BROWNELL:
THE WHITE CASE RECORD
JUST what information about Harry Dexter White had been given to President Truman by Feb. 6, 1946, when Truman allowed White's appointment to the International Monetary Fund to go through? Did Truman keep White so that the FBI would catch fellow conspirators? On these points there is a public record, and last week Attorney General Herbert Brownell and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover read it before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Salient passages:
ON Nov. 6 in Chicago, I made a speech which was one of a number of speeches and magazine articles in which I publicly discussed the problem of Communist infiltration in Government and the steps taken by the Eisenhower Administration to meet that problem.
In that speech I referred to the case of Harry Dexter White and the manner in which it was treated by the prior Administration to illustrate how successful espionage agents had been in penetrating our Government at that time and how lax our Government was at that time in meeting such a grave problem.
This afternoon I want to discuss the case of Harry Dexter White, and the manner in which it was handled by the Truman Administration . . . Before I do that, however, I want to make certain preliminary remarks. An inference has been drawn in some quarters from my speech which I think is unwarranted. By lifting certain sentences out of context, it has been said that I implied the possibility that the former President of the United States was disloyal. I intended no such inference to be drawn.
In order to point out that I intended no such inference to be drawn, I specifically said that I believed that the disregard of the evidence in the White case was "because of the unwillingness of the non-Communists in responsible positions to face the facts and a persistent delusion that Communism in the Government of the United States was only a red herring."
In another part of the speech, I also stated:
"The manner in which the established facts concerning White's disloyalty were disregarded is typical of the blindness which inflicted the former Administration on this matter . . ."
"A Persistent Delusion"
When this subcommittee completes its investigation, I believe that you will conclude, as I did, that there was an unwillingness on the part of Mr. Truman and others around him to face the facts and a persistent delusion that Communist espionage in high places in our Government was a Red herring. And I believe you will conclude that this attitude, this delusion, may have resulted in great harm to our nation . . .
The only disclosure which I made from our records, and I believe it is the type of thing that the public is entitled to know about, is that the Truman Administration was put on notice at least as early as December 1945 that there were two spy rings operating within our Government . . .
In considering the facts in this case, it is well to keep in mind that the matter to be decided in January and February of 1946 did not relate to criminal proceedings in court. It was not a question whether White could at that time have been formally charged before a grand jury with espionage.
The matter to be determined by Mr. Truman and his associates was whether Harry Dexter White should be advanced to a post of high honor, great trust and responsibility and of vital importance to the security of our country.
If there was solid evidence at that time establishing that White was engaged in espionage activity, certainly no one would contend that sound and proper administration required his advancement or even continuance in Government service simply because a criminal conviction could not be obtained.
White entered upon his duties and assumed the office of executive director for the United States in the International Monetary Fund on May1, 1946. What was known at the White House of his espionage activities prior to that date?
"Delicate and Dangerous"
On Dec. 4, 1945, the FBI transmitted to Brigadier General Harry H. Vaughan, military aide to the President, a report on the general subject of "Soviet Espionage in the United States." . . . This was a secret and highly important report of some 71 pages . . . This report . . . summarizes White's espionage activities in abbreviated form, but no reasonable person can deny that that summary, brief though it may be, constituted adequate warning to anyone who read it of the extreme danger to the security of the country in appointing White to the International Monetary Fund or continuing him in Government in any capacity.
As the subcommittee knows, copies of this report were sent to a number of Cabinet officers and high officials in the Truman Administration, including the Attorney General. It would be difficult to understand how under any circumstances a document upon so delicate and dangerous a subject would not have been brought to Mr. Truman's attention by at least one of his associates.
But in addition to that fact, I have here a letter from J. Edgar Hoover to General Vaughan a month before that, dated Nov. 8, 1945 . . .
