Baldy & Bunker

An ugly, bare-hill mass with a flattened top, Old Baldy juts out awkwardly in front of the Eighth Army's stabilized, heavily fortified MLR (main line of resistance), a few miles west of Chorwon on the western front. U.S. troops captured Old Baldy last May. Since then it has changed hands more than once, but--up to last week--it was held by units of the U.S. 7th Division, with South Americans of the Colombia battalion attached. Baldy had some value as an observation point, but it was vulnerable to Communist attack on three sides. Mostly it had prestige value: it was what some officers cynically call a "political hill."

Early last week, just after dark, the Chinese Reds laid a painful artillery-and-mortar barrage on Baldy, whose bunkers and trenches had been softened by insistent spring rains. Under enemy fire, most of the weakened shelters collapsed. One outpost was overrun, then recaptured by U.S. reinforcements in the middle of the night. The main Red attack, however, was aimed at Baldy's summit by a reinforced Chinese regiment of 3,000 to 3,500 men, advancing in waves through a curtain of their own fire. The 7th Division units on the crest could not stand.

Wounded to the Rear. Next day, with socked-in weather preventing air support, the Americans pulled back from most of the hill and were launching futile counter attacks from exposed positions, while U.S. tanks worked around the ridges trying to cut off enemy reinforcements. And on the following day, the U.S. forces abandoned the hill entirely to give the air and artillery a chance. Air Force jets and Marine Corsairs swarmed over Baldy by day, B-26s at night. Still the Chinese held on. Some of the green U.S. replacements going up to the front vomited when they passed the first loads of dead and wounded coming back.

The assault on Old Baldy, the heaviest and bloodiest of 1953, came just a few days before the Chinese made a surprise offer to settle the "one question alone" which prevents a Korean truce (see NATIONAL AFFAIRS). Thus, the Red right hand had struck while the left hand held out an olive branch. This familiar pattern of pugnacity mixed with conciliation undoubtedly had its place in the world strategy of the Kremlin's new management; within the Korean frame of reference, its meaning seemed fairly clear. The military attacks said, in effect: "Don't think, just because we are offering peace, that we are weak or frightened--you see, we are still able and willing to fight."

Three days after the fight for Baldy started, the Chinese attacked Bunker Hill, some five miles east of Panmunjom. again with a reinforced regiment. Bunker was held by units of the glory-laden U.S. 1st Marine Division. The leathernecks had small forces on two knobs called Vegas and Reno--perhaps a platoon on each-and these units were simply overrun and wiped out. One radio message came through from a caved-in and sealed bunker: "Only seven of us are left alive--the rest have suffocated."

The Marines recaptured Vegas, lost it again; then, after five grueling counterattacks against "bucketfuls" of enemy grenades and heavy fire from the Red mortars and artillery, got back on top. But at week's end Reno was still in Communist hands.

Sluggish Movements. Aside from their losses, no one was concerned about the Marines; they could take care of themselves. No one feared a Communist breakthrough anywhere. In Tokyo, Mark Clark said he was not distressed about the loss of Old Baldy. either. But there was quite visible distress in the 7th Division, resulting from tactical confusion and confused statements about what the troops were doing. The division commander, Major General Arthur Trudeau, was publicly rebuked by I Corps' Commander Paul Kendall.

Instead of pulling smartly back to the MLR, to save casualties until they were in shape for a successful counterattack, too many of the 7th's units had tried to stand their ground, throwing in cooks and KPs and yelling for reinforcements. The long sitdown had made the Eighth Army sluggish. The battalion and company commanders were not prepared for quick emergency movement of their equipment and command posts. No corps or division command post had been moved for tactical reasons in nearly two years. Sluggishness could be seen in the movement of field pieces up to the front and in the handling of transport on the muddy roads.

The Communists lost many hundreds, perhaps thousands, of men, for a gain of almost nothing. The U.N. losses, though not as high as correspondents feared at first, were substantial.

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