How Strong Is Russia?

The unavoidable and awesome fact confronting the world today is that before the decade or even the year is out, the U.S. and Russia may be at war. On the U.S. estimate of Russian power depends--or should depend--the extent to which the U.S. will build up its own strength.

Russian strength is a question mark, but not as mysterious a question mark as is often assumed. Some of Russia's most important assets have always been obvious: the vastness of its land, the large numbers and great tenacity of its people. These assets are as good a defense against the atom bomb as they were against Napoleon's infantry or Hitler's Panzers. The other, and decisive, components of Russian power are far less obvious, i.e., the size and quality of its armed forces and its industrial potential.

No modern industrial state, no matter how tyrannically secretive, can altogether hide its industrial plant and its military establishment from outside view. In recent years, the West has learned a great deal about Russia, not necessarily through cloak & dagger methods, but through patient, painstaking analysis of mountains of Soviet publications, official reports, government directives and statistics. These are often distorted, but they are not completely fantastic; they usually contain enough facts to enable Russia's own managers to go on managing their economy. Independent scholars as well as U.S. Government economists and intelligence analysts have laboriously constructed a picture of Russia's present strength.

There are at least 200 million people in the Soviet Union. Of them, 140 million live in Russia's western tip, the area inside the arc that runs through Leningrad and along the Volga to Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea. In other words, 70% of the U.S.S.R.'s people are concentrated in about 13% of the nation's area. (In the U.S., 70% of the population is concentrated in 32% of its area.)

Some 65 million Russians--as against 40 million Americans--are under 15 years old, i.e., they will soon be able to bear arms or to work in factories and on farms. In the 15-to-25 age group, the Russian advantage is almost as great. But in the 24-55 age bracket, World War II losses have cut Russia down to equality with the U.S. Some observers believe that this temporary Russian disadvantage is a powerful factor in persuading the Kremlin to postpone war for five or ten years. Others doubt the conclusion since, in any case, the U.S.S.R. will have as much manpower as it can feed and supply.

Entirely aside from such factors as courage and morale, the Russian pool of military manpower is lower in quality than that of the U.S. because the level of Russian education is lower, and the run of Russians have had less experience in handling mechanical devices, including modern mass-production machinery. The qualitative difference in manpower is even more striking on the economic front. A Soviet farmer (more than half of all Russians work in agriculture) turns out a quarter of a U.S. farmer's output, a Soviet factory worker less than a quarter of a U.S. worker's output.

What Will They Fight With?

Washington estimates that Russia has anywhere from five to 60 atom bombs; a favorite guess is 20-25. (Estimates about the U.S. atom bomb stockpile run from several hundred to "a small four figures.") It is certain that Russia's uranium ores are low-grade. A half-dozen or so deposits were discovered in 1944 in the Tashkent area of central Asia. The other main Soviet uranium source is northeast of Lake Baikal, in Siberia.

Inferiority in atomic bombs continues to be the main short-range Russian weakness and probably the chief factor inhibiting the Kremlin from all-out war -- to date. However, U.S. strategists do not view the atomic bomb as an "absolute weapon," capable by itself of achieving decisive victory. "Conventional" weapons and modes of war will have to be taken into account.

Land Power. Total Red army strength, including service troops, is 2,800,000. Of these 1,555,000 men are organized in 175 divisions, averaging 6,600 men in each; at full strength a Russian division has about 8,000 men. (The U.S. has 15 divisions in service, is organizing three more.) The Russians' 175 divisions break down into about 125 infantry divisions (including the airborne), and 50 mechanized divisions including armored outfits. U.S. Army Intelligence believes that Russia, which has long had a thoroughgoing system of compulsory military training, can mobilize 300 divisions within 60 days.

Historically and currently, Russians excel as artillerists. Their artillery weapons are generally excellent -- their World War II 76-mm. cannon was one of the best in its class. Their tanks are equally good; their T-34 medium is a match for all but the newest U.S. tanks and their Joseph Stalin III may be the best in service any where.

