Suez Session

Seven foreign ministers, the largest number ever to attend a U.N. Security Council meeting, turned up in New York last week to debate the Suez crisis. Russia's bulky Dmitry Shepilov, jutting tall above his clump of Soviet assistants, moved about with a big smile and gladhand. Belgium's Paul Henri Spaak popped cherubically into place. The U.S.'s John Foster Dulles, arriving at the last moment, moved coldly past Shepilov to shake the hand of France's moon-faced Christian Pineau. For the instigators of the session, Great Britain and France, Britain's Selwyn Lloyd leaned forward and put the issue: "We are determined to uphold our rights, rights properly secured and guaranteed, to free transit through this international waterway." It was an almost typical beginning for a debate on the world's most serious grievances. But it quickly became clear that the desire of most, if not all, was to get done with the oratory and slip into a closed room where the foreign ministers could negotiate directly. Ostensible terms for the negotiations were set out in a resolution introduced by the British and French, calling for Egypt's acceptance of last August's 18-nation plan for international operation of the canal. But that had already been rejected by Egypt and by Russia and was therefore probably doomed to die under Russia's veto. Even the U.S., though Dulles promised to vote for the resolution, was plainly without confidence in it ; there was still no decisive unanimity between the American and the Anglo-French diplomats on the steps that ought to be taken.

So the goal of the closed negotiations had to be something else than a full Egyptian about-face. The idea may be not to find a settlement in itself, said one of the ministers, but merely to explore whether there is any basis at all for try ing to negotiate a settlement.

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