The Strange War

The first phase of the great Chinese spring offensive -- South Korea's third Red invasion -- was over, and it was a failure. The Chinese had failed to inflict serious damage on the U.N. forces, had not come anywhere near their stated objective of driving the allies into the sea.

Chinese strategy was the same as before: to pour in masses of manpower. U.N. strategy was to retreat in orderly fashion, stand and fight at favorable spots, and inflict maximum casualties on the enemy through superior air and fire power. That strategy gave the U.N. forces no hope of winning the strange war in Korea, but it extorted an exorbitant price from the Reds for the ground they gained.

The Communists pushed the allied line back to Seoul in the west, a shorter distance (to a point below Chunchon) in the center, and little or not at all on the east coastal flank (which was attacked by light-hitting North Koreans). For this, General Van Fleet estimates, they lost some 70,000 men. To soldiers of the West, at least, it seemed too much to pay for so little ground. By this week, the allies had what looked like a good defense line: it was straight and considerably shorter than the angling line which the Chinese had crashed into a week earlier (see map).

The Chinese do not have enough room in the narrow Korean peninsula to make the best use of their manpower superiority. In World War II, during the Russian advance from Stalingrad to Berlin, it was a favorite trick of the Red army to open an attack on a narrow front, then widen it until the Germans available for defense were stretched out. In Korea, the sea prevents the Reds from trying this maneuver on the allies.

The picture may change when & if the Reds throw in their air power. By week's end, they had not done so. The U.N. forces regrouped, held on, waiting for Phase Two of the offensive.

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