Dubious Value

Last week Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson renewed Harry Truman's oft-made request for universal military training for all boys between 17 and 20 years old. Politically, U.M.T. had suddenly acquired a lot of congressional support as a fine-looking gesture of preparedness, which, incidentally, had long been demanded by veterans' outfits whose members will go to the polls in November. But militarily, events had taken from U.M.T. whatever value it might once have had. The Administration was asking for it without really wanting it.

On its face, U.M.T. was an appealing idea. At less cost and without the disruption caused by maintaining big standing armies, the nation would presumably get a militia, ready to spring to arms at a moment's notice. But the program as constituted would not have accomplished this, even in peacetime 1947, when it was first laid before Congress.

The six months' minimum training period (plus part-time service in reserve units) was too short to turn out a combat soldier; even the training given to regular Army soldiers had proved none too much on Korea's battlefields. And last week the U.S.'s urgent need was not for more half-trained reserves, but for combat soldiers.

To take veteran soldiers out of fighting units to train UMTers would also cut down the U.S.'s combat effectiveness just when it was most needed. Johnson himself asked only for a "standby" program, pointing out that "we cannot divert officers and men . . at this time."

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