Air Power. In World War II, the U.S.S.R. scoffed at strategic bombing, used its aircraft almost exclusively in close support of ground troops. Since the war, and especially since the atomic bomb, the U.S.S.R. has laid more stress on long-range bombers. Today Russia has about 500 TU-45 (its copy of the 6-29) which could bomb most U.S. cities in one-way missions. Russia also has several hundred old four-engined bombers, which might be used for strategic bombing against Europe and Britain, though they would be sitting ducks to modern fighters.

Russia has continued to concentrate on developing tactical air support for its infantry. Its total of operational aircraft is estimated at 14,000 planes, most of them fighters and light bombers.

Under the reorganization of the Soviet armed forces last February, the air force lost its relatively independent status, be came a part of the army. Soviet military aviation is now divided into three sections, the army air force (tactical ground support), the fighter arm of the Soviet air defense, and the strategic bomber group.

These sections are organized into air armies, each consisting of three corps, with three divisions to a corps, three regiments to a division, and three squadrons to a regiment. A squadron has 30 to 50 planes.

When the Russians captured German aircraft plants and technicians in World War II, they got busy working on jet planes. The first Soviet jets, the MIG9 and the YAK-15,* were unveiled in 1946.

They had a top speed of only 500 m.p.h., but they have been surpassed by new models. One of their best: the swift-wing MIG-15, which U.S. jet airmen have met in Korea. It is fast, may well be the equal in speed of the latest U.S. jets in service.

Sea Power. In the last two years Russia has shown signs of wanting to become a major naval power. This ambition was fed by the annihilation of the Japanese navy and the Communist seizure of China, which opened a range of Pacific warm-water bases to the Red navy. But Russia's known navy is negligible except for its growing submarine fleet. It has about 300 submarines now, of which 30 to 40 are snorkel-equipped boats with enough speed and range to travel with a fleet.

For 15 years Russia has had two or three battleships under construction. At least one of them, the Sovietsky Soyuz, may be in commission in the Baltic. Russia is not known to have any carriers, but the Red navy is developing a land-based naval air force.

What Can They Produce?

Soviet industry has dramatically recovered from World War II's losses, and surpassed its prewar level. These are the latest available production figures in millions':

P: Steel ingots, from 18.3 metric tons in 1940 to 21.2 tons in 1949; P: Coal, from 160 to 236 tons; P: Oil, from 31 to 34.2 tons; P: Aluminum, from 56.7 to 160 tons; P: Electricity, from 48,300 to 70,000 kwh.

Much of this progress is due to increased technological skill. By the end of the '30s, the Russians were learning new industrial techniques fast, were just about to reap a modest harvest by the time they switched over to total war production. After the German attack in 1941, thousands of Russian technicians went to the U.S., worked in U.S. factories, took home invaluable industry know-how. The 1940-49 figures show in part how the new knowledge paid off.

The gains do not mean that Russia has greatly increased its capital equipment. Dr. Demitri Shimkin, who served on the U.S. Army's General Staff during the war, and is now with Harvard's Russian Research Center, has concluded from a careful study of postwar Russian production figures that the Russians achieved much of their gains by hard use of their old capital equipment. Shimkin's conclusion seems to indicate that after World War II the Russians decided to go on turning out all the war material they could at top speed--rather than to emphasize capital goods at first so as to be able to turn out larger amounts of war goods later. That involved taking a chance that their present capital equipment would be inadequate for the demands of a future war. Significantly Moscow took that risk in order to be ready for war at any time.

Steel is the pet industry in the U.S.S.R. as it is in any other major power. Soviet steel labor is elite labor, with an efficiency twice that of other Soviet workers. A severe drag on Russian steel production is the fact that 95% of Russia's working iron deposits lie west of the Ural's industrial complex, and 85% of its coking-coal reserves lie east of it. Bringing coal and iron together to make steel puts a heavy strain on Russia's inadequate transport system and slows down the growth of the steel industry.

