What's Wrong, Charlie?

Standing up before 200 scrap-metal dealers in Washington last week, Chief Mobilizer Charles E. Wilson angrily pounded his ham-sized hands down on the lectern. The Defense Production Administration, he said, had told him that steel production will be lower in the beginning of 1952 than in the last quarter of this year. Cried Charlie Wilson: "I just won't accept that answer. We have got to have at least a million more tons to distribute in the first quarter and another million or two million tons in the second quarter . . . Get this damn scrap in."

Wilson's blood & thunder speech may have been intended only as a pep talk to get badly needed scrap rolling into steel mills. But it shocked steelmen who wondered where Wilson got the figures. If DPA had privately made such a gloomy report on a drop in steel production, why had NPA estimated that steelmen will produce 400,000 tons more steel in the first quarter of 1952 than in this year's last quarter? Furthermore, how did Wilson expect to get more steel next year when he had permitted DPA to slash the steel industry's allotment of metal for expansion only a fortnight ago? What, wondered steelmen, had got into Charlie Wilson?

The answer seemed to be that Wilson has suddenly become shocked and worried by the way parts of his mobilization program have fallen behind schedule. Items:

P: From March through July, there was no speedup in deliveries of 95 key military items, including some bombers, most tanks and electronics equipment. P: Deliveries on many critical goods were behind schedules only 30 days old. P: $3.5 billion worth of goods scheduled for delivery in 1952 will not be delivered until 1953.

P: The peak in military deliveries planned for 1952 may not be reached. The total has already been scaled down from $50 billion to $45 billion.

As the responsible boss of U.S. mobilization, Charlie Wilson must expect to take the rap for this delay. As long as six months ago, defense production was obviously lagging; but Wilson was so anxious "not to disturb the civilian economy that defense producers often came in last in the race for scarce materials and skilled manpower. Furthermore, Charlie Wilson thought that he could confine himself to policy matters, let other agencies (Commerce, DPA, Interior, etc.) carry out the job. But the other agencies sometimes worked at cross purposes without firm direction from topside. Now, it looks as if Wilson will need a staff to lay down just how his policies should be carried out--and see that the job is done. He may even have to take a hand in production scheduling himself, where his genius for getting out the goods can be felt.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.