It is a document of historical importance, and I therefore, with your permission, will quote it in full:
Dear General Vaughan:
As a result of the bureau's investigative operations, information has been recently developed from a highly confidential source indicating that a number of persons employed by the Government of the United States have been furnishing data and information to persons outside the Federal Government, who are in turn transmitting this information to espionage agents of the Soviet government.
At the present time, it is impossible to determine exactly how many of these people had actual knowledge of the disposition being made of the information they were transmitting. The investigation, however, at this point has indicated that the persons named hereinafter were actually the source from which information passing through the Soviet espionage system was being obtained, and I am continuing vigorous investigation for the purpose of establishing the degree and nature of the complicity of these people in this espionage ring.
The bureau's information at this time indicates that the following persons were participants in this operation or were utilized by principals in this ring for the purpose of obtaining data in which the Soviet is interested:
Dr. Gregory Silvermaster, a longtime employee of the Department of Agriculture.
Harry Dexter White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury.
George Silverman, formerly employed by the Railroad Retirement Board, and now reportedly in the War Department.
Lauchlin Currie, former Administrative Assistant to the late President Roosevelt.
Victor Perlo, formerly with the War Production Board and the Foreign Economic Administration.
Donald Wheeler, formerly with the Office of Strategic Services.
Major Duncan Lee, OSS.
Julius Joseph, OSS.
Helen Tenney, OSS.
Maurice Halperin, OSS.
Charles Kramer, formerly associated with Senator Kilgore.
Captain William Ludwig Ullmann, U.S. Army Air Corps.
Lieut. Colonel John H. Reynolds, of the U.S. Army, a former contact of Gaik Ovakimian, former head of the Soviet Secret Intelligence (NKVD) in New York, is also apparently involved in the Soviet espionage activities stemming from Washington, D.C.
In addition to the foregoing group in the Government, it appears at this time that Mary Price, formerly secretary to Walter Lippmann, the newspaper columnist, and presently publicity manager of the United Office and Professional Workers of America, C.I.O., is also associated with the foregoing group.
The Government documents were furnished to Gregory Silvermaster, who thereafter photographed them and turned over the undeveloped but exposed film to a contact of the Soviets in either Washington, D.C. or New York City. In the past, it is reported, the contact man made trips to Washington, D.C. once every two weeks and would pick up on such occasions an average of 40 rolls of 35-millimeter film.
Investigation of this matter is being pushed vigorously, but I thought that the President and you would be interested in having the foregoing preliminary data immediately . . .
/S/ J. Edgar Hoover
It is a blunt fact from which there is no escape that, in the teeth of the Nov. 8 warning from the FBI, the developing evidence indicated a substantial spy ring operating within the Government and involving Harry Dexter White and the documented report delivered to the White House on Dec. 4. Some six weeks later President Truman, on Jan. 23, 1946, publicly announced his nomination of Harry Dexter White for appointment to the International Monetary Fund. I just do not understand this. It still seems completely incredible to me.
But the matter does not end there. Because of this development, the FBI compiled a special report devoted exclusively to Harry Dexter White and his espionage activities and delivered it, together with a covering letter, by special messenger on Feb. 4, 1946 to General Vaughan for the attention of the President, to the Attorney General, Tom Clark, and to Secretary of State James Byrnes . . . I will now read into the record the FBI letter, now officially declassified, transmitting the White report:
Dear General Vaughan:
As of interest to the President and you, I am attaching a detailed memorandum hereto concerning Harry Dexter White, Assistant Secretary of the United States Treasury Department.
As you are aware, the name of Harry Dexter White has been sent to Congress by the President for confirmation of his appointment as one of the two United States delegates on the International Monetary Fund under the Bretton Woods Agreement.
In view of this fact, the interest expressed by the President and you in matters of this nature, and the seriousness of the charges against White in the attachment, I have made every effort in preparing this memorandum to cover all possible ramifications.
As will be observed, information has come to the attention of this bureau charging White as being a valuable adjunct to an underground Soviet espionage organization operating in Washington, D.C.
