Three Handy Sizes

Ever since Stalin's death, the Kremlin gang had been passing out a carefully blended mixture of honey and vinegar which seemed to signal a softening of Soviet foreign policy. The first clues to the new Communist policy were small and ambiguous. Last week, however, came two stronger indications of a new line.

In Korea, a U.N. liaison officer, called to Panmunjom by the Reds, was handed a startling letter. Dispensing with the usual Communist invective, the Red commanders accepted U.N. Commander Mark Clark's month-old proposal for an immediate exchange of "seriously sick and seriously wounded" prisoners of war, according to the terms of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention. Such an exchange, U.N. officers estimated, might involve about 3,000 of the 123,000 prisoners now held by the U.N. and perhaps 1,000 of the 12,000 prisoners the Communists admit they hold. It was unlikely that more than 200 to 300 Americans would be returned. Close Study. On the surface, the Communist note seemed satisfactory. While it linked the exchange offer with a proposal for more truce talks, it apparently was not conditional upon any further negotiations. Nonetheless, the U.N. command was understandably leary. "We are going to study this offer very closely," said General Clark. "We want to be sure there isn't anything in it we don't understand."

While Clark was still studying the Communist note, the Chinese made a second and far more important proposal. In a Peking radio broadcast, Chinese Premier Chou Enlai, who had recently returned from Moscow, abandoned Chinese insistence upon forced repatriation of all P.W.s, the issue which caused the breakdown of the Panmunjom talks. Admitting that there are some Chinese who don't want to go home--"captured personnel of our side who, under the intimidation and oppression of the opposite side, are filled with apprehension"--Chou suggested that prisoners who reject repatriation be handed over to a neutral state. Four months ago, Communist China had turned down a somewhat similar proposal by India. Last week Chou said: "It is only to put an end to the bloody war in Korea . . . that we take this new step."

International Poker. Like the skillful international poker players they are, the Chinese accompanied their new truce offers with strong ground attacks on the U.N. battle line. They gave no indication as to why they had extended the olive branch again. Bitter experience had convinced most U.S. observers that Communist concessions are always made in the hope of lulling opponents into dangerous relaxation. The lull the Communists were seeking this time, however, may come in any one of three handy sizes:

1) Korean Size. More stalling at Panmunjom talks to give the Chinese more time to build their defense in Korea before the new U.S. Administration strikes for a decision there.

2) Asiatic Size. Quick agreement on a Korean truce, designed as a prelude to another blow elsewhere in Asia.

3) World Size. A general cold war armistice designed to give the whole Communist world a chance to settle the problems arising from Stalin's death, and to take the momentum out of the Eisenhower "liberation not containment" drive.

In all three sizes, agreement would be good or bad for the non-Communist world, depending upon the actual terms and even more upon whether the Communists succeeded in getting their opponents to drop their guard or slow down the effort to liberate enslaved peoples.

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