Monday, May. 02, 1955
Lulling Words
THE NATION Lulling Words
In cold war the appearance of sweet reasonableness sometimes can be as powerful a weapon as a supply of atom bombs. Last week, at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Communist China's Premier Chou En-lai dropped a psychological blockbuster. After purring about peace and understanding all week long, Chou announced that the Chinese Communists were willing to confer with the U.S. on the question of "relaxing tension" in the Formosa area (see FOREIGN NEWS).
In the Red lexicon relaxing tension means lulling the non-Communist forces to sleep while the Communists build up their strength. Some of the delegates at Bandung understood that meaning and heard Chou's proposal in that perspective, but others were lulled. From the U.S. Government, the reaction was swift and clear and firm.
Not long after the first reports of Chou's statement reached Washington, President Eisenhower was on the telephone from his farm in Gettysburg with Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr. (Secretary John Foster Dulles was at his island retreat in Lake Ontario.) By nightfall, the State Department had issued a reply: "The United States always welcomes any efforts, if sincere, to bring peace to the world. In the Formosa region we have an ally in the Free Republic of China and, of course, the United States would insist on Free China participating as an equal in any discussions concerning the area."
Having set that key condition, the U.S. statement went on to point out that Communist China could give evidence of its sincerity in a number of ways, including:
P: Placing in effect an immediate cease-fire in the Formosa Strait. P: Immediately releasing the eleven U.S. airmen and the American civilians whom it unjustly holds."
P: Accepting the invitation of the United States National Security Council to participate in discussions to end hostilities in the Formosa region.
In Taipei the Communist proposal hit a solid wall. After the U.S. said it would confer only if the Nationalists participated, Chiang Kai-shek's government immediately and firmly took the position that it "will reject any proposal to sit at the same table with representatives of the
Chinese Communists in and outside the United Nations that would imply the recognition of any Communist aggressors' gains." Said Nationalist Foreign Minister George Yeh: "A cease-fire proposal without taking into consideration the distinction between the aggressor, who should be punished, and the victim of aggression, who should be protected by justice, is tantamount to encouraging international aggression."
Behind that angry statement was the firsthand knowledge, shared by high officials of the U.S. Government, that the Chinese Communists' soft words bore no resemblance to their intentions.
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