NEW DEFENSE MODEL V. MORE CHROME

THE U.S. was beginning to realize that the Russian thermonuclear bomb demands a whole new range of political and military thinking. The dominant fact percolating through policy discussion in Washington is that the U.S.S.R. will have enough super bombs to menace the U.S. by 1956 or sooner (TIME, Sept. 21). And the thermonuclear blast is so devastating (potentially thousands of times the power of the most up-to-date atomic bomb) that victory after 1956 may go not to the nation with the biggest stockpile of bombs but to the nation that drops them first.

Treasury Secretary Humphrey has been a firm believer in military budget cuts for economy's sake, but now he is saying in Cabinet meetings that every item of expense must be examined in the light of the new bomb threat. Last week, in a public speech, Humphrey went a step farther: the new Joint Chiefs of Staff must produce a defense plan that will be a "real new product." Said Humphrey: "It won't be done just by putting some additional chrome on the bumper. We have to have a brand new model. . . and still [spend] less money."

Armed Negotiation. One new model that has been outlined (not by Humphrey) to the President is this: the basis of U.S. defense should now be a striking force of heavy bombers, supported by fast-moving aircraft carriers and guided missiles, with very little invested in defensive weapons, e.g., interceptor fighters or pushbutton establishments. The Navy should mothball battleships and similar outdated ships of the line. The Army should be cut close to Marine Corps size, with perhaps enough troops in Europe to satisfy NATO commitments.

Coupled to the new model is a proposal for using this strength politically. If the Russians know that the U.S. is clearly capable of delivering a knockout blow, they may enter negotiations with a different attitude. The U.S. should be unafraid to flex its muscles in negotiations (as the theory goes) if muscle-flexing is necessary to secure a workable agreement for ensuring peace.

This theory was meeting violent opposition from the "more chrome on the bumper" boys. Said Navy Secretary Robert Anderson last week at the Marine Corps school at Quantico: "The increasing power of the atomic bomb suggests to me that the need for improvement of the more conventional forms of warfare may well become greater, rather than less, as we approach absoluteness in mass-destruction weapons... It may well be that the presence of such fearful weapons may act as a deterrent to their use by either side. Should the superweapons thus cancel themselves out--and I suggest to you that eventually it is entirely possible--then the emphasis would immediately be restored to the capabilities of conventional weapons as the basis for military decision."

The Elk-Saddle Policy. Conceivably, a situation might arise in the thermonuclear age in which the U.S. would need such an outdated weapon as a battleship. In war, one never knows what will come in handy. When British troops landed at Narvik, Norway in 1940, some of them, according to one report, carried saddles for riding elk. Some thoughtful supply officer, with an eye to the rigors of an Arctic campaign, had ordered them years before. The Navy now has four battleships and 15 heavy cruisers in operation; they cost somewhat more than elk saddles. An effective weapons policy has to be derived from a general military policy. It cannot be constructed by ordering all the things that might turn out to be useful. A general defense policy, in turn, cannot be made solely by thinking of all the things the enemy might do. A defense policy logically starts from political goals; a nation determines what kind of military force it needs to achieve its political ends. Military policy is interlaced with foreign policy, especially where a nation, hoping to avoid war, intends to use its military power in political bargaining.

Under these circumstances, the U.S. State Department might be expected to take a lively interest in the Defense Department's groping for a new basic military policy. But this is not yet the case. State does not want to "interfere" with the military experts.

State consults Defense closely on another kind of matter, i.e., on the list of areas of the world the U.S. is prepared to defend. This is the old loop (or snare) theory all over again (TIME, Jan. 15, 1951). It assumes that all choice is in the enemy's hands, and that the U.S. can only try to guess where the enemy will strike and try to prepare itself for his thrust.

Last week, while Secretary Dulles was making his speech (see above) on the urgent need for international agreement in the Atomic Age, his department's main contact with the military was on a aoth century projection of the old U.S. problem of which stockades could be defended against the Sioux. Dulles' speech outlined the political goal, but he--and Secretary Wilson and President Eisenhower--have a long way to go in the construction of a political-military policy that will give some sensible basis for choosing between one weapon and another, and for deciding how many of each weapon is enough.

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