Monday, Apr. 27, 1953

For a True & Total Peace

Dwight Eisenhower and his advisers knew, on Stalin's death, that history had reached a crossroad, and that it was imperative for the U.S. Government to restate its direction in foreign policy. But the President would not be hurried; he wanted Stalin's successors to show their hand first. He rejected an early proposal for a special message to Congress, another for a fireside chat to the nation. Then last week, choosing his platform and timing carefully, the President went before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington's Statler Hotel to deliver one of the notable policy statements of U.S. history.

It was notable not because of style or flourish, but because it successfully projected into a divided world the universal philosophy of the U.S. It spoke a regard for liberty as well as peace, for justice as well as hope, for freedom as well as security. Thus, in the broad framework of the kind of "true and total peace" the U.S. stands for, the President could set down--as the free world had never set down be fore--the kind of terms which such peace demands from Communism.

Another Road. Eisenhower looked pale (unknown to his audience, he was fighting an upset stomach -- see below) and deeply serious as he put on his horn-rimmed glasses and began to read the text of his address. He used fewer gestures than he ordinarily does; he paused reluctantly for applause as he moved quickly to the "one question" that, above all, weighed upon the free world: "The chance for a just peace." Why had the bright prospect of peace vanished in the aftermath of World War II? "The U.S. and our valued friends . . .

chose one road. The leaders of the Soviet Union chose another." Because the Soviet leaders sought security "by denying it to all others," they forced the world into a crushing burden of armaments -- "a theft from those who hunger and are not fed,

those who are cold and are not clothed." "This," said Eisenhower, "is humanity hanging from a cross of iron." Five Precepts. As a contrast to Russian conduct, Eisenhower restated "a few clear precepts" which govern U.S. foreign policy : "First: No people on earth can be held -- as a people -- to be an enemy, for all humanity shares the common hunger for peace and fellowship and justice.

"Second: No nation's security and well-being can be lastingly achieved in isolation, but only in effective cooperation with fellow nations.

"Third: Every nation's right to a form of government and an economic system of its own choosing is inalienable.

"Fourth: Any nation's attempt to dictate to other nations their form of government is indefensible.

"And fifth: A nation's hope of lasting peace cannot be firmly based upon any race in armaments, but rather upon just relations and honest understanding with all other nations." Minimum Terms. What specific steps could prove that Communism has genuinely peaceful intentions? Ike's specifications: P: Russia's signature on the long-stalemated Austrian peace treaty, or its release of "thousands of prisoners still held from World War II." These could be immediate and "impressive signs of sincere intent." P: An honorable armistice in Korea. This must be "the first step," and it must be followed by free elections in a united Korea.

P: An end to direct and indirect attacks on Indo-China and Malaya. This recognized the indivisible nature of Communist aggression in East Asia. A Korean truce, said Eisenhower, would be "a fraud" if it merely released Red forces for attacks elsewhere.

P: A defensible alliance of Western Europe. Its shield would be NATO and, within NATO, the European Defense Community of six nations.

P: A free, equal and united Germany taking its share in EDC.

P: An independent Eastern Europe. This, in the most sensitive area of Moscow's encroachment, meant an end of Russian military occupation and new, free elections.

Once the political basis for peace with the Communists was laid down, said the President, the U.S. "would welcome and enter into the most solemn agreements" for reducing the crushing burden of armaments. Specifically, under adequate safeguards and "a practical system of inspection under the United Nations," the U.S.

would join in plans to:

P: Limit all armed forces "by absolute

numbers or an agreed international ratio."

P: Limit production of strategic materials

(e.g., steel) for military purposes.

P: Set up international control of atomic

energy "to promote its use for peaceful

purposes," ban atomic weapons and "other

weapons of great destructiveness."

Beyond such agreements, he went on, lies opportunity for "a declared, total war, not upon any human enemy, but upon the brute forces of poverty and need." The U.S., said he, is willing to devote "a substantial percentage of any savings achieved by real disarmament to a fund for world aid and reconstruction."

All this--the hopes for immediate peace, the broad settlements, and the vision of the future--he left at the door of the Kremlin, for all the world to see. "I know of only one question upon which progress waits," he said. "It is this: What is the Soviet Union ready to do?"

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