A Matter of Current Interest

Into the arena strode John Foster Dulles. More than 200 reporters, waiting in the State Department auditorium, were the lions--at least they were ready to growl. Dulles eyed them with a slight smile. "I have a brief statement to make," he began, "about a matter which I judge to be of current interest." He noted that an article in LIFE, which had said that the U.S. policy of strength had deterred the Communists from full-scale war in Korea, Indo-China and the FormosL Strait "has attracted much comment." He then read a statement:

"Let me say this: I did not write the article, I did not review or censor the article, or know of its title. I did not know in advance of its publication date, and, in fact, I did not read the article until after it was released for publication ... I believe that the United States should adopt every honorable course to avoid engagement in war. Indeed, I have devoted my whole life to the pursuit of a just and durable peace. I believe, however, that there are basic moral values and vital interests for which we stand, and that the surest way to avoid war is to let it be known in advance that we are prepared to defend these principles, if need be by life itself.

"This policy of seeking to prevent war by preventing miscalculation by a potential aggressor is not a personal policy; it is not a partisan policy; it is a national policy. It is expressed in mutual security treaties which we now have with 42 nations, and which the United States Senate has overwhelmingly approved . . .

"This policy of making clear our position in advance, of course, involves risks ... It is a calculated risk for peace. But as we have learned by hard experience, failure to make our position known in advance makes war more likely, because then an aggressor may miscalculate. The policy of deterrence is only one aspect of the task of maintaining a just and durable peace. It is necessary to be patient; it is necessary to be conciliatory; it is necessary to make our peace a vital force for justice and human welfare, so that all men will aspire to share that kind of peace. My views with respect to peace have been made known on many, many occasions, and there is no reason to think that they have altered because the article, like others dealing with complex subjects of foreign policy, inevitably tends to emphasize oversimplification and special emphasis."

"Brought." When Dulles concluded his statement, the questions came snapping in. Dulles would not say whether or not he recommended to the President a form of retaliation against Red China if it intervened in Indo-China: "I am not going to discuss the contents of the article, because that would make it into a sort of state paper." A reporter came back on Indo-China: "When are we going to get the facts?" Another reporter came back on Quemoy-Matsu: "Why do we not make our position clear?" Dulles replied to this one: "I think it is clear." The reporter said: "It is not clear to me, sir." Dulles said: "It is not clear to you because you, like me, cannot read the minds of the Chinese Communists. But to them, I think it is quite clear." The reporter persevered: "What do you think they think we mean to do?" Dulles answered: "I think that they think that if an attack is started there which comprehends a claim to take by force Formosa and the Penghus, that we will fight."

Dulles pointed out that many of his critics had drawn his statements to LIFE out of context, to the effect that "the getting to the brink of war might be our choice rather than a choice that was forced upon us ... The important thing is that we were brought to the verge of war by threats which were uttered in relation to Korea ... to Indo-China . . . and to Formosa." Dulles then attempted, a bit hopefully, to wind up the whole affair. "The substance of what had been attributed to me was substantially accurate and in line with what I previously had said ... I saw no reason to issue a repudiation or a correction . . . [But] the article, I'm sorry to say, gives me a great deal more credit than is my due. The title of it ["How Dulles Gambled and Won"] gives me too much credit; the article as a whole gives me too much credit, and, as such, it was bound to attract criticism in some quarters. I regret the fact that some people have given me too much credit, although I do not regret the fact that there are some people who seem to approve of what I have done."

"Yackety-yack." The row, of course, did not end there. All week U.S. Senators and other sundry public figures spoke out for and against John Foster Dulles.

For: Republican Senators Saltonstall, Wiley, Bridges, Mundt, Knowland, Thye, Bender, Alexander Smith; Cabinet members Charles E. Wilson, George M. Humphrey and Vice President Richard M. Nixon (who termed the row "yackety-yack").

Against: Democratic Senators Humphrey (five times at bat on the LIFE article), Symington, Sparkman, Fulbright, Mansfield; House Speaker Rayburn and Presidential Possibles Adlai Stevenson (three times at bat on the article), Estes Kefauver and Averell Harriman.

By week's end, however, the uproar showed signs of settling at least into international perspective. British Prime Minister Eden indirectly arrayed himself alongside Dulles on the essential point: that deterrence was the policy of Britain, the U.S. and their allies. The London Daily Telegraph sharply attacked Dulles for his wording, his timing, and his manner of self-expression, "but to allow these marginal comments to provoke us into denouncing the central burden of his argument--that peace has depended in the past and still depends on American willingness to fight--is to cut off England's nose to spite Dulles' face."

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