The Answer

The "re-examination," as Robert Taft called it, had begun in earnest. It involved the size of the armed forces, the drafting of young men, the quality of weapons; it encompassed the policies of the nation in the U.N., in Europe, in the Far East.

Even as General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower flew off to Paris to organize the North Atlantic Treaty forces (see INTERNATIONAL), the nation echoed with doubts about the whole European enterprise. The idea of U.S. military involvement on the Continent had been attacked by Herbert Hoover. The scope of that involvement was scrutinized even more rigorously last week by Ohio's Taft. The debate ranged over questions of effectiveness, practicality and logic.

In one of the areas of debate, events had set up an insistent demand for decision, without delay. The area: Korea. Here, defeat and disaster were not future possibilities but present-day facts. Its cities gutted, its land scorched, its people uprooted, Korea had ceased to exist as a nation, had become a monument to the ravages of war. By the most optimistic speculation, U.N. forces would be able to hold only a corner of the shattered peninsula.

An End fo Do-Nothing. What should the U.S. do next? The nation's U.N. allies were taken by the fear that tough countermoves in Asia might plunge them all into World War III. The Administration itself took no decisive action: its position was that it could not move until U.N. gave the word. So the U.S. stood with one hand behind its back, waging a war that wasn't a war against an enemy who was not quite an enemy, who was inviolate as long as he stood north of the Yalu River.

One answer to the question came when Senator Styles Bridges abruptly demanded an end to the Administration's do-nothing stand. Bridges demanded that the U.S. use its fleet to support the Nationalist Chinese in an invasion of the China mainland, that it blockade Red China and bomb Red China's bases. Its allies, he added, must be summoned to supply more troops in the Far East and take the step of unequivocally declaring Red China an aggressor. Said Bridges: "Our men . . . should not be expected to battle any longer against the diplomatic odds which cripple their magnificent efforts."

A Final Summing-Up. Harry Truman answered Bridges. At his press conference the President did not argue the point; he merely affirmed that the U.S. could not bomb China without permission from the U.N. The U.S., he said, was not even considering making any such request. He still clung to the hope, he added, that the whole situation could be resolved by negotiation with the Red Chinese. Was this the Administration's only answer? Last week, after five weeks of vain waiting for the Chinese to agree to a cease-fire in Korea, the U.S. made a behind-the-scenes appeal to the U.N. General Assembly: declare China an aggressor. More tentatively, it suggested that the U.N. should consider imposing economic and political sanctions against the Chinese Reds. There was little disposition among the European and Asiatic nations to go along with either proposition. But that was the only answer the Administration seemed to have.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.