The eastern Ukraine and the trans-Ural area form Russia's most efficient steel" making region, providing 75% of all Soviet steel capacity. Russia's best coal comes from the Kuznetsk Basin (or Kuzbas), halfway across Russia. From there, it is a long haul to the Ural mills, to say nothing of the mills in European Russia. The steel mills of central Russia must transport their ores and coal from the Ukraine in the south and from the war-developed mine at Vorkuta (also a famed slave-labor camp) on the Arctic Circle.

At Stalinsk, in the coal-rich Kuzbas, the Russians have built a sizable new steel mill. Farther east there are only two known mills; one, with 200,000 tons' capacity, is at Komsomolsk (north of Vladivostok), supplying naval construction and ordnance for the Far East. Since Siberia lacks iron ore, this plant must get its iron from western Russia. The other is a tiny mill somewhere in the Transbaikal.

The steel figures add up to this: Russia has not enough steel to fight a long war involving major ground action. That is why Germany's Ruhr is a key piece on the chessboard of world strategy. Western Germany is now producing almost as much steel as the whole vast U.S.S.R. Transfer of the Ruhr capacity from Western to Russian control would change the world strategic picture more decisively than any other territorial grab the U.S.S.R. could make.

Oil. Russia's oil production, concentrated vulnerably in the Caspian Sea area, north of Iran, and a markedly weak feature of its industrial system, is expected to top 35 million metric tons this year. (U.S. production: 262 million.) The Balkan satellites may divert two or three million more tons to Russia. The rich oilfields of Iran and Iraq would double Russia's oil output, but the Soviet Union would meet stiff U.S. and British opposition if it tried to seize them.

It is easy to exaggerate the strategic effect of oil shortage on Russia. It needs only a small fraction of its oil for civilian economy, in contrast to the U.S., which during World War II used less than a quarter of its oil to supply its armed forces. Best corrective for the conclusion that Russia cannot fight with only 35 million tons a year is the fact that Hitler's Germany managed to carry on a large-scale war with only 10 million tons a year.

Rubber is no problem. Russia was the first country (1936) to set up a sizable synthetic-rubber industry, now produces about 125,000 metric tons a year.

Power. The Soviet Union gave electric power one of the highest priorities in postwar reconstruction. The 1940 output of 48 billion kw-h was raised this year to nearly 80 billion, which is very far below the U.S. output (350), but is a strong indication of future Russian industrial expansion.

Can They Carry What They Produce?

Transport is the overall limiting factor in the economic growth of the U.S.S.R. Russia's resources, especially iron ore and coal, are wide apart (see above). Russia has five main industrial regions: north western European Russia (Moscow, Leningrad, Gorky); the Ukraine (Kiev, Krivoi Rog, Dneprostroi) ; the newer industrial complex just behind the Urals (Sverdlovsk, Magnitogorsk, etc.); the Kuznetsk Basin (Novosibirsk, Stalinsk, etc.); and the scattered mills, mines, army bases and slave-labor camps near the Pacific. Despite a widespread belief in the West that Russia's industrial trend is toward "safety behind the Urals," there is evidence that about 1947, Stalin & Co. hardheadedly concluded that U.S. bombers could strike behind the Urals almost as easily as in the Ukraine. So the trend appears to be back to the Ukraine and Western Russia.

The Soviet aim is to make each of these regions as self-sufficient as possible, so that if one is knocked out in a war, the others can fight on. But Russia's regions are still heavily dependent on each other, which means on transport. For example, nearly all Russia's synthetic rubber is made at Voronezh, four-fifths of her trucks and cars are made at Gorky and Moscow, each more than 300 miles away.

From the days of the Revolution, the Communists have made shift with old rail equipment, putting their limited steel into other kinds of capital goods. But Russia made or acquired in Europe nearly 150,000 new freight cars in the last five years, now has about 850,000. Many of Russia's passenger coaches and more than half its locomotives were built before World War I. Most of the rail networks are still single track. About half the rail mileage was destroyed or badly damaged in World War II. Since the war most of the damage has been repaired, but new construction has lagged.

Other standard forms of transport are little developed in Russia. Highways are poor, development of pipeline transport has only just got under way. With her present steel output, Russia cannot afford to stress both armament and transport. And transport is one item it cannot stockpile.

