Time to Whistle

"Do not waste your time in trying to discover what is at the back of (the other man's) mind; there may, for all you know, be nothing at the back. Concentrate all your attention upon making quite certain that he is in no doubt whatsoever in regard to what is at the back of your mind."

--Diplomacy, by Harold Nicolson

This sound diplomatic precept obviously lay well at the front of John Foster Dulles' mind last week. On his ten-day flying trip to Western Europe's capitals, the new Secretary of State left little room for doubt that 1) unless the European allies end their dillydallying over the European Army and soon show the U.S. Congress they mean business, severe cuts in U.S. aid are probably unavoidable; 2) the European partners have until about April--when Congress begins budgeting foreign aid--to prove that they really want the European Army.

The Communists, and a few newspapermen in too much of a hurry for a headline, called Dulles' message a 75-day "ultimatum." Most of the Secretary's audience appeared willing to take it for what it was meant to be--a helpful reminder of the facts of life in the U.S. "This visit," suggested Germany's Rhein-Neckar Zeitung, "shows [all] nations with brutal clarity that it no longer suffices to pucker one's lips. We now must whistle."

Rushing from stop to stop, sniffling and red-nosed from a cold, Secretary Dulles not only talked, but listened:

Italy was the pleasantest stop. Premier Alcide de Gasperi, one of the most zealous champions of European unification, virtually guaranteed that Italy would approve the European defense treaty.

The Low Countries were preoccupied with the ravages of the North Sea floods (see below), but said that the damage would not interfere with their commit ments to NATO defense. They were marking time because of French hesitations over a European Army.

West Germany gave Dulles a chance to strengthen the skilled hand of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, whom Britain's Manchester Guardian haughtily calls "the best boy in the European class," because he so ardently supports the European Army. Dulles addressed himself to West Germans' principal fears: that military alliance with the West would harden for good the division of West and East Germans. It would do the opposite, said Dulles; a strong West Germany would provide such an "attraction" to East Germany and other satellites that it might in time pry them away from the Eastern orbit. Perhaps even now, in the convulsions of a new purge, said Dulles, the Communists are showing "stress and strain." Dulles made the shrewd move of conferring with Socialist Party Leader Erich Ollenhauer (the only opposition leader he saw on the trip), listened to the Socialist's counterarguments, then firmly told him that the U.S. would consider no alternatives--it is the European Army or no German rearmament at all.

Great Britain was noisy with controversy over President Eisenhower's order to the Seventh Fleet, and chilly with misgivings about Dulles' intentions. Three days before the Secretary arrived, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden made formal representations to Washington about Formosa, and later told the House of Commons that Eisenhower's action will "have very serious political repercussions without compensating military advantages." London wondered uneasily whether Dulles would demand that Britain join the European Army as the French have long urged. Dulles spoke reassuringly about Formosa, did not try to pressure the British into EDC. (Eden was "immensely relieved" that he did not.) Dulles did make clear that the U.S. hopes to see more energetic British efforts to align Britain with the six continental nations.

France, full of doubts and dissension over the European Army, was Dulles' severest test. Are the French really trying to scuttle the idea with their talk of "protocols" added to it? Foreign Minister Georges Bidault tried to explain with an allegory about Roland's mare, which was a perfect animal except, alas, it was dead. Dulles, whose rusty French was not quite up to talk of Roland's mare, finally understood what Bidault was trying to say: better an amended European Army treaty that would pass a hostile Assembly than a perfect treaty that would not. Bidault claimed that the proposed changes are not horrendous: they involve, for example, giving France the right to transfer its troops between its overseas commands and the European Army without consulting the other nations. The difficulty is whether, once a treaty is open to amendments by its friends, its enemies can be stopped from amending it further. When the French Assembly set up committees last week to consider the matter, two of the fiercest opponents of the European Defense Community got the two key places on the committee: Gaullist General Joseph Pierre Koenig and Socialist Jules Moch. At best, the French may pass the treaty by June, long after Dulles' April deadline.

Nonetheless, returning home at weekend, Dulles professed himself more hopeful about Western European unity than when he left. It remains to be seen whether, under U.S. prodding, Western Europe is yet capable of what Dulles calls "efforts equal to the dangers."

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