Material which came into his possession as a result of his official capacity allegedly was made available through intermediaries to Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, his wife, Helen Witte Silvermaster, and William Ludwig Ullmann. Both Silvermaster and Ullmann are employees of the United States Treasury Department, reportedly directly under the supervision of White.
The information and documents originating in the Treasury Department were either passed on in substance or photographed by Ullmann in a well-equipped laboratory in the basement of the Silvermaster home. Following this step, the material was taken to New York City by courier and made available to Jacob M. Golos until the time of his death on Nov. 27, 1943.
Golos, a known Soviet agent, delivered this material to an individual, tentatively identified as Gaik Ovakimian.
Ovakimian, you will recall, was arrested some years ago as an unregistered agent of the Soviet government and, subsequently, by special arrangements with the Department of State, was permitted to return to the U.S.S.R.
After the departure of Gaik Ovakimian, Golos delivered his material to an individual who has been tentatively identified (here a name is deleted for security purposes).
Subsequent to the death of Golos, the courier handling material received from the Silvermasters and Ullmann delivered it through an unidentified individual to Anatoli Borisovich Gromov,who, until Dec. 7, 1945, was assigned as first secretary of the Soviet embassy, Washington, D.C., when he returned to the U.S.S.R.
Gromov had previously been under suspicion as the successor to Vassili Zubilin, reported head of the NKVD in North America, who returned to Moscow in the late summer of 1944.
This whole network has been under intensive investigation since November 1945, and it is the result of these efforts that I am now able to make available to you . . .
/S/ J. Edgar Hoover.
[ Brownell then gave the committee a number of facts from the report, in addition to those in the letter of transmittal.]
It was also reported that there was in existence another parallel of Soviet Intelligence operating within the United States Government and headed by Victor Perlo. The information gathered from the Perlo group was channeled through Jacob M. Golos and on to the Soviet diplomatic establishment in the same manner as outlined for the operation of the Silvermaster group.
Because of the relationships existing between Golos and the Perlo group, Harold Glasser appeared in the picture. Glasser was rather closely associated with White and was able to supply general information concerning the activities of the United States Treasury Department, particularly where they concerned proposed loans to foreign countries . . .
Proof of the Pudding
It is interesting to note how accurate this information was that the FBI supplied at that time. Following is a list of White's close associates referred to in the FBI reports who were members of the espionage ring who have claimed their privilege not to answer questions on the grounds that it would incriminate them: Silvermaster, Perlo, Glasser, Coe, Ullmann, Silverman, Halperin, Kaplan.
Also there is Lee Pressman, who admitted membership in the Communist Party, and Alger Hiss who has since been convicted.
Of course, no one could, with any validity, suggest today that there is any doubt that White was in this espionage ring . . .
The record, which was available to the Truman Administration in December 1945 and thereafter, should have been sufficient to convince anyone that White was a hazard to our Government. The question which had to be decided at that time was not whether White could have been convicted of treason. There was ample evidence that he was not loyal to the interests of our country. That was enough.
Government employment is a privilege, not a right, and we don't have to wait until a man is convicted of treason before we can remove him from a position of trust and confidence.
When I was first invited to appear before this subcommittee, I thought from what I had read in the newspapers that there was some issue of fact involved on the question of whether Mr. Truman knew about Harry Dexter White's espionage activities at the time he appointed him as executive director for the United States of the International Monetary Fund. I read in the newspapers that after being advised of my speech in Chicago, Mr. Truman stated to the press that he had never read any of the derogatory reports concerning Harry Dexter White to which I referred. I read later that Mr. Truman said that he fired White as soon as he discovered he was disloyal. On the basis of these statements I thought that the accuracy of what I had said in Chicago was being challenged.
