The Dramatic Gambit

On the broad chessboard of international diplomacy, the U.S. moved decisively last week in a gambit that took the breath of professionals for its daring and won the assent of kibitzers for its instinctive rightness. With an open show of sternness, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles advised Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser that the U.S. is no longer interested in building the $1.3 billion Aswan High Dam.

In so doing, Dulles indicated to everyone around the board, neutrals, allies and Communists alike, that the U.S. remains unawed by bold Communist boasts of matching the West in economic competition--in particular in the financing and building of the high dam on the Nile. And if neutrals want to dart and barter between the two, this will be a kind of "fearful risk" that they will have to worry about. They can no longer hope to seize the best of both worlds.

Dangling Offer. Seven months ago the U.S. offered Egypt a preliminary $56 million loan to start construction at Aswan. Aided by Britain ($14 million) and the World Bank ($200 million), the U.S. was willing to supply the major part of the capital to finish the mighty three-mile dam. But the offer was left dangling. Nasser, who had mortgaged $200 million worth of cotton not yet planted as barter for Czechoslovakian weapons, occupied himself by recognizing Red China and by planning a trip to Moscow. And when Soviet Minister Dmitri Shepilov visited Cairo last month, Nasser's spokesman whispered that Russia had renewed its offer to finance the dam with a 20-year loan at 2%.

Such double-trading drew no cry of outrage from the U.S.--and no rush to offer still better terms. Early last week, in the face of this resounding U.S. silence, Egypt's "diplomatic sources" announced that Nasser had decided to let the West build his dam after all. Chubby Ambassador Ahmed Hussein rushed from Cairo to Washington to consummate the deal, emerged sadly from a 50-minute interview with Dulles.

So that there could be no misunderstanding of U.S. feeling, the President transferred able U.S. Ambassador Henry Byroade, who had been involved in the earlier offers to Nasser, to South Africa, replaced him by uncommitted Raymond A. Hare (see Foreign Relations). From London quickly came an official announcement that offers for the Anglo-Egyptian loan likewise were being canceled and private comments that Britain would not feel amiss if Nasser's debacle resulted in his downfall.

Sunbathed Neutrals. The Dulles decision won hearty approval in Congress, where cotton-state legislators are nervous about cotton-growing Egypt and where Zionist spokesmen have held Nasser to be the Middle East's archvillain. The Sen ate Appropriations Committee earlier had been so bold as to "order" Dulles not to make the Aswan loan from Mutual Security funds. Dulles firmly resisted such an unconstitutional demand. But the whole argument became academic when Dulles decided, for foreign policy reasons, on his big no.

Carefully made and tactfully timed, the decision was announced as Nasser ended chats at sunbathed Brioni with co-Neutralists Tito and Nehru (see FOREIGN NEWS). Before making it, the U.S. considered carefully not only the effect on Nasser and neutrals, but on other Arab states, e.g., Saudi Arabia, where the U.S. is delicately negotiating for air-base rights at Dhahran. The probable effect: a feeling among cabal-loving Arabs that Nasser deserved the consequences.

Fast Answer. At home most editorial writers were impressed, but they croaked a warning: the decision played squarely into Russian hands, gave the Soviet an opportunity to build the dam and a toehold in the Middle East. U.S. policymakers had thought most about this aspect of the decision. There was strong doubt that the Communists could afford to build Aswan Dam. If they tried, the outlay would put further strain on relationships with restive, underfed and agitating satellites. Moreover, the risk of Soviet penetration was no greater than the risk of having Nasser go on with his fast-and-loose game in the precarious Middle East.

At week's end the Russians themselves provided an unexpectedly fast answer for the quidnuncs. In Moscow Foreign Minister Shepilov was asked if the Soviet would now rush in to make its loan to Egypt for the Aswan Dam. Said Shepilov: Russia is ready to help with industrialization projects. But, said he innocently, it had no intention of financing Aswan Dam. In a word, "nyet."

It was highly possible that Chessmaster Dulles already had his opponents in check.

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