The Secretary's Defense

Forty-eight hours after Secretary of State John Foster Dulles landed in Washington after his vacation in the Bahamas, he sat down in the crowded Senate caucus room last week to face the storm over U.S. foreign policy. In charge was Georgia's Walter George, who had called the unusual open session of the Foreign Relations Committee primarily to find out about the off-again, on-again Saudi Arabian tank shipment. But it was obvious from one look at the squall line of Democratic liberals (Minnesota's Hubert Humphrey, Alabama's John Sparkman, Arkansas' Bill Fulbright) at the end of the committee table--busy conferring around piles of books, maps, clippings and notes--that much more than that was coming.

Dulles got quickly to the point with a prepared statement about U.S. policy in the Middle East, stressing that it has one basic aim: maintenance of peace. Recognizing needs of defense and internal security, he said, the U.S. might sell more arms to both the Arabs and the Israelis. But he believes that the hope of little Israel lies in mutual security through the United Nations, not in an arms race with the immensely larger and more populous Arab states.

"We are dealing here in this area with problems of tremendous delicacy and complexity," said the Secretary of State. "Our difficulty in dealing successfully with this problem derives very largely from the fact that the Arabs believe that the United States is, in the last analysis, dominated by domestic political considerations . . . I can say that it is the determination of this Administration to deal with the problem purely from the standpoint of the best interests of the United States, and to deal on a basis . . . of friendly impartiality."

Presidential Concurrence. Dulles turned the first questions about the Saudi tanks over to Under Secretary Herbert Hoover Jr., who handled the case in the Secretary's absence. Hoover's answers were firm. He had made the decision to hold up the tanks, then had made the subsequent decision 43 hours later to let them go. Why? Because charges in the press and on the radio had created doubt and confusion, and he wanted the people of the U.S. to be sure that "all of these matters would be thoroughly investigated." Had he discussed the problem with President Eisenhower? "The decision was fully concurred in by the President, and I do not believe that I should discuss my relations with the Executive." What Hoover did not discuss was the fact that most of the impetus toward the hold order had come from the President, vacationing in Thomasville, Ga. Lacking full information on the transaction, and informed by Press Secretary James Hagerty that there was great furor about it, the President wanted the shipment held until he, as well as the public, could be reassured.

When the committee got Dulles back in its sights, it wanted to know more about Middle East policy. Could those tanks be used for Arab aggression against Israel? No, said the Secretary of State, he had the assurance of the military that there was no way of getting them to the Israel border. Was the sale of the tanks related to U.S. maintenance of an air base in Saudi Arabia? "Only in this sense, that if we refused to give the Saudi Arabian government its reasonable requirement in this area, it is probable, at least possible, that our air base agreement would not be renewed."

Soviet Dilemma. Before long Humphrey, Sparkman and Fulbright began to bear down on the new threat implicit in the changing Soviet policies. If they expected Dulles to be on the defensive, they were surprised.

There are indeed great problems and grave dangers, said Dulles in substance, but the U.S. and the free world have made substantial gains against a failing Soviet Union policy.

Fulbright: Do you think this last meeting which just ended . . . or that the speeches of Khrushchev and the other leaders in the Russian government would indicate a failure in their foreign policy?

Dulles: Absolutely, sir . . . For 30 years Soviet foreign policy and Soviet policy generally has been based upon two principles: namely, intolerance of any non-Communist system . . . and also upon the policy of using violence as a means of getting their results . . . Those policies have gradually ceased to produce any results . . . They have got to revamp their whole creed from A to Z. It is a tremendous process for them because they have got to undo the teaching of many years and get onto a new basis . . . The unity and firmness and resolution of the free nations during the past few years have caused the Soviet policy to fail, and today they are trying to figure out how they are going to get a better one.

Fulbright: Was the news . . . that they were weak internally . . . borne out by the facts, do you think?

Dulles: They are weak internally in certain vital respects . . . They have pushed their heavy industry quite effectively . . . In the process they have neglected their other forms, their consumer goods and their agricultural situation, which is quite critical . . . They are in a very bad way.

In the decade since the end of World War II, Dulles continued, the Soviet Union has come to the realization "that our method of doing things is better than theirs." They are past masters at violence and subversion, but now they say that they are going to try mutual security and economic assistance and friendliness. "That is what we have been doing for ten years, and if we can't beat them at that game, then we ought to be ashamed of ourselves. I think we can."

As Dulles left the hearing room after four hours of testimony, the Democratic liberals were ready with statements of shocked incredulity for the press. But the overflow crowd gave Dulles a hearty round of applause. In his first hours against the storm, the Secretary of State had indeed done well. He had eased as many of the apprehensions about U.S. foreign policy as a Cabinet officer could. But the problems and the dangers were still there, and so was the heat of a presidential election year.

This week, at the Philadelphia Bulletin Forum, Secretary Dulles said that the U.S. can begin counteracting the new Soviet policy by adopting the mutual security program sent to Congress Jan. 16 by President Eisenhower, i.e., 1) appropriate $100 million more for fiscal 1957 than the $4.2 billion being spent this year, 2) place parts of the mutual security program on a long-range basis. Said Dulles: "We should not appropriate in a panic merely because of Soviet economic activities. There is, however, need for somewhat greater flexibility and for greater continuity. Some of the development projects which are most significant will take several years to complete. It is difficult for the countries concerned to arrange for financing these projects unless United States support can be relied upon not just for one year at a time but for several years."

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.