Nations Divided

Suddenly the grand plan to erect a European Army against Communism seemed to fall apart:

P: In France, Premier Rene Mayer served notice that his new government wants alterations which would long delay, and might kill, the European Army.

P: In West Germany, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer--getting into the act before his powerful Socialist opponents could beat him to it -- announced that Germany also wanted changes.

P: In Belgium, the Conseil d'Etat, which is short on legal powers but long on moral suasion, unexpectedly took the position that the EDC treaty violated Belgium's constitution.

Temporary Alternative. After all the palaver and the promises, the whole two-year-old debate appeared to be wide open again. A tempting alternative was now widely discussed. Why not forget all the complexities of a common command, a common uniform and common budget? Why not simply rearm the West Germans, and postpone all talk of a federated Western Europe? This is the proposal of General de Gaulle, who from the first has fought the European Army idea.

In France, cabled a correspondent last week, "there is not a majority for liking German rearmament, but there is a ma jority for having it." Yet it was the French who had first insisted on the complexities of the European Army, as their price for letting Germany rearm. Now many Frenchmen, including Marshal Juin, were coming to see that the chains that bind Germany would also chafe France.

For example, Saint-Cyr, the West Point of France, would be obliged to admit German, Benelux and Italian cadets, and could no longer have sole say over its own curriculum. Nor would France any longer be able to make, buy or sell arms as it sees fit. There was also a serious question whether France could freely exchange its overseas officers--fighting in Indo-China or tied down in colonial trouble spots--with its own officers in the European Army, without five nations' concurrence. These difficulties had led De Gaulle to demand a looser federation, something like an old-fashioned grand alliance. Germany would get its army more quickly, he said; but down in the fine print, France would run the show.

The question of the moment is whether abandonment of the European Army would in fact hasten German rearmament. There is no reason to believe that the French people (or their politicians) are in any greater hurry to accept a revived German Wehrmacht and a return of the German general staff, in preference to Germans-in-European-uniforms under international command. To satisfy De Gaulle would also be to antagonize Germany, for De Gaulle insists that Germany must sign a separate treaty with France agreeing to junior status and fewer troops than the French have in France. Germany also has to acknowledge that a Frenchman "must" command the European defense. Since there is no greater likelihood of De Gaulle's ideas being accepted, the danger is that, if the European Army is rejected, nothing at all will be done: only more talk, more drafts, more delays.

There had been talk enough already. "The French," complained one of Konrad Adenauer's key aides, "want to give us too much to die with but not enough to live with. We can only counter with renewed demands--for example, outright membership in NATO. And that puts us right back where we started two years ago." Unshakably convinced that EDC is the only route to West Germany's and Western Europe's security, Adenauer himself nevertheless felt obliged, after Mayer's concessions to De Gaulle, to go on the air himself and edge toward the side of the revisionists.

Heights to Depths. What had happened to tumble the European Army ideal from June's heights to January's depths? The principal reasons were five. First was a failure of the diplomats: the hands-off timidity of the U.S. State Department, the standoffishness of the British Foreign Office, the hesitations and quibbles of the six continental nations involved. Second was Joseph Stalin's new false face, the calculated sweetness of recent Soviet propaganda, which has persuaded many that the danger of war is lessening. Third are the exigencies of domestic politics. Elections come next August in West Germany, and Adenauer is not at all sure of survival. Mayer's new regime was at the stage of making compromise and concessions to get into power.

Fourth is Britain's persistent refusal to join the European Army. At SHAPE headquarters outside Paris last week, British Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, deputy commander of NATO forces, spoke up bluntly for British membership in the European Army, though he too made conditions. He told a group of British M.P.s that Britain's participation could make the European Army a reality. The Foreign Office and Defense Ministry were quick to say that Monty spoke only for himself. Winston Churchill, who out of office championed European federation, has proved in office an adamant opponent of British participation.

Fifth was the withdrawal of U.S. initiative and leadership from Europe dur ing the election campaign and the eleven-week interregnum which ends Jan. 20. Partly this stemmed from Europe's resistance to unwanted pressure from an outgoing, lameduck administration. In New York, President-elect Eisenhower took extraordinary steps to recover some of the lost ground.

Since Election Day, Eisenhower has followed a strict practice of staying mum on high-policy questions until his inauguration. But he could not stand by while the European Army, which he did so much to promote, fell before it stood. To embattled Chancellor Adenauer, who had appealed secretly for a psychological boost from the incoming President, Eisenhower sent a special public message emphasizing that he believed more stoutly than ever in "the importance of a growing European unity and the establishment of a European Defense Command."

Then he tackled Prime Minister Churchill in the privacy of their conference in New York. With Secretary of State-designate John Foster Dulles to back him up, Eisenhower taxed Churchill's Tory government for not doing more to support the faltering European Defense Community.

The European Army was not yet dead, though the hour is late. The whole issue was indeed wide open--open to disaster but also to decision. At the very beginning of his Administration, Dwight Eisenhower faces a world problem of the first magnitude. Judging from what could be overheard from his talks with Churchill, he was well aware of the danger, and of the opportunity.

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