In Mossadeq's Wake

All over the Middle East last week, men with old hatreds seized new opportunities.

The daddy of all the troubles, long underestimated Mr. Mossadeq of Iran, sat in Room 1619 of New York Hospital's George F. Baker Pavilion, while U.N. officials, Asiatic friends and U.S. diplomats tiptoed to his bedside. Though he had won a spectacular reputation for fainting at appropriate moments, he was pronounced in good health by U.S. doctors. After that, he quietly moved himself to the Ritz Tower. He was in New York to tell the U.N. Security Council (and a nationwide TV audience) that it had no business interfering with Iran's decision to kick out the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. State Department men, noting that he had brought along his oil experts, thought the aged Premier might be willing to discuss some other arrangement whereby the West would still get the oil. The British thought it would be tough going. Said one: "Impossible type, you know."

Ready with Demands. Mossadeq's example was admiringly watched and quickly followed in the Middle East. In Egypt, 75-year-old Premier Mustafa Nahas Pasha, who like Mossadeq has spent most of his life baiting the British, seized the chance of a lifetime, jumped on the British with rough demands that they vacate the Suez Canal zone and the Sudan (see col. 3).

Three days later, in Iraq (Iran's sparsely populated but oil-fat neighbor), more anti-British demands were announced. Premier Nuri es-Said requested "revision" of a 1930 treaty which grants the British two air bases in Iraq, along the air route to India. Nuri has a reputation as an old friend of England, and his demands were diplomatically made, but even he assumed the proper anti-British posture. There was a reason: Egypt, the strongest Arab nation, had arranged through the Arab League for Iraq to follow Egypt's lead.

With these new--and in Egypt's case reckless--demands, the West faced the possibility of a power vacuum in an area where Russia, since Czarist days, has been trying to expand. For the U.S., the situation recalled a parallel: Greece in 1947. Then, declining power had forced the

British to withdraw their troops, and the U.S. had assumed Britain's obligations, rather than let the area go by default to Communist penetration.

Ready with a Plan. In Iran, the U..S. was unenthusiastic about taking Britain's side, yet unwilling to take Britain's place. In Egypt, trouble had been foreseen. The U.S., Britain, France and Turkey had long been at work on a plan. When Nahas Pasha--who knew the plan was coming--sounded off, the State Department hastily unveiled it. Its main features: P: Replace British control of the Suez with a new five-power agreement setting up a Middle East Command. Founder members: U.S., Britain, France, Turkey and Egypt.

P: Set up headquarters of the command in Egypt, for joint Suez Canal defense. Suggested initial donors of troops: Britain and Egypt.

P: Establish the principle that other nations, including the U.S., contribute to Middle Eastern security.

This week, Egypt cockily rejected the plan. But the West was not intending to let Egypt become another Iran. Britain announced that she was staying put--by force if necessary.

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