By Way of Moscow

On the political front the Western powers seemed to be doing just about what Communist China wanted. Last week British Delegate Sir Gladwyn Jebb proposed that the U.N. Security Council invite Mao Tse-tung's government to send representatives to the forthcoming U.N. discussion of General MacArthur's report on Chinese intervention in Korea (TIME, Nov. 13). U.S. Delegate Warren Austin argued that since Communist China was the aggressor the invitation should be called a "summons." Snapped Russia's Jacob Malik: "When a colonial power speaks to a colonial slave it may 'summon' . . . him, but in the present case the term should be 'to invite.' '

Despite their grumping, Austin and Malik found themselves in rare agreement when it came time for a vote on the British resolution. Both men raised their hands in favor of the proposal, which passed by a vote of 8 to 2.

Soothing Promises. Two days later, the U.S. and five other non-Communist members of the Security Council made an open effort to placate the Chinese Communist government. The six nations jointly proposed a resolution consisting chiefly of soothing promises: i) U.N. troops would leave Korea as soon as a stable, democratic government had been established there; 2) the Chinese-Korean frontier and Chinese interests in the "frontier zone" would be protected; 3) any frontier problems would be referred to the U.N. Commission on Korea for settlement.

Points 2 and 3 were concessions to the hopeful British view that the Chinese had invaded Korea primarily to safeguard the North Korean dams which generate hydroelectric power used by Manchurian industry and furnish light to the Manchurian industrial center of Mukden, the Russian naval base at Port Arthur and Dairen. The British view was strengthened by the fact that Chinese troops had struck hardest in the area south of the Yalu River's 480-ft. Suiho Dam, which has a capacity of 700,000 kw., two-thirds as much as massive Hoover Dam. But supporters of the British view did not explain how Communist China, whose armed forces consist almost entirely of ground troops, hoped to safeguard power plants which U.N. bombers could destroy from the air whenever they chose.

Signs of Weakness. The Security Council's invitation and its reassuring promises to the Chinese might conceivably make some sense, but they had also brought Communist China a long step closer to capturing the U.N. membership now held by Nationalist China. Even the U.S., which had long opposed Red China's claims, had been forced to admit by implication that the Communists were China's real rulers.

Mao Tse-tung's government reacted to the U.N. concessions as Communist governments usually react to any signs of weakness. From Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-lai came a stiff message refusing the U.N. invitation to send delegates to discuss Chinese intervention in Korea. But, in answer to a previous Security Council invitation, Chou agreed to send delegates to discuss what Chou called U.S. "aggression on Formosa." Besides discussing Formosa, Chou suggested, his delegates ought to be given a chance to accuse the U.S. of "armed intervention" in Korea.

China's delegation, added Chou, would be led by General Wu Hsieu-chuan, director of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern European Affairs Division of the Peking Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He and his eight assistants planned to come to Lake Success by way of Moscow.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.