Opportunity

Thoughout a decade of cold war, the non-communist world has been divided on a key question. What is the best way to deal with the Communists? From a demanding position of strength? Or from a purely defensive position of conciliation? Last week, as the West welcomed a rearmed Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a clear answer came through the Iron Curtain. In the face of the new display of Western unity and strength, the Communists were reacting almost desperately to Western initiative.

The Red reaction took several forms. After ten years of stalling, the Soviet Union finally signed a peace treaty for Austria, agreeing to long-resisted clauses in return for Austrian neutrality. At the same time, with noticeable urgency, the Kremlin arranged a top-level mission to Yugoslavia, a pilgrimage to beg Marshal Tito to take a neutral position.

The Communist moves in Austria and Yugoslavia meant a considerable retreat from the old Soviet formula of swallowing up satellites and building an ever-expanding Communist front, a long way from 1948, when it was said that the Red army needed only shoes to march to the English Channel.

The Time Has Come." This week came the most important reaction of all: the U.S.S.R. accepted a Western invitation to a Big Four conference of the heads of government some time this summer. The invitation had been issued from Paris, where the NATO Council had met to accept their new colleague, West Germany's Konrad Adenauer.

The timing was all-important. For many months the U.S. had been resisting the idea of a "conference at the summit." Those months were the critical period when the issue of rearming West Germany hung in the balance. The U.S.S.R. made it menacingly plain that it would do everything it could and dared to prevent German rearmament. The Soviet attitude stirred neutralists and others to support a "conference at the summit" as a substitute for German rearmament. This sentiment was so strong that even Sir Winston Churchill repeatedly urged such a conference, if only to prove that Russian peace talk was insincere. The U.S. refused to be deflected from the defense of Europe by the conference clamor.

More recently, it has been increasingly apparent that Moscow recognizes its failure to divide the West over the German rearmament issue. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and President Dwight Eisenhower were convinced that last week's deeds in Europe adequately set the stage for words. Said Dulles: "Our experience has shown that each time we have confronted the Russians with a strong and determined act they have been willing to talk seriously."

The tone of the Western invitation was set largely by John Foster Dulles. "We recognize that the solution of these problems will take time and patience. They will not be solved at a single meeting or in a hasty manner ... In the limited time for which the heads of government could meet, they would not undertake to agree upon substantive answers to the major difficulties facing the world. Such a meeting could, however, provide a new impetus by establishing the basis for the detailed work which will be required . . . The important thing is to begin the process promptly and to pursue it with patience and determination."

A Difficult Agenda. In Vienna this week, when the Big Four foreign ministers met to sign the Austrian treaty, Vyacheslav M. Molotov accepted the invitation for the Soviet Union. As outlined and accepted, the conference would have three stages. First, the foreign ministers would meet briefly to lay the groundwork, and perhaps to agree on a broad agenda. Then, with their foreign ministers at hand, the Big Four heads of government--Dwight Eisenhower, Anthony Eden, Edgar Faure and Nikolai Bulganin--would meet to discuss issues and methods of arriving at solutions. Later the foreign ministers and their aides would deal in detail with the points outlined during the top-level meeting. On the first question to be decided, the place of meeting, the ministers promptly encountered a difference. Dulles proposed Switzerland; Molotov suggested Vienna. A decision was deferred.

What will the men at the summit talk about? There is no agreed agenda, but the main issues that logically would come up are clear:

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC CONTROL. There is little prospect of stable peace while two or more inimical sovereign govern ments have uncontrolled power over the manufacture and use of atomic weapons. The U.S. proposed international control even when it had a monopoly, but the U.S.S.R. has persistently refused to agree to the thorough inspection that would be necessary to make control effective. The U.S.S.R. wants to "abolish" atomic weapons, i.e., it wants to sign a toothless agreement which a democratic country would keep, but which the U.S.S.R. could ignore.

DISARMAMENT. During nine years of disarmament discussions, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have presented proposals. The Communist formula has always been basically and unacceptably the same. It would destroy the U.S. lead in nuclear weapons, but would preserve the Russian advantage in military manpower. The new Soviet plan submitted to the U.N. subcommittee on disarmament in London last week appears to make enough concessions to be worth discussing (see FOREIGN NEWS), but the manner in which it was publicized indicates that it is little more than another Communist propaganda gambit.

UNIFICATION OF GERMANY. Prospects for an agreement on unification do not appear to be good. The Soviet Union's long-range aim now appears to be neutralization of Germany, but the West can hardly agree to a weak and disarmed Germany, with U.S., British and French forces removed, standing on the doorsill of the Communist bloc of nations. On the other hand, the Communists will be very loth to agree to a strong, armed Germany standing at the heart of Western defense.

LIBERATION. In Paris last week, John Foster Dulles brought the NATO Council meeting to rapt attention with the statement that the West must never accept the continued enslavement of captive peoples living under Communist rule, and must insist on discussing liberation at the Big Four conference. Dulles has by no means abandoned his liberation policy, although he stressed that he did not think that the West should attempt liberation by armed force from outside. The Austrian treaty,* in a very real sense, liberated an area of Europe. This example might have a profound effect in making Austria's satellite neighbors more eager for freedom.

THE FAR EAST. In President Eisenhower's statement that he expects the conference to be "global," there was a clear indication that he anticipates discussion of Asian problems. The West would be likely to request that Russia use her influence on the Chinese Communists to bring about a cease-fire in the Formosa Strait; the U.S.S.R. could be expected to propose that the Chinese Communists be admitted to the United Nations.

Dangers Ahead. As excitement about the forthcoming conference spread around the world, it bred danger of false hopes. With that in mind, President Eisenhower took pains to point out that he did not expect a sudden, solid peace to break out. Said he: "There is no expectation on my part that in a few hours, a few days or a few weeks this world is going to be turned around."

On the other hand, the scars of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam produced some defeatism about the conference. Said California's William Knowland, Republican leader of the U.S. Senate: "In the long history of the Soviet Union or the shorter history of Communist China, there is nothing to demonstrate that the Communist pledged word is worth the paper on which it is written. [Should the U.S.] take the Soviet's word on a new scrap of paper?"

For Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, the meeting at the summit will be a challenging step in an intricately difficult diplomatic maneuver. While attempting to build up Western European defenses, and at the same time seeking peace with the Soviet Union, the U.S. is walking through diplomatic land mines. Western Europe is driven toward defensive unity mainly by the immediate threat from the East. As Western strength builds, the Red threat diminishes. As the threat lessens, the motive for Western unity becomes weaker.

The perplexing problem facing the U.S. is to keep the cement of Western European unity firm, while continuing to advance toward a real peace by dealing with the Communists from a position of growing strength.

* Immediately after Secretary Dulles signed the treaty, he cabled George Catlett Marshall and Dean Gooderham Acheson, his predecessors under the Truman Administration, expressing appreciation for their early work on the Austrian problem.

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