However, it now seems in the light of Mr. Truman's television speech that it is conceded that on Feb. 6, 1946, the day on which White's appointment was confirmed by the Senate, Mr. Truman did read the most important of the reports to which I referred, and that he thereafter, even though he had a legal right to ask that the nomination be withdrawn, signed White's commission and permitted him to take office on the first day of May with full knowledge of the facts reported by the FBI.
It is, of course, extraordinary to learn from Mr. Truman, in view of his earlier statements, that he signed Mr. White's commission with the thought that it might help to catch him. I would think that the commissioning of a suspected spy to an office of such great importance would not be easily forgotten. It seems to me even more extraordinary to learn that Mr. Truman was aware as early as 1946 that a Communist spy ring was operating within his own Administration, when for so many years since that time he has been telling the American people exactly the opposite.
Indeed, it seems to me that this explanation of White's appointment--that is, that he was appointed and allowed to remain in office for more than a year in order to help the FBI trap him as a spy--raises more questions than it answers.
While under suspicion and surveillance, White was, we are told, appointed as the first United States executive director of the fund. He was also its chief architect. The opportunities afforded him in that capacity for betraying the country were very great. There were matters of great importance to the United States which were handled by the executive directors while White was a member. A first order of business was to plan the general organization of the staff. It was agreed to divide the staff into five primary departments and offices. Each of these departments and offices had a director.
One of these five primary departments was called the Office of the Secretary. Now, who received the position of head of the Office of Secretary? It was Frank Coe, named in the FBI report as a member of the espionage ring, and at a salary of $20,000 a year . . .
Was the Nation Protected?
Recently this subcommittee had occasion to inquire of Mr. Coe whether he was presently engaged in subversive activities. Mr. Coe replied:
"Mr. Chairman, under the protection afforded me by the Fifth Amendment, I respectfully decline to answer that question."
Coe continued in the employ of the fund until as recently as Dec. 3, 1952, when he was finally dismissed.
Who received the position of adviser to the United States member of the board? It was Harold Glasser, also named as a member of the espionage ring.
Glasser was subpoenaed by the Senate subcommittee on April 14, 1953, and when asked about his relationships with members of the Communist underground, he invoked his privilege against self-incrimination . . .
It has now been said that White's promotion to the post of director of the International Monetary Fund was permitted to go through so that he might better be kept under surveillance and so the investigation of the other members of the ring might continue unimpaired.
It is suggested that permitting White to continue his espionage operations might enable the Truman Administration to entrap not only White but the whole Soviet espionage ring working within our Government. To accomplish such an end would require infinite and detailed care if the national interest was to be at all protected.
"Simple and Reasonable Tests"
In the first place, arrangements would have to be made to insure absolute control of the subjects and the situation. Some time limits would have to be established.
If the national interest were to be protected, measures would have to be designed to prevent classified material with a significant bearing on national security from reaching White and the others.
Top responsible officials of the United States Government, whose duties brought them in contact with White and the other members of the ring, would have had to be forewarned. Great care would have to be taken to make certain that these spies did not affect the decisions of our Government. The records available to me fail to indicate that any of these minimum precautions were taken. The records available to me fail to show that anything was done which interfered with the continued functioning of the espionage ring of which White was a part.
And if we apply simple and reasonable tests to show how other members of the espionage ring named in the FBI report were treated, there is considerable doubt that anything was done to protect the national interest. Let me offer you a few examples.
Harold Glasser, a close subordinate and associate of White, was described in the FBI report as an active member of the espionage ring. What controls were established over the movements of Harold Glasser?
In July 1946, Glasser attended the UNRRA conference in Geneva, Switzerland, as a member of the United States delegation. In January 1947, Glasser went to Trieste as a United States member of a four-power commission to study the economic aspects of the Trieste problem. At the special request of the State Department in March and April 1947, Glasser attended the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers as an adviser to the United States Secretary of State [George C. Marshall] . . .