What Can the Satellites Contribute?

The satellites are a dubious asset to Russia. Their economies have long been tied in with Western Europe. In steel, for example, the satellites have a total capacity of 5,000,000 tons -- one-fourth of Russia's capacity. Yet this production has long been based on materials imported from the West, especially ores from Sweden. In oil -- mainly from Rumania's Ploesti, Hungary's Lispe and Austria's Zistersdorf fields -- the satellites can produce 6,000,000 tons, a sixth of Russia's own production. But most of this oil is needed to keep the satellites' own industry going.

The maintenance -- let alone the expansion -- of satellite industries might cost Russia more than it would be worth.

Militarily, the satellites might be of more use to Russia; they can provide about 100 divisions, whose worth would depend largely on the effectiveness of Communist propaganda and political control.

How Much Food Can They Grow?

Soviet agriculture, unlike Soviet industry, has not recovered to its prewar level, even though growing weather has been good since the 1946 drought. Soviet propaganda plugs the theme that Russia is a land of oceanic wheatfields and of modern collective farms. Actually, in relation to its population, Russia is a poor country agriculturally. With a third more people than the U.S., Russia has slightly less arable land than the U.S., produces only half as much grain. Since 1895, Russia has had a drought once every five years on the average, reducing crops as much as 25%.

Dr. Naum Jasny, author of last year's massive Socialized Agriculture of the U.S.S.R., has demonstrated how geography and climate greatly limit Russian agriculture. Corn is barred to all of north and central Russia by the cold, to most of the south by lack of rainfall. The Russian soil, starting at the city of Astrakhan at the mouth of the Volga and proceeding northwest, is at first semidesert, then improves to chestnut soil (dark brown soil), then to rich chernozem (fertile black soil), and finally declines to thin podsols (grey, leached, acid soil) -- see map. Russia's huge long swatch of chernozem is the biggest in the world, but most of it lies north of the latitude of Bangor, Me. (45th parallel) which means that its yield is much lower than the same type of land in the U.S.'s Midwestern wheat belt.

A comparison with the U.S. shows a basic weakness. Eastward from Salt Lake City (comparable to Astrakhan in temperature and moisture) the series of soil types is virtually the same as in Russia.

But there are two differences: 1) the temperature stays mild and steady (mean annual temperature 55DEG F.) along most of the U.S. soil range and 2) rainfall increases toward the seaboard where it is most needed. In Russia, the mean temperatures are much lower and rainfall is only moderately higher in the poor-soil areas of the north. In the U.S., climatic factors become more favorable as soil gets poorer; in the U.S.S.R. soil and climate become less favorable together. Agriculturally, Russia runs the wrong way.

Before World War I, Russia's farm output had to sustain a nation of 137 million people, 86% of them peasants. Now, with a food output only some 30% larger than that of 1913, it has to sustain a peasantry of about the same size as in 1913, plus a new proletariat of 60-odd million city workers -- half again more people, a third more food.

This does not mean that the Russians are likely to starve -- in peace or war. It does mean that the weak agricultural base will be a drag upon any very rapid expansion of Russian industry.

How Much Do Shortages Mean?

The Russian economy's shortages, especially in steel and transport, are not necessarily as serious as comparable shortages would be in the U.S. One factor beyond statistics -- and possibly more important -- is Russia's ability to turn all its resources relentlessly to war needs. An example of this ability is the Russian munitions output in 1944. At that time Russia's national income was only 20% of the U.S.'s. Nevertheless Russia's munitions output reached 35 to 40% of U.S. production and Russian production of some weapons was equal to the U.S. output. Despite the abuse inflicted on it, the Russian industrial machine does not seem to break down; in the words of one baffled U.S. economist it "somehow" goes on producing.

U.S. Intelligence analysts have boundless appreciation of the Russians' ability to suffer and carry on -- and of the Kremlin's ability to control the country despite shortages and hardships. "The Russian economy is not only flexible," says one Washington expert, "but it is Spartan.

