Frightening Truth

All the shooting was in Asia, and Asia was a long way from Europe. But Western Europe still embodied a frightening truth: if the Russians choose to risk all-out war with the U.S., they can roll through Western Europe like a color guard crossing a parade ground. With Mao's Chinese armies to protect their rear, the Russians could throw the better part of their 175 divisions,* 25,000 tanks and 19,000 warplanes into a sweep to the Atlantic.

To oppose the Russians, the West has on hand a pathetic collection of 12 to 15 divisions--seven on occupation duty in Germany (two U.S., two British, three French), four in France, one in Belgium, and the equivalent of about three divisions in Italy. Some of these are next to worthless, almost all are underequipped. Some French units are armed with aged Hotchkiss machine guns saved from World War I. Italian soldiers have 1891 Mannlicher-Carcano rifles which as long ago as 1915 they called "humanitarian rifles" because they usually missed the enemy.

Last April the twelve North Atlantic Allies were congratulating themselves on plans to build up between 30 and 40 divisions by 1955. Actually, that blueprint was as inadequate as the Italians' humanitarian rifles. In the view of top military men in Washington, to contain a Russian offensive Western Europe needs an integrated army of 50 to 70 well-equipped, well-led divisions, backed up by a husky tactical air force--and it needs them a lot sooner than 1955. Two weeks ago the U.S. asked the countries of Western Europe what they proposed to do about it. By this week, some of the answers were in.

Great Britain announced that it would boost its defense budget by 45%, spending more than $9.5 billion in the next three years. At present, one of Britain's five divisions is tied down fighting Communists in Malaya, two are on garrison duty in Hong Kong and North Africa. Britain has a reserve of 4,000,000 trained or partially trained men, but they have virtually no equipment. The British army is underpaid, but so far the Labor government has not been able to bring itself to grant a pay raise which would spur enlistments--it might make trade unionists jealous.

Most of the expanded defense budget will go for more fighter aircraft, antiaircraft guns, antitank weapons and radar equipment. The decision to spend more on defense did not cheer Britons, who--after bitter years of austerity--have just begun to enjoy slightly better living. Yet even the proposed effort seemed to some far from adequate. The British memorandum stated carefully that the new program was designed not to upset economic recovery, or put Britain on a war footing. London's Economist found no assurance "that what is planned will be enough to do the job."

France, with most of the good fighters of its 695,000 men under arms occupied in Indo-China, undertook a three-year rearmament program which will cost $5.7 billion.* France estimated that it could provide 15 new, well-equipped French divisions. The program called for an immediate $228 million boost in the French defense budget. It was a step forward, but a tiny one compared to the $3 billion or more that some experts thought it would take to put real muscle on French defenses. The French army--too many of whose generals care more about politics than about their military tasks--suffers from bad morale. It has a large number of Communist Party members and Communist voters scattered through its ranks. While Western observers believe that many of these would remain loyal to France in case of war with Russia, no one can be sure just how many.

The Low Countries began stiffening their defense plans. The Dutch, in the midst of demobilizing their returning Indonesian expeditionary force when South Korea was invaded, announced last week that three divisions would be formed from veterans of Indonesia. Belgium, which at present has one division, was counted on to produce one, perhaps two more by 1951.

Italy's Defense Minister last week asked for another 50 billion lire ($80 million) to modernize the Italian army, restricted by the peace treaty to 250,000 men. U.S. officials planned to spend several million of this year's $5 billion MAP money in Italian industries.

Denmark decided to spend $57,100,000 on defense in 1950-52, concentrating on antiaircraft, radar and artillery equipment for its army of 100,000.

The U.S. has promised an additional $4 billion of MAP funds this year, is seeing to it that Marshall Plan money will be put more & more to military uses. With this additional U.S. aid, and if all pledges are kept, Western Europe should be able to raise between 25 and 30 well-equipped full combat divisions by the end of 1951.

Crucial problems remain unsettled. Among the most important:

1) Organization, which, as much as manpower, is Western Europe's great weakness. Despite elaborate plans for a joint Western European command and an integrated, balanced defense, Western European armies are still separate units. In the Pentagon last week, officers were predicting that soon there would be an American in the job of Supreme Allied Commander for the North Atlantic Alliance.

2) Rearming Western Germany, which is obviously indispensable to effective defense of Western Europe. It is believed that under the impact of the Korean war, the French, who for political reasons have held out longest against it, would now agree to a West German army.

3) Spain, which could provide vital bases in a combat to defend Western Europe. (But Washington is still trying to make up its mind about how to deal with Franco Spain (see NATIONAL AFFAIRS).

A Deed from Whom? No doubt Western Europeans will be ready to fight, if & when they see that they have a chance against Russia. But most Western European leaders still seem to feel that the defense of their countries is basically up to the U.S. Most want to see more U.S. troops on the Continent. West Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer told a TIME correspondent last week: "The most important single thing that needs to be done right now is for America to send more divisions to Europe . . . They would act as a mighty catalyst. Around them Europeans could organize their defense . . . They could become men again . . . The situation is still in the balance. A deed from America can tip the scales."

Has the U.S. a right to expect a deed from Europe? With its population of 275 million and its vast and versatile industrial plant, why can't Western Europe do more on its own?

It could. The reasons why Western Europe is not prepared to do more are political, not military. For five years Western Europeans have been compelled to concentrate on economic recovery and increased production for export. Western Europe's welfare-state politicians have worried more about social security than about military security. An all-out military effort would require drastic cuts in their countries' standards of living; this, the Western Europeans argue, would give Western Europe's Communist parties--contained in recent years--plenty of opportunity to make trouble.

No responsible American wants to undo the slow, difficult economic progress which Western Europe has made (with U.S. assistance) since war's end. But the Russians have forced the free world, in any choice between guns and butter, to choose guns. If Western Europe ignores that lesson, it will one day have neither guns, butter, nor the freedom to choose.

* Not quite so impressive as it sounds.The Russians organize their divisions into much smaller, more specialized units than do the West Europeans or the U.S. What the U.S., for instance, calls division artillery, i.e., artillery organic to the division, the Russians call a separate artillery division. But the Russians are much more frugal in the use of troops for rear echelon duty. Where the U.S. requires three men in the rear to support one at the front, the Russians require only three men to support two. This looks at first glance like much better organization by the Russians. Actually, the U.S. method, which means better food, medical care, supplies and communications for the men at the front, pays off in the long run.

* Under their new programs, both Britain and France will be spending 10% of their national income for defense. Proposed U.S. rearmament outlays, including MAP, EGA and other overseas aid, add up to 11 1/2% of the U.S national income.

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