How was Glasser's access to classified materials limited? As far as we have been able to determine, it was not. Records in the department indicate that late in 1946 Glasser, described as a member of the espionage ring, received a copy of the FBI report on Victor Perlo which described him as a member of the Soviet espionage ring. Perlo stayed on in the Treasury Department until March 27, 1947.
Nathan Gregory Silvermaster in March 1946 was promoted to become the Chief Economist of the War Assets Administration's Division of Economic and Market Research . . .
A New Approach
As members of this subcommittee know, this Administration is trying an entirely different approach to security problems.
Despite difficulties stemming from past laxity, 1,456 employees have actually been separated from Federal Government payrolls since January 1953 on the grounds that they are security risks . . .
The White case illustrates that it is not enough for men in high Government positions to be loyal. They must also be vigilant to combat the dangers to our Government and our free institutions.
HOOVER:
THERE is more involved here than the charges against one man. This situation has a background of some 35 years of infiltration of an alien way of life into what we have been proud to call our constitutional republic.
Our American way of life, which has flourished under our republic and has nurtured the blessings of a democracy, has been brought into conflict with the godless forces of Communism. These Red fascists distort, conceal, misrepresent and lie to gain their point. Deceit is their very essence. This can never be understood until we face the realization that to a Communist there are no morals except those which further the world revolution directed by Moscow.
The Harry Dexter White and related cases are in point...
In the pertinent time period, our national climate was one conducive to the so-called "united front." Communist-front organizations flourished to the point where it appeared that to belong, in certain circles, was to be stylish.
Even today, the feeling is rife in some quarters that the FBI should not even be investigating the loyalty of Government employees. Over the years, the FBI has been the target of attack from persons both in & out of Government because of its investigations of subversive activities.
Even Harry Dexter White, when we interviewed him in March 1942, spent more time in denouncing investigations of Government employees . . . than he did in furnishing facts. He observed that if the chairman of one congressional committee "was one-tenth as patriotic as I am, it would be a much better country."
Miss Bentley and 29 Others
On Nov. 7, 1945, Miss Elizabeth Bentley advised special agents of the FBI in considerable detail of her own career as an espionage agent. On Nov. 8, 1945, a letter bearing that date was delivered to Brigadier General Harry H. Vaughan, wherein it was stated:
"The bureau's information at this time indicates that the following persons were participants in this operation or were utilized by principals in this ring for the purpose of obtaining data in which the Soviet is interested."
The name of Harry Dexter White was the second name mentioned in the list of names furnished . . . In the meantime, our investigation of White and others mentioned by Miss Bentley and Whittaker Chambers, as well as those individuals on whom we had adverse information from equally reliable sources, continued . . .
From Nov. 8, 1945 until July 24, 1946, seven communications went to the White House bearing on espionage activities, wherein Harry Dexter White's name was specifically mentioned . . . The FBI, of course, has a duty to evaluate its sources of information. In the 28-page summary concerning White, dated Feb. 1, 1946, delivered to General Vaughan on Feb. 4, 1946, the information contained therein came from a total of 30 sources, the reliability of which had previously been established.
In connection with the sources, I would like to mention one in particular, Miss Elizabeth Bentley. From the very outset, we established that she had been in a position to report the facts relative to Soviet espionage, which she has done. We knew she was in contact with a top-ranking Soviet espionage agent, Anatoli Gromov, the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C., as late as Nov. 21, 1945 in New York City . . .
All information furnished by Miss Bentley, which was susceptible to check, has proven to be correct. She has been subjected to the most searching of cross-examinations; her testimony has been evaluated by juries and reviewed by the courts and has been found to be accurate.
Now to return to Harry Dexter White. In a conversation on Feb. 21, 1946, the Attorney General [Tom Clark] informed me that he had spoken with the then Secretary of the Treasury, the late Chief Justice Fred Vinson, and the President about White. The Attorney General stated he felt the President should personally tell White that it would be best for him not to serve.
