Time to Move

Lavrenty Beria's fall, like H. Dumpty's, was a great event, and all the Russian experts in the West started trying to piece together facts, rumors and Communist propaganda lies in order to reconstruct their theories of what is going on in the Kremlin. Charles Bohlen, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, probably knew as much about what had happened as any outsider could. But last week, when he flew home to brief the Big Three Foreign Ministers' Conference, it was apparent that even "Chip" Bohlen did not know much.

The most obvious lesson of Beria's arrest was probably the most useful: the Communist Party is not a legitimate government of Russia, and illegitimate governments cannot develop orderly succession of authority. Like gang bosses, the top men fight until one wins. Some specialists on Russian doings had recently convinced themselves that Stalin's death released a great democratic trend in the U.S.S.R., which accounted for the "soft" line in Russian foreign policy.

Dramatic Offer. This kind of wishful thinking influenced British and French demands for a four-power conference with Russia. Last week, with jungle law clearly stalking the Kremlin, a four-power conference seemed less appropriate than ever. Whoever represented Russia at such a conference would gain in recognition and stature against his rivals. It is hardly in the interest of the anti-Communist powers to abate the dog fight by helping the Communists to pick a new top dog. At this time of renewed treachery and revolt in the Communist world, any contribution the U.S. could make toward its further disunity might pay off handsomely.

President Eisenhower lost no time in making public a dramatic and highly appropriate move. He offered last week to send $15 million worth of food into hunger-ridden East Germany. "Because of its position as an occupying power in GerMany, my Government," said Eisenhower, "has a legitimate interest in the welfare of the people of Germany." Both the U.S.S.R. and the East German Communist government shrilly rejected the Eisenhower offer, a rejection certain to increase the rebellious mood of East Germans.

Necessary Agreement. If the news called for exploitation of Communist troubles, it also emphasized the need for greater unity of the anti-Communist nations. On this front, too, the week brought a major development--Syngman Rhee's agreement to abide by the terms of a truce in Korea. Rhee's stubborn holdout had been in large part the result of the tragic U.S. failure to define clear goals in the Korean war. But the truce negotiations had gone so far that no advantage to the anti-Communists could be gained by delaying a truce. Rhee's stand, plus evidences of Communist internal weakness, seemed to underline the need for U.S. insistence, in the peace talks scheduled to follow the truce, on free elections for a united Korea.

All in all, a newsful week beckoned the U.S. to firmer moves on the world board.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.