Agreement

TRUCE TALKS Agreement This week, seemingly beyond reasonable doubt, a Korean armistice was imminent. The U.S. had outlasted South Korea's Syngman Rhee in the battle of wills. And the Communists appeared so tremulous for a truce that their anxiety stood out on them almost visibly--like drops of sweat.

Dwight Eisenhower's troubleshooting Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson published a joint statement with Rhee. in which the substance of agreement was hidden under an amiable flow of words. Apparently this was done to save Rhee's face, i.e., to screen the manifest fact that he had been backed down. Excerpts: "Our two governments are in agreement in respect to entering into a mutual defense pact, negotiations for which are under way. We have likewise discussed collaboration along political, economic and defense lines, and our conversations have disclosed a wide area of agreement concerning these matters. In particular, we wish to emphasize our determination to work together for the realization ... of our common objective, namely a free, independent and unified Korea . . ." None of this formally committed Rhee to anything, but Robertson was said to have private assurances from Rhee in writing that he would not try to go it alone, or impede a truce.

"Go Ahead & Sign." After 17 arduous days in Korea and 14 meetings with President Rhee, Robertson met reporters on the clipped green lawn of the U.S. embassy in Seoul, poured himself a stiff drink of Scotch and parried questions.

Said Robertson later: "The United Nations Command now can go ahead and sign ... I have confidence that President Rhee will carry out his commitments. He has promised not to obstruct an armistice now or in the post-armistice period." It is understood that Rhee will take no action of his own for approximately six months--that is, until three months after the start of the political conference. In return, the U.S. promised South Korea substantial economic aid. and a security pact (with the explicit understanding that it requires Senate consent) to go to Rhee's aid if the Communists start something.

Back to the Hut. Meanwhile, the Communist truce negotiators came scrambling back to Panmunjom to see what the U.N. had to offer in the way of guarantees. At the first meeting since Rhee liberated the anti-Communist North Koreans last month, the truce hut was stifling hot. The U.N. delegates fanned themselves with memo pads, and mopped their faces with soggy handkerchiefs; the Reds simply sat and sweated in their heavy uniforms. The proceedings were secret. The first session lasted only three minutes, but it was followed by another longer one, and by a third next day. A truce, if all went well, was probably still another week away.

In dealing with Rhee, the U.S. strategists and their emissaries had avoided two unwise extremes: 1) trying to remove stubborn old Syngman Rhee by a coup; 2) surrendering to him and going on with the war. They had proceeded on the assumption that Rhee would change his tune when he saw that no amount of guile or obstruction on his part would swerve the U.S. from its goal. Apparently Rhee became convinced.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.