Critically Weak

"It is certain," said Winston Churchill in March 1949, "that Europe would have been Communized long ago . . . but for the deterrent of the atomic bomb in the hands of the United States."

Four years and many committee meetings later, the Churchillian thesis still seems as good as any, to judge by the continuing imbalance between Eastern and Western strength. The lineup:

Troops: 58 Western divisions (27 U.S., British, West European, in the central sector; 31 Greek, Turkish, in the southeast). Maximum strength: 700,000 men. Help in war might also come from Yugoslavia (32 small divisions).

versus

245 Eastern divisions (175 Russian, 70 satellite), supported by the nucleus of an East German army. Minimum strength: 2,550,000 men.

Planes: Approximately 4,000 in NATO v. approximately 20,000 Communist.

Reported General Matthew B. Ridgway, retiring Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, last week to the NATO Standing Group in Washington: "I find the disparity between our available forces and those which the Soviet rulers could bring against us so great . . . that a full-scale soviet attack within the near future would find Allied Command . . . critically weak . . . Our progress is insufficient ... to give us acceptable prospect of success if attacked.

"Much," said Ridgway, "has been done." For example: 1) from the North Cape to the Caucasus, Allied forces are now controlled by one integrated command; 2) existing land forces could probably ward off a surprise onslaught by the 22 Russian field divisions on permanent station in East Germany; 3) 60 of the scheduled 125 Allied airfields are usable in an emergency; 4) atomic warfare training for key NATO officers is under way.

But Ridgway was not satisfied with the state of his support and supply units, his ammunition stocks, and "our greatest weakness"--tactical air power; he was disturbed that West Germany's "contribution" was still denied him. Above all, he was alarmed by the way "nations are beginning to change their planned military programs from rapid rearmament to a longer-term policy . . . Any real slackening of effort may itself open the way to aggression."

Ridgway on the peace offensive: "I know of no facts which would lead me to conclude that the military danger from the East has lessened ... As a soldier, I cannot afford to deal with conjecture."

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