They can make substitutions that we can not conceive of here. There is no one commodity that will cripple Russia by its absence -- unless maybe it is munitions, in the simple sense that the Russians have got to have something to throw at our heads. That means steel. Beyond that they can substitute and improvise -- and eat nothing but bread for years." The U.S.'s chance to exploit Russian shortages and cripple its war machine is to force Russia to fight the kind of war in which it will have to expend its resources faster than it can replace them. In the absence of such expenditure, strategic bombing of the U.S.S.R. is unlikely to have a decisive effect.

Will They Crack Up?

Can the U.S. reasonably hope that opposition to Russia's Red masters would, in case of war, grow to the point of widespread passive resistance, sabotage or even revolt?

There is no doubt that millions of Russians hate Stalin's regime, but it seems to be a weary, passive hate. Harvard's Dr. Merle Fainsod recently published a study of careful interviews with some 100 Soviet citizens who had deserted their country and fled into Western Germany. Besides the usual story of slowly mounting dislike for the party bullyboys who run the collective farms and the factories, Fainsod found signs of weakness in the Soviet Union's heralded nationality policy (which promises, on paper, complete equality for national minorities). He found that the younger intellectuals among the U.S.S.R.'s racial minorities are becoming increasingly restive under Russia's rigid control, also found that the Soviet hold on youth is less ironclad than generally supposed, because Communism has lost its aura of rebellion, its "ideological elan." But opposition is locked in the separate minds of millions of individuals, and unless it is organized it is valueless. There is no sign that it is becoming organized. The modern world has several impressive examples of the ability of dictatorships to control their people even under the most extreme rigors of war. One example is that of Russia itself, which fought on in World War II even after the most valuable portion of the country had been lost, after 5,000,000 army casualties had been suffered, and after the level of life had dropped to a point which the West would consider unbearable.

What Kind of War?

The most notable characteristic of the Russian war potential is unevenness. It is pre-eminently powerful in some fields, anomalously weak in others. This imbalance is not easy to correct. It does not result from errors of judgment on the part of Russia's ruler, but from the limitation of geography and of the Russian economy.

From the nature of Russian strength and weakness, observers can get a fairly clear idea of the kind of war Russia would like to fight. The greatest defect is lack of mobility, especially at sea; Russia is still militarily landlocked and will probably have to stay that way unless it can add the industrial resources of Western Europe to its own. To a lesser degree, its armies are also tethered by the limitations of Russian industry. The U.S.S.R. could not support vast masses of infantry operating thousands of miles from home.

Russia partially compensates for its lack of military mobility by control of the Communist Party throughout the world. The party carries the Red offensive into distant lands, dupes other peoples into fighting Russia's battles and ties up (as in Korea and Indo-China) the armed forces of the West. The Communist Party is the most effective substitute for sea power the world has ever seen.

Russia has three other main assets: 1) defensive strength based on self-sufficiency and tight political control of its own people; 2) a position within reach of the industrial centers of Western Europe, which are not beyond the logistical tether of the Red army; 3) possession of atomic bombs which might be able to reduce U.S. and other Western production to the level of the U.S.S.R.

If allowed full use of these assets, Russis could win world domination by two wars, or two phases of one war.

First Phase. Russia would hold together under U.S. atomic bombing while the Red army took over Western Europe and the Communist Parties consolidated Red power in Asia. Meanwhile, Russian atomic bombing of the U.S. would try to force an armistice or, at least, throw the U.S. off balance so that its offensive strength could not be brought to bear.

Second Phase. Russia, controlling Western Europe and with help from Asiatic satellites, would have a productive base far stronger than that of the U.S. today. Most of today's limitations on Russian mobility could be overcome in five or ten years.

The present Russian strength makes Red victory in the first phase a distinct possibility. Russian victory in the first phase would make victory in the second phase a heavy probability.

* Soviet planes are named after their designers. Thus YAK is for Colonel General A. S. Yakolev, MIG is for the designing team of Mikoyan & Gurevich, TU for Andrei Tupolev.

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