After the Shock

The French are famed for their logic, but when pride is hurt, logic flies out the window. When Secretary Dulles said last week that the U.S. would be forced to an "agonizing reappraisal" of basic policy unless France went ahead with EDC, he was making a statement of fact so plain as to be self-evident.

But the French were outraged. The favorite headline word was "brutal." Le Figaro, which is friendly to the U.S., called Dulles' warning salutary but "clumsy." Hardly anyone else was so polite. Anti-EDC Gaullists demanded that the French Cabinet explain "its regrettable silence" at this "intolerable interference in internal French affairs."

At the Quai d'Orsay, however, one knowledgeable Foreign Ministry man was convinced that the Dulles statement "did not do as much damage as some say it did." It was a shock--but only because French leaders had failed to make plain to the public and the National Assembly what the leaders themselves clearly understood and had been told again at Bermuda. One European quoted Dulles as saying to him: "I felt in my conscience that I must do it. If things turn out badly in the French Parliament, I can't blame myself for not having said 'Look out!' ':

It was calculated shock therapy: the bedside manner had not worked. Under the usual diplomatic ground rules, governments speak only to governments; but since Laniel's dying government cannot commit France, Dulles chose to speak over its head to the French Assembly.

Shared Aversion. Dulles reflected more than U.S. impatience. In Bonn, where Chancellor Adenauer himself fears the resurgence of uncontrolled German militarism and regards EDC as the "unique" way to prevent it, Dulles' words on EDC were received "with satisfaction." French diplomats in Bonn muttered darkly of "collusion," for Adenauer had spoken with Dulles in Paris before Dulles made his statement. Italy's Premier Pella called Dulles' remarks "very courageous." Dutch Foreign Minister Beyen said it was necessary to speak "very clearly" to France, and Belgium's Foreign Minister Paul van Zeeland said: "The time has come to say 'yes' or 'no'; we have been in suspense too long." Some of these EDC partners might well have directed their remarks at their own Parliaments (see box).

Bristling Detours. Most important of all was Sir Winston Churchill's response. At Bermuda, fearing the "deplorable contingency" of French refusal to ratify EDC, Churchill had an alternative--admission of an independent German army into NATO. He hoped thereby to secure the support of French nationalists, who are said to oppose EDC solely because of the surrender of French sovereignty that it entails. But Ike and Dulles would not even discuss such bristling detours, and Sir Winston was told that the French Assembly would not approve, nor

Adenauer assent to, such an alternative.

Said Sir Winston last week in the House of Commons: "Germany must make her military contribution to the safety of Europe. We cannot in any case expect a robust and valiant people of 60 millions to rest unarmed and defenseless in an unstable Europe for an indefinite period, and these facts have to be faced whether any of us in any country like it or not ... All the possible consequences of abandoning EDC should be placed squarely before the French people. I should not like it to be slurred over as a matter of little importance."

And if France rejected EDC? Dulles had spoken of U.S. unwillingness to collaborate if France chose to commit suicide. Did this mean, as some French critics leaped to conclude, that the U.S. would withdraw its troops from Europe and honor its NATO commitments by a "peripheral strategy" of defending the continent from air bases surrounding it? Publicly, the U.S. refused to consider any alternative until convinced beyond all doubt that EDC will fail. But a U.S. withdrawal is not probable; a U.S. reduction of troops is a possibility.

When reporters at Dwight Eisenhower's press conference last week questioned the wisdom of the Dulles statement, the President answered that Dulles had only said what is the law of the land: the Richards amendment to the foreign-aid act requires that half of 1954's military aid to Europe be channeled through EDC. Ike, therefore, was "a little bit astonished" that anyone should have thought Dulles' warning blunt. After all, said the President, "what do we do?"

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.