The Limited War

Just what did George Catlett Marshall consider the Korean business anyway, asked Washington's Harry Cain, "a police action ... a large or a small war?"

"I would characterize it as a limited war which I hope will remain limited," replied Marshall.

"An Intermingling." Do the limitations imposed--which Douglas MacArthur objected to--originate with, and have the unwavering endorsement of, the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Chairman Russell asked.

MARSHALL: "Those restrictions directly related to views of the Chiefs of Staff as expressed and discussed in the National Security Council, with the presence of the President, the Vice President, myself, the Secretary of State . . . There was an intermingling there of political necessities along with military directions."

RUSSELL : "As to the extension of the war, the adoption of the MacArthur Plan . . . What do you think ... of that plan?"

MARSHALL: "I think the extension of the conflict would not be profitable . . . for a number of reasons."

Profit & Loss. Marshall ticked off the Administration's rejoinder to the MacArthur proposals: bombing of Manchurian bases or of the Chinese mainland would not cripple the enemy as much as Mac-Arthur believes, because, for one thing, life is cheap in China; a naval blockade would involve the U.S. with Russian ships, would probably "leak like a sieve," and would not shut off the main Chinese supplies, coming by land from Russia; the value of Chiang Kai-shek's troops on Formosa in any expedition against the Reds is negligible. "I do not believe . . . the result would be commensurate with the effort that we would have to make."

Lines Deleted. "You stated . . . that you thought there was a great likelihood that the adoption of General MacArthur's policy would result in greater losses in Korea than to follow the present policy."

MARSHALL: "I assumed . . . that if we started on that [MacArthur's] procedure ... we would immediately have whatever retaliation they were able to effect. There [has been a] buildup of Communist China air power which has been very evident for several months [one and a half lines deleted]."

If there were no question of Soviet intervention, asked Georgia's Senator Walter George, would Marshall and the Administration favor the MacArthur plan to bomb bases in Manchuria?

MARSHALL : "... If, from a hypothetical point of view, there was no danger whatever of a Soviet intervention, I would say that certainly the bombing you mention would start almost immediately."

"There Is a Limit." Marshall had observed, in discussing the possible impact of bombing China proper, that life is cheap in

China. Later he had explained that the Administration was hoping that the large scale killing of Communists would make the Chinese give up in Korea. Wasn't that inconsistent? inquired New Hampshire's Styles Bridges.

MARSHALL: "I referred to trained Communist forces. There is a limit to what they have in trained Communist forces and presumably a limit as to equipment . . . There were 34 [Chinese] divisions, and the last report I heard, 26 of those had been pretty largely chewed up ...

"We have filled the hospitals all over China, and what happens with the wounded that are released and naturally talk ... is bound to have its effect on the Chinese people in the end."

But doesn't the Administration's policy leave the initiative in the enemy's hands? "That is very much the case," Marshall admitted. The Republicans pressed this point--didn't it promise no end to the Korean war except stalemate?

Marshall disagreed. "The application of this policy has not always been easy or popular," he declared. "Korea is not the first time there have been demands for a quick and decisive solution . . . Korea has lasted for ten months, but the Berlin crisis lasted almost 15 months and was a very daring undertaking . . . There were times when [it] also looked like a stalemate, but we ... won a notable victory . . . There were many that advocated that we breach the Russian setup, and go through their territory with an armed convoy. We didn't do that . . . Undoubtedly [that] would have promoted a general conflict . . . The effort to free

Greece from Communist aggression took 18 months. There were those who said that this was a hopeless adventure . . ."

"Some Things Are Unavoidable." Senator George went on to a new tack. Those very things--the Greek-Turkish aid program, the European Recovery Program and North Atlantic alliance--all involved the possibility of provoking Russia to war. "We took ... a lot [of] calculated risks ... It doesn't seem to me that we are required to be certain . . . that Soviet Russia will not come in."

