Invoking Moral Force

While British and French troops moved to the alert in the tense Suez Canal crisis, the U.S. last week took a firm stand for moderation. In one of the most unusual gambles in diplomatic history, the President and the Secretary of State proposed to confront Egypt's President Nasser with the pressures of moral law, then stood back to await the consequences.

Flying home from conferences with the British and French in London (see FOREIGN NEWS), Dulles radiotelephoned to the White House a request to report to the nation on the crisis. Seven hours after touchdown, he sat before the TV cameras in the President's office, listened attentively while the President introduced him. Said Dwight Eisenhower: "All of us ... were vastly disturbed when Colonel Nasser a few days ago declared that Egypt intended to nationalize the Suez Canal Company."

"Fancied Grievances." In schoolmaster fashion, Dulles spelled out the ABCs of the situation. The Suez Canal was by far the world's busiest waterway. It was open by international agreement at all hours to all vessels, and was vital to the West. Nasser had recognized the international status of the waterway only a couple of years ago, but now Nasser had nationalized the Canal Company "for purely selfish purposes."

"President Nasser . . . said that Egypt was determined to score one triumph after another in order to enhance what he called 'the grandeur of Egypt.' And he coupled his action with statements about his ambition to extend his influence from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf . . . His seizure of the Canal Company was an angry act of retaliation against fancied grievances."

"No Commitments." As such, said Dulles, Nasser's exploitation of the canal was "inadmissible." To let the seizure "go unchallenged would be to encourage a breakdown of the international fabric upon which the security and the well-being of all peoples depend. And the question, Mr. President, as we've agreed, is not whether something should be done about this Egyptian act--but what should be done about it."

Dulles explained, in effect, that by taking a position of moderation the U.S. was restraining "some people who counseled immediate forcible action," i.e., the Brit ish and the French. On Dulles' urging, the U.S., Britain and France had agreed instead to convene a 24-nation conference of nations principally affected by the canal seizure (including Russia and Egypt, excluding Israel) to negotiate what he carefully termed "an adequate and dependable international administration of the canal on terms which would respect, and generously respect, all the legitimate rights of Egypt." But what if Nasser chose not to heed the moral forces of the conference, even to attend it? Said Dulles: "We have given no commitments at any time as to what the U.S. would do in that unhappy contingency ... I believe that by this conference we will invoke moral forces which are bound to prevail."

Dulles' moderation line blunted the demands of the British and the French for direct, quick retaliation against Egypt. But by taking its stand, the U.S. had for better or worse assumed the leadership in the tense situation. Should the force of law bring an effective settlement in the Middle East, the favorable repercussions would be of sweeping significance. But a failure--or any effort to let Nasser go his way unrepentant--would be a tremendous blow to the Eisenhower-Dulles policy and to U.S. prestige everywhere.

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