a joint military plan for reoccupying the canal.

The joint organization was set up and named Amilcar (after Hannibal's father). While diplomats attended London conferences and took appeals to the U.N., the British-French forces gathered on Cyprus. Tanks were painted sand-yellow, occupation currency was printed, plans were made for the requisitioning of civilian air transports. The target was Egypt; the plans at this stage had nothing to do with Israel.

Shortly thereafter, the French made a basic political decision: courtship of the Arabs was over. From then on, France set to work to woo Israel, the Arabs' enemy. Menachim Beigin, onetime terrorist and leader of Israel's hot-headed Herut party, visited Paris and was invited to address the Chamber of Deputies--an unprecedented honor for an opposition politician of a foreign country. Secretly, France shipped Israel an extra 30 Mystere jet fighters. On Sept. 23, Israel's Premier David Ben-Gurion joyfully proclaimed that Israel had at last found "a true ally." (The U.S. embassy in Israel sent round to ask who, got no answer.)

Late Joiner. At first, Britain was not I in on this act. Britain was still busy try-I ing to outbid Nasser for leadership of the I Arab world. Early in October, Sir Anthony I Eden infuriated the Israelis by suggesting Va peace based on the 1947 partition plan, which would cost Israel all the territory it won later by beating the Arabs. Jordan was the battleground of Britain's contest with Nasser. Jordan had kicked out Britain's Glubb Pasha, but still needed its $33-million-a-year subsidy from Britain. At London's urging, Iraq (Britain's only ally in the Arab world) offered Jordan military aid. But Iraq's offer came down to two planeloads of small arms; Nasser topped that by sending five Vampire jets. As a last resort, Britain proposed to send Iraqi troops into Jordan in an attempt to prevent a takeover by a Nasser-minded government in Jordan's forthcoming elections. On Oct. 12 Israel let it be known that such a move would mean war. Britain backed down, and Jordan veered conclusively toward Nasser. It was a decisive event.

With Jordan's virtual loss, Britain saw her own position in the Arab world crumbling. Britain was bitter and disillusioned at the failure of her efforts to bring Nasser to heel. In the U.N., the Russians had just vetoed the latest effort to force a solution on Egypt. Both British and French were increasingly annoyed at U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. In their view, Dulles had precipitated Nasser's anger by his abrupt decision to end the Aswan dam deal. Furthermore, when Nasser countered by seizing the canal company, Dulles had talked the British and French out of strong measures, and then, as they saw it, reneged on his implied promise to pay for an economic boycott of the canal--leaving Nasser triumphant and unpunished.

Day of Decision. On Oct. 16 Sir Anthony Eden and Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd flew to Paris to meet with Mollet and Foreign Minister Christian Pineau. Barring all advisers from the room, the four conferred in deepest secrecy for five hours.

This presumably was the moment when Britain made the fateful decision--at France's urging--to back Israel in the Middle East. As the French knew, Israel was already on the edge of launching a preventive war. The evidence indicates that it was at the Oct. 16 Paris meeting --twelve days before Israel's invasion of Egypt--that Eden and Mollet agreed to reoccupy the Suez Canal Zone jointly on the pretext of protecting it from Israel's planned attack. Whether or not Israel was so informed is not clear (they intended to attack anyway), but from then on, Israel apparently kept France (and through France, Britain) abreast of its moves.

Answering criticism of his inaction at a Cabinet meeting about this time, Premier Mollet blurted: "You must have confidence in me. Something is going to happen before the end of the year. I cannot say any more: there is a diplomatic secret to be kept." Also, from that moment forward, U.S. diplomats lost all contact with their London and Paris diplomatic sources on Middle East matters. U.S. queries were turned aside, requests for information evaded, interviews deferred.

The Date. State Department officials are sure that the British and French callously deceived or misled them from this date onward. On Oct. 23 Pineau dashed over to London, reportedly to tell Eden that Israel was all ready to launch preventive war on Nasser. Ben-Gurion's moment was well chosen because, it was reasoned, 1) the U.S. would not dare move decisively against Israel on the verge of a presidential election, and 2) the Hungarian rebellion, then at its height, would keep Russia's hands tied.

Eden did not tell the U.S. He did not inform the members of the Common wealth, he did not tell the House of Commons, he did not inform his party colleagues. In fact, in the Foreign Office itself, only Lloyd seems to have been privy to the plan. Selwyn Lloyd chose this moment to indicate to the U.S. that he had fresh hopes of a peaceful Suez settlement.

On Thursday, Oct. 25, when Israel began its swift and quiet mobilization, U.S. military attaches noticed that their French and British colleagues had suddenly stopped talking to them. The French and British also seemed to know far more about Israeli mobilization than the Americans did.

Delay & Foreknowledge. The two days of crisis were Monday and Tuesday of last week. All through those hectic 48 hours, there was a clear pattern: the British and French knew what the Israelis were doing, and in advance; the U.S. did not. Eleven hours before the first Israeli vehicle rolled across the Egyptian border, Pineau dashed over to London. To an aide who asked whether there would be a war, Pineau was reported as saying: "I can't tell you yet." In Jerusalem, Britain's Ambassador Sir John Nicholls was told that morning that the Israeli army would jump off at nightfall, and relayed the news to Eden. Eden said nothing to the U.S. In Washington, knowing only of the Israeli mobilization, Eisenhower announced that the U.S. would "honor our pledge" under the Tripartite Agreement of 1950, which pledged the U.S. to act in concert with Britain and France "within and outside the United Nations" against an aggressor in the Middle East. Only last February, Eden had come to Washington to press for a firm U.S. commitment to back that agreement.

But in a matter of hours after Eisen hower's statement, State Department officials concluded that Britain considered the Tripartite Agreement a dead letter. That afternoon Dulles summoned British and French diplomats to get their cooperation in calling an early emergency meeting of the Security Council. They stalled. Apparently they had orders to delay until the ultimatum could be delivered next day.

It soon became apparent that the British were not interested either in halting the Israeli attack or in branding the Israelis as aggressors. In London, Lloyd summoned U.S. Ambassador Winthrop Aldrich early Tuesday morning to urge that the U.S. resolution omit any reference to aggression. Significantly, though Britain and France were going to deliver an ultimatum to Egypt that day, Lloyd said nothing to Aldrich about Britain's intent.

According to Plan. At 4:30 p.m. British time (11:30 a.m. Washington time), Eden announced the ultimatum--an ultimatum that demanded in effect that Egypt withdraw 100 miles from its own frontiers and accept British-French occupation of the Canal Zone on the ground that the British and French had to protect the canal from the Israelis (they then proceeded to bomb not the Israelis but the Egyptians). Neither the U.S. nor the Commonwealth was notified until 15 minutes later. The President of the U.S. learned of the ultimatum in Jacksonville, Fla. by news ticker.

In Paris, the Assembly had to wait until 10 o'clock for Premier Mollet to get back from London and make a parallel announcement of the ultimatum. After the Assembly's vote of confidence, Defense Minister Maurice Bourges-Maunoury stopped off at his office for ten minutes to clean up some papers, and then went home to bed. Apparently, everything had been all arranged, long before.

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