The China Shop

There are important moments when a U.S. Secretary of State, proclaiming the principles of national policy, should be blunt, uncompromising and direct. There are equally important moments--and more of them--when a Secretary, aware that he speaks for his country, should be guarded in expressing judgments on the international situation, or should just keep his mouth shut. John Foster Dulles last week gave striking examples of how to state policy and how not to.

"In the Interest of Peace." Speaking to the American Legion at St. Louis, Dulles made a direct statement of U.S. intentions in Asia. On Korea, he stressed two points: 1) the Communists can no longer count on their "privileged sanctuary" beyond the Yalu, if they attack Korea again; 2) knowing that the Communists like to use negotiation as "a cover for achieving ulterior purposes," the U.S. will not let the Korean peace talks drag on indefinitely.

Dulles took up the question of possible Chinese Communist aggression in Asia, outside Korea. "Many believe," he said, "that neither the First World War nor the Second World War would have occurred if the aggressor had known what the United States would do. It is even more probable that the Korean war would not have occurred if the aggressor had known what the United States would do ...

"Communist China has been and now is training, equipping and supplying the Communist forces in Indo-China. There is the risk that, as in Korea, Red China might send its own army into Indo-China. The Chinese Communist regime should realize that such a second aggression could not occur without grave consequences which might not be confined to Indo-China. I say this soberly, in the interest of peace . . ."

Two Ad Libs. The day after his blunt, well-prepared St. Louis speech, Foster Dulles had a press conference at his Washington office. He led off with another well-prepared policy statement, again fixing the blame on the Russians for Germany's continued division. But when one reporter asked him what he thought about the German elections (see FOREIGN NEWS), the Secretary started ad-libbing. A defeat of Christian Democrat Konrad Adenauer, said Dulles flatly, would be "disastrous " for both Germany and the cause of German unity.

Washington newsmen were astounded. No U.S. official had ever before made such a bare-faced endorsement of a political faction in the elections of a friendly country, especially where both the leading rival parties were non-Communist and professed friendship for the U.S.

But the Secretary had not finished his tour of the china shop. Someone asked him about U.S. policy on the disputed border zone of Trieste, noting that during the Italian election campaign of 1948, the U.S. had signed a joint declaration supporting return of Trieste to Italy. Dulles broadly suggested that all this might now be changed. The U.S. Government, he said, has been exploring other alternatives. It does not regard the 1948 statement on Trieste like the laws of the Medes and Persians, which stand forever.*

In his legion speech, Dulles had remarked that the U.S. does not have to be "constantly taking international public-opinion polls" to see what its friends overseas are thinking. No one had to take an international public-opinion poll, either, to find out what the U.S. allies thought about Dulles' press conference. "An insult to the German people," cried Adenauer's Socialist opponents, and quickly started using the threat of U.S. intervention to whip up nationalist sentiment for their campaign. Adenauer's supporters were embarrassed. Said one Christian Democrat adviser: "If this endorsement had come a week earlier, it might have wrecked Adenauer's chances."

In Italy, where feeling over the Trieste problem is at fever-point, the reputation of the U.S. hit a new low. Communists and other extremists gave Dulles' statement all the publicity they could.

Picking Up the Pieces. Back at the State Department, officials tried to pick up the pieces. Dulles himself assured the Italians that the U.S. does not plan any new proposals for Trieste, has no intention of going back on its 1948 statement. For a while he thought of issuing a supplementary statement to clear up his unfortunate observation on Germany, but he finally decided against it.

On his three main statements of the week, Dulles' score stood: 1) On future Communist aggression in Asia, the policy he announced was not only right but needed saying. 2) On Germany, his appraisal of the German situation might be right but badly needed not saying. 3) On Trieste, there is no reason for the U.S. to back down on its promise to Italy, and even if there had been such a reason, the form and timing of Dulles' remarks would have been the worst possible way to go about a switch in U.S. policy on Trieste.

* "Then these men assembled unto the king, and said unto the king, Know, o king, that the law of the Medes and Persians is, That no decree or statute which the king establisheth may be changed."

--Daniel 6:15

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.