BRITISH POLICY BEFORE GENEVA

AN OFFICIAL VIEW BY THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR

At the request of TIME, and with the approval of the Foreign Office, Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador to the U.S., herewith defines British policy in Asia on the eve of Geneva.

"Peace is our aim, and strength is the only way of getting it." This sentence from a recent speech by Sir Winston Churchill defines British foreign policy not in one area alone but throughout the world. We do not see the problems of Asia as separate from those of the rest of the world.

The present focus of the Far Eastern situation is the Geneva Conference, opening next week. Mr. Anthony Eden, who will represent Britain, said recently: "I am going to Geneva determined to do my best to get a settlement in Korea and Indo-China, but I am going without any illusions about the kind of people the Chinese Communists are."

Korea. In British eyes the objective of the United Nations' resistance in Korea was to defend South Korea, and also to show Communists everywhere that they cannot achieve their aims by force. The British contribution to the struggle was significant and valuable, but it was thanks, in large measure, to the sacrifice in men and material by the United States that the immediate objective was attained. The long-term objective is now before us: the unification of Korea as a free and peaceful state. We do not believe that this could or should be achieved by force. Any settlement must first take account of the interest of the Koreans themselves, but it is also vital to the United Nations that Korea should not become a base for Communist attack and intrigue. Negotiation may be difficult and frustrating. But on all essential points Britain and the United States, together with the other nations who contributed to stopping the Communist invaders, are united in purpose. We will not let each other down at the conference table any more than we did on the battlefield.

Indo-China. In Indo-China, French Union forces have been fighting a costly and difficult military campaign against local Communist forces. It has been a gruelling struggle for the three young nations of Indo-China (Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos) and a severe drain on the manpower and resources of our old friends and allies, the French. The Communist threat in Indo-China is directed not only against the aspirations of the Indo-Chinese peoples as they emerge to nationhood, but menaces the whole of Southeast Asia and its rich raw-material resources. Britain has a strong and direct interest in preventing the spread of Communist imperialism in this area. We shall do all in our power at Geneva to help in reaching a settlement which will safeguard the interests of the free world. We believe that the prospects of such a settlement will be improved by the knowledge that Britain and the United States are now prepared to join with the other countries principally concerned in examining the possibility of the collective defence of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, within the framework of the U.N. Charter.

China. On January 6, 1950, six months before the Korean war began, Britain recognized the Central People's Government of China, and withdrew recognition from the Nationalist authorities on Formosa. We simply recognized the fact that the Peking Government controlled China. That recognition did not, and does not, imply approval of the regime. Both Britain and the United States recognize some 60 or more governments, including the Soviet Union. It does not follow that we like their policies.

In the Soviet Union the Marxist-Leninist doctrine is being moulded with the years into traditional Russian forms. No one can tell how Chinese Communism will develop; but the possibility of its assuming a distinctively Chinese pattern undoubtedly exists, and contacts with the West will certainly not impede it. There are advantages in diplomatic contacts, however tenuous.

A question often raised in connection with British recognition of the Peking Government is the representation of China in the United Nations. This is not a question of the admission of a new member state. China is a Charter member and a permanent Member of the Security Council. The question is which government should represent China. Because Britain recognizes the Peking Government, we feel that it should one day occupy the Chinese seat. But we have not pressed for this; we have not even proposed it, "in view of that Government's persistence in behaviour which is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter.'' For the moment Britain is neither agitated nor agitating about it.

Trade. There is also the matter of trade. As early as 1949, Britain was applying strategic controls to trade with all Communist countries. We were the first country to do so. In May 1951 the United Nations General Assembly recommended certain controls on exports to China. We have strictly enforced these controls. But Britain is dependent on overseas trade, just as are other countries of the West. It would do no good either to our own economy or to the economy of the free world to deny ourselves, within the agreed limits, commercial contacts with one quarter of the population of the globe.

We think that, once the Chinese show willingness to live at peace with the United Nations in Asia, there can be considerable benefit to the West through increased trade in non-strategic goods.

The British Crown Colony of Hong Kong is in a special position. It is an oasis of freedom on the Chinese mainland. The mainland is Hong Kong's natural trading partner and its necessary source of food. Hong Kong has maintained the same firm embargo on strategic trade as Britain, but trade in non-strategic commodities is essential to its survival, and to the million or more Chinese refugees from Communism who find haven there. Hong Kong has properly been called "the Berlin of the Far East."

Malaya. There are 150.000 men (troops, police and home guards) under arms in Malaya, out of a total population of 6,000,000, carrying on a bitter fight against a relatively small number of Chinese Communist bands in the jungle. These Communists seek to sabotage the country's material wealth in rubber and tin and to obstruct Malaya's planned programme of political, social and economic evolution. They have not succeeded. On the contrary, they are being steadily pushed back in a slow process of elimination. But any Communist successes in Indo-China would at least stiffen their morale and at most might afford them the material support they now so badly need.

Conclusion. This review is obviously not exhaustive. It is illustrative. These are the areas mostly in the headlines. There are other areas--like Japan--of great importance, where the same principles guide British foreign policy. It is a policy based on peace through strength. Peace comes only from the progressive elimination of the causes of war, coupled with readiness to uphold the rule of law when it is threatened. Strength means more than an armoury of weapons. Enduring strength comes from economic prosperity, rising living standards, and political stability, as well as military preparedness.

We in Britain know that no country today can achieve peace and enduring strength by its own unaided efforts. That is why we believe in the collective approach to world problems.

We believe that nowhere is it more important and more urgent to seek our objectives by collective approach than in Eastern Asia. The problem today is to give the non-Communist countries there the time and means to develop in freedom. This is a problem for the free countries of Asia. It is also a problem for us, for you, for our partners in the British Commonwealth, for France. A solution must be found. So far as Britain is concerned, we are determined to find it, and to find it with you.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.