I told the Attorney General I felt it was unwise for White to serve. The Attorney General then stated he would like to confer with Judge Vinson and me on the following day, Feb. 22, 1946.
I had luncheon on Feb. 22, 1946 in the Attorney General's office with Judge Vinson and the Attorney General, at which time there was a lengthy conference. I was told that the problem was what could be done to prevent White from taking his oath of office. Judge Vinson did not want Mr. White to serve as a United States delegate on the International Monetary Fund and, in fact, did not want him to continue as an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.
On the other hand, Judge Vinson stated that the President could be forced to sign the commission since the Senate had already confirmed White's appointment. I advised Judge Vinson and the Attorney General that the character of the evidence was such that it should not be publicly disclosed at that time in view of the confidential sources involved.
Three Courses for Lunch
It was the opinion of Judge Vinson and the Attorney General, as expressed that day at luncheon, that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General would arrange to see the President as soon as possible, outline to him exactly what the situation was, and they would suggest to the President that there were three alternatives:
1) The President could dismiss White, and make no statement.
2) The President could send for White and tell him he had changed his mind and that he desired White to resign and not serve.
3) The President could sign the commission, instruct the Attorney General to continue the investigation vigorously and instruct the Secretary of the Treasury that he, as governor of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems and of the International Bank, should take steps to see that any persons selected for appointment should not be appointed except with approval of the governor . . .
I did not enter into any agreement to shift White from his position in the Treasury Department to the International Monetary Fund. This was not within my purview. I was at the meeting to furnish facts, which I did.
There was no agreement while I was present between the Attorney General and Judge Vinson other than that they should see the President with the Secretary of State and suggest the three alternates mentioned above. I was not present in any discussions with the President concerning this matter.
I was advised on Feb. 26, 1946 by the Attorney General that he had seen the President and that an effort would be made to remove Harry Dexter White, although the Attorney General expressed" doubt that this would work out.
The Attorney General further stated to me on Feb. 26, 1946 that he felt that White would go into the job and then would be surrounded with persons who were especially selected and were not security risks. He further stated that the President was interested in continuing the surveillance.
No FBI Agreement
I might add White had been under surveillance as early as November 1945. I stated if that was the desire, we would continue the investigation.
At no time was the FBI a party to an agreement to promote Harry Dexter White, and at no time did the FBI give its approval to such an agreement. Such an agreement on the part of the FBI would be inconceivable.
If this principle were applied to White, it would, of necessity, have applied to others who had similarly been involved in this particular investigation, who were dismissed from Government service when their subversive activities were discovered. Those dismissals occurred in March 1946, June 14 and 18, 1946, July 1946 and Sept. 25, 1946.
At no time did the FBI interpose objections to such dismissals. No restrictions were placed upon the agencies wherein action was taken. All that we asked was that sources of information be protected.
Had it been the intent of the FBI to handle the Harry Dexter White and other related cases solely as an intelligence operation, the widespread dissemination of information that was furnished to various branches of the Government by the FBI would not have been undertaken . . .
The decision to retain White was made by a higher Government authority. Obviously, if a higher authority elected to shift a man rather than fire him if he was suspect, then it would go without saying that the FBI would continue our investigation as best we could.
If in fact there was any agreement to move White from the Treasury Department to the International Monetary Fund to aid the FBI investigation and surround White with persons who were not security risks, then the agreement would have been broken very early because Mr. Virginius Frank Coe, a close associate of" Harry Dexter White, became the secretary of the International Monetary Fund in June 1946, which position he held until Dec. 3, 1952, when he was dismissed after invoking the Fifth Amendment in an appearance before this same committee here last December . . .
From the foregoing, it is clear that the FBI called to the attention of the appropriate authorities the facts, as alleged by reliable sources, which were substantial in pointing to a security risk, as they occurred. It is equally clear that the FBI did not depart from its traditional position of making no evaluation, and was not a party to any agreement to keep White in public service.
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