MARSHALL: "Some things are unavoidable. I would say, if we don't do them, we lose definitely and we know that. That would be the European Recovery Program . . . We either had to allow [Western Europe] to go Communistic or do something . . . There was the question of Greece. Unless we did something Greece would go wholly Communistic, and that meant probably Italy would and Turkey was then in a serious predicament . . .

"Now, when we come to Korea . . . there has been a choice . . . We might easily be forced into action and are prepared to take that action [i.e., some or all of what MacArthur proposes]. But it is avoidable up to the present time. It may not be avoidable beginning tomorrow, but it is avoidable at the present time . . ."

Some Notable Campaigns. But, Senator George persisted, was it not almost impossible to win a purely defensive war in which the enemy would "immunize himself from your shot by merely going across the river and there rebuilding his forces?"

MARSHALL: "It is very difficult to win on a defensive basis [but] it is very reckless when you are under strength to plunge in on an aggressive offensive procedure. There have been some notable defensive campaigns in history which have ended in an offensive and decisive action . . . Notably, one was the peninsula campaign under Wellington . . . His campaign was measured in years ... In the end, he really played a leading part in the complete upset of the Napoleonic regime. He had to start on a defensive basis. He had no other choice. We have had to start on a defensive basis because we have really no other choice."

Any End? But, demanded Wisconsin's Alexander Wiley, "how do you visualize the Korean conflict will be terminated?"

MARSHALL: "If it goes on in the manner that it has for the last two months, and particularly in the last two weeks, it would appear that the trained fabric of the Chinese Communist forces will be pretty well torn to pieces. They must have--I know they must have--a decided limit. Their situation is assuming very serious proportions."

On the West's side, Marshall testified, the situation is improving every day. Casualties are dropping, have fallen from a high rate of 1.4 men per 100 men in action in the third month of the Korean War to .3 men per 100 in action in the last eight weeks. U.S. manpower mobilization has reached a stage where soon the U.S. will be able to send 20,000 fresh troops to Korea each month.

"Clear on That." On the outlines of a final settlement, the Administration seemed still to be hazy. What would it consider to be an acceptable solution to the Korean situation? Suggested Marshall: "[It] may mean the advance into northern Korea ... or our holding South Korea [only] safe from aggression . . . As to the political requirements or policies governing the situation, I must ask you to question the State Department . . . We always have the difficulty of whether or not agreements reached by negotiation with the [Communists] anywhere in the world can be depended upon . . . We must remain on guard until good faith is established."

In any case, the Senators wanted to know, would the U.S. consider giving the Red Chinese Formosa or a U.N. seat as part of a settlement? Marshall was more positive than any member of the Administration has ever been before: "We are very clear on that--Formosa must never be allowed to come under the control of a Communist government or of a government that is under Soviet Communist domination."

The U.S., he added, was equally adamant against giving Red China membership in the U.N. Would the U.S. use its U.N. veto to back up that policy?

MARSHALL: "That is the very decided impression I have. Now, just how that is [done] ... I think your questions apply more to the State Department than they do to me. I was merely told by my lawyer . . . that this was a lawyer's paradise for backs and forths."

Calling China's Hand. Louisiana's Russell Long, Huey's son, got back to the heart of the matter: "It would seem that if we would take stronger and more forceful efforts against China, that we could probably shorten the conflict there . . . It would seem like it might be unwise just to let her feel that we are afraid to call her hand."

MARSHALL: ". . . When they are losing many thousands of people with each operation, the question is whether they will end up with any hands."

Vermont's Ralph Flanders was troubled, too, that "we are given no idea as to what the military end of our present engagement is going to be. We have presented to us a sort of a vacuum. And it is my strong belief that the attractiveness of General MacArthur's program is because it drops into this aching void . . . And MacArthur proposes something to put in there and nobody else does."

Senator Flanders' troubled remarks brought from Marshall the most optimistic estimate he had made all week. Said Marshall: "I am getting an increasing confidence toward the possibility of a satisfactory conclusion. Whether or not it will be a military triumph or not, I don't know how you would characterize it. It would be a triumphant demonstration, I think, of our military powers in proportion